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Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies

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dc.contributor.author Apaydin vom Hau, Fulya
dc.contributor.author Jordana, Jacint
dc.date.accessioned 2021-02-23T08:34:35Z
dc.date.available 2021-02-23T08:34:35Z
dc.date.issued 2020
dc.identifier.citation Apaydin F, Jordana J. Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. International Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):1-18. DOI: 10.4000/irpp.1458
dc.identifier.issn 2679-3873
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571
dc.description.abstract Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.
dc.description.sponsorship This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Competitiveness under the ACCOUNTREG Project (Grant CSO2012-396939).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher International Public Policy Association
dc.relation.ispartof International Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):1-18. DOI: 10.4000/irpp.1458
dc.rights International Review of Public Policy is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.title Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi http://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458
dc.subject.keyword Regulation
dc.subject.keyword Independence
dc.subject.keyword Voluntary accountability
dc.subject.keyword Regulatory governance
dc.subject.keyword Delegation
dc.subject.keyword Asymmetries of power
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2012-396939
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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