Mostra el registre parcial de l'element
dc.contributor.author | Germano, Fabrizio |
dc.contributor.author | Meier, Martin |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-05-25T09:26:44Z |
dc.date.available | 2020-05-25T09:26:44Z |
dc.date.issued | 2010-12-01 |
dc.identifier | https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1256 |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 97, pp. 117-130, 2013 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/11728 |
dc.description.abstract | Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large. |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1256 |
dc.rights | L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title | Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified | 2020-05-25T09:23:09Z |
dc.subject.keyword | media economics; media consolidation; media markets; advertising and commercial media bias. |
dc.subject.keyword | Microeconomics |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |