Despite the fact of dealing with the same object (the state, and specially the democratic state) from two different focus of interest, little effort has been devoted to analyze the normative relationship between democratic republicanism and current theories of right of secession (TRS): whether (and where) they are mutually reinforcing, contradictory, independent or in tension. This gap is part of another major gap: the lack of a democratic republican theory of secession. This article tries to fill ...
Despite the fact of dealing with the same object (the state, and specially the democratic state) from two different focus of interest, little effort has been devoted to analyze the normative relationship between democratic republicanism and current theories of right of secession (TRS): whether (and where) they are mutually reinforcing, contradictory, independent or in tension. This gap is part of another major gap: the lack of a democratic republican theory of secession. This article tries to fill the first gap as a first step to further fill the second one. In doing this, it shows (1) how current TRS can point out democratic republicanism as having missed to handle the dangers that secession conflicts imply in terms of exclusion, domination (either by blackmailing minorities or permanent majorities), and instability; and (2) how democratic republicanism can point out all current TRS as falling in some of these dangers. Hence, to explore how to reconcile democratic republicanism with the field of TRS appears as a relevant task to be developed; in this sense, the article also shows that we have reasons to think that we can work on an alternative democratic republican TRS as a feasible way to reach such reconciliation.
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