Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature:
Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare
implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic
sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of
naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than
under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this ...
Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature:
Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare
implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic
sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of
naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than
under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show that
these results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yet
knowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.
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