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dc.contributor.author Glaeser, Edward L.
dc.contributor.author Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
dc.contributor.author Shleifer, Andrei
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
dc.date.issued 2016-09-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1538
dc.identifier.citation
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27327
dc.description.abstract A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong the state or its powerful citizens against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1538
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Securing property rights
dc.title.alternative
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:17:47Z
dc.subject.keyword property rights
dc.subject.keyword subversion
dc.subject.keyword liability
dc.subject.keyword injunction
dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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