dc.contributor.author |
Ganuza, Juan-José |
dc.contributor.author |
Gómez, Fernando |
dc.contributor.other |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned |
2017-07-26T10:50:32Z |
dc.date.available |
2017-07-26T10:50:32Z |
dc.date.issued |
2002-12-01 |
dc.identifier |
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=666 |
dc.identifier.citation |
Review of Law & Economics, 1 (2006), 3, pp. 3 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/419 |
dc.description.abstract |
The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims have
heterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care by
the injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observe
at all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-best
cannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on the
first-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,
and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-best
solution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as due
care. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing the
optimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannot
verify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no
difference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and a
rule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate the
findings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Law
legal systems. |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 666 |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title |
Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified |
2017-07-23T02:07:29Z |
dc.subject.keyword |
imperfect information |
dc.subject.keyword |
negligence rule |
dc.subject.keyword |
accidents |
dc.subject.keyword |
heterogeneous victims |
dc.subject.keyword |
Business Economics and Industrial Organization |
dc.rights.accessRights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |