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Browsing Articles (Departament d'Humanitats) by Author "Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín"

Browsing Articles (Departament d'Humanitats) by Author "Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín"

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  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Taylor & Francis, 2017)
    Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Springer, 2018)
    Recent philosophical and empirical contributions strongly suggest that perception attributes determinable properties to its objects. But a characterisation of determinability via attributed properties is restricted to the ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Springer, 2014)
    Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Taylor & Francis, 2022)
    Ordinary thinkers are not only capable of keeping hold of the same thought across contexts via shifts in the way of thinking. They also possess the ability to do so in a manner that grounds disagreement with respect to ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Springer, 2020)
    Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín; González de Prado, Javier (Taylor & Francis, 2021)
    Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín; Quesada, Daniel (Springer, 2011)
    Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2012)
    From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought (LOT ), a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Brill Academic Publishers, 2018)
    Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Wiley, 2015)
    In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Wiley, 2017)
    There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2020)
    Can a subject who expresses a belief with ‘today’ on a given day, and subsequently loses track of time, retain and re-express that belief on a future, potentially distant day? Since Kaplan’s tentative remarks on Rip Van ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Cambridge University Press, 2016)
    I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Springer, 2021)
    Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this ...
  • Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín (Taylor & Francis, 2016)
    It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far ...

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