We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls
a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate
riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is
more likely to win the election when there is less information
about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the
weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent
political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When
there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat,
``posturing'' ...
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls
a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate
riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is
more likely to win the election when there is less information
about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the
weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent
political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When
there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat,
``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.
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