The goal of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the conceptualization of international judicial independence. First, it will be argued that judicial independence is not to be conceived as an end in itself but rather as a condition for the legitimacy of international courts (ICs). Also, independence is not a monolithic concept, but one of degree and the optimal degree of independence might vary according to the function and type of ICs. Second, I will provide a taxonomy of judicial ...
The goal of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the conceptualization of international judicial independence. First, it will be argued that judicial independence is not to be conceived as an end in itself but rather as a condition for the legitimacy of international courts (ICs). Also, independence is not a monolithic concept, but one of degree and the optimal degree of independence might vary according to the function and type of ICs. Second, I will provide a taxonomy of judicial independence in the international sphere and identify and systematize the relevant actors and variables. While studies about international judicial independence tend to focus on the mechanisms available to state governments, this work will take into account a broader set of actors and variables. Finally, a notion of interdependence will be advanced as a framework for institutional design that combines the need to enable adjudication free from undue influence or pressure with mechanisms to counterbalance judicial power. Forms of interdependence on the grounds of the principles of accountability and checks and balances might contribute to the overall legitimacy of ICs.
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