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dc.contributor.author Gomes, Armando
dc.contributor.author Hart, Sergiu
dc.contributor.author Mas-Colell, Andreu
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1997-04-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=241
dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 27, pp. 204-228, 1999
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/463
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 241
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2016-09-29T02:50:10Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword noncooperative bargaining games
dc.subject.keyword consistent value
dc.subject.keyword consistent
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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