Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Decarolis, Francesco
dc.contributor.author Goldmanis, Maris
dc.contributor.author Penta, Antonio
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
dc.date.issued 2019-04-12
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1657
dc.identifier.citation
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44763
dc.description.abstract The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1657
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
dc.title.alternative
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:25:59Z
dc.subject.keyword collusion
dc.subject.keyword digital marketing agencies
dc.subject.keyword facebook
dc.subject.keyword google
dc.subject.keyword gsp
dc.subject.keyword internet auctions
dc.subject.keyword online advertising
dc.subject.keyword vcg
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics

In collaboration with Compliant to Partaking