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dc.contributor.author Hinzen, Wolfram
dc.contributor.author Rosselló i Ximenes, Joana
dc.contributor.author McKenna, Peter J.
dc.date.accessioned 2017-08-25T16:53:02Z
dc.date.available 2017-08-25T16:53:02Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.citation Hinzen W, Rosselló J, McKenna P. Can delusions be understood linguistically?. Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 2016; 21(4):281-99. DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2016.1190703
dc.identifier.issn 1354-6805
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/32695
dc.description.abstract Delusions are widely believed to reflect disturbed cognitive function, but the nature of this remains elusive. The "un-Cartesian" cognitive-linguistic hypothesis maintains (a) that there is no thought separate from language, that is, there is no distinct mental space removed from language where "thinking" takes place; and (b) that a somewhat broadened concept of grammar is responsible for bestowing meaning on propositions, and this among other things gives them their quality of being true or false. It is argued that a loss of propositional meaning explains why delusions are false, impossible and sometimes fantastic. A closely related abnormality, failure of linguistic embedding, can additionally account for why delusions are held with fixed conviction and are not adequately justified by the patient. The un-Cartesian linguistic approach to delusions has points of contact with Frith's theory that inability to form meta-representations underlies a range of schizophrenic symptoms. It may also be relevant to the nature of the "second factor" in monothematic delusions in neurological disease. Finally, it can inform the current debate about whether or not delusions really are beliefs.
dc.description.sponsorship This research was enabled by the Arts and Humanities Research Council UK, [grantnr. AH/L004070/1] (‘Language and mental health’), and the Spanish ministry for Education, Culture, and Sport, [grantnr. FFI2013-40526-P].
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
dc.relation.ispartof Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 2016; 21(4):281-99. DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2016.1190703
dc.rights © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.title Can delusions be understood linguistically?
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi http://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2016.1190703
dc.subject.keyword Schizophrenia
dc.subject.keyword Cognition
dc.subject.keyword Delusions
dc.subject.keyword Language
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2013-405
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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