We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of
cooperation: (i) framing, (ii) the number of players and (iii) the perceived risk of cooperating. We
work with a (two-player) Prisoner s Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good
Game.
These themes have been separately studied by a large number of experimental papers,
using diverse methodologies. Our experiment targets them in a common, clear-cut framework. We
find three strong effects (a) Framing; (b) ...
We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of
cooperation: (i) framing, (ii) the number of players and (iii) the perceived risk of cooperating. We
work with a (two-player) Prisoner s Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good
Game.
These themes have been separately studied by a large number of experimental papers,
using diverse methodologies. Our experiment targets them in a common, clear-cut framework. We
find three strong effects (a) Framing; (b) The number of players (there is less cooperation in the
three-person games that in the two-person ones); (c) The neutralization of risk (about 50% of
participants cooperate when risk is neutralized). Both (a) and (c) go in the expected direction but,
in all three cases, the strength of the effect is surprising.
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