

Online Appendix

*Deciding about the unknown: The effect of party and ideological cues on forming opinions
about the European Union*

Mariano Torcal

*Universitat Pompeu Fabra
ICREA-Academia Scholar
mariano.torcal@upf.edu*

Sergio Martini

*Universitat Pompeu Fabra
sergio.martini@upf.edu*

Lluis Orriols

*Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
lluis.orriols@uc3m.es*

Figure A1: Original vignette – (pre-) 2015 general election.

No cue	Party cue
State of Autonomies	
Let's talk about some important issues on which the recent political debate has focused. One important issue is related to the State of Autonomous Communities and the Basque and Catalan situation. Which one of the following proposals is closer to your own position?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with defending the current State of Autonomous Communities and even reducing it a little • I agree with the proposal of a Federalist Reform of the State. • I agree with securing the right of the Regional governments to celebrate public consultations over the territorial organization of the State • I agree with the independence of certain territory of the State • I agree with favouring the reform of the State of Autonomous Community, clarifying the competencies between the central administration and the Autonomous Communities • Don't know 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with defending the current State of Autonomous Communities and even reducing it a little <i>as proposed by the PP</i> • I agree with the proposal of a Federalist Reform of the State <i>as proposed by the PSOE</i> • I agree with securing the right of the Regional governments to celebrate public consultations over the territorial organization of the State <i>as proposed by Podemos</i> • I agree with the independence of certain territory of the State <i>as proposed by the CDC and ERC</i> • I agree with favouring the reform of the State of Autonomous Community, clarifying the competencies between the central administration and the Autonomous Communities <i>as proposed by Ciudadanos</i> • Don't know
Senate	
Another important issue is related to the Reform of the Senate. Which one of the following proposals is closer to your own position?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with maintaining the Senate as it is • I agree with abolishing the Senate • I agree with a Senate of territories • I agree with a Senate that represents the Autonomous Communities • I agree with a Senate that represents the national diversities of the State • Don't know 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with maintaining the Senate as it is <i>as proposed by the PP</i> • I agree with abolishing the Senate <i>as proposed by Ciudadanos</i> • I agree with a Senate of territories <i>as proposed by the PSOE</i> • I agree with a Senate that represents the Autonomous Communities <i>as proposed by Podemos</i> • I agree with a Senate that represents the national diversities of the State <i>as proposed by the PNV and CDC</i> • Don't know
European Central Bank	
Another important issue is related to the European Union and the European Central Bank. Which one of the following proposals is closer to your own position?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with keeping the European Central Bank as it is • I agree with abolishing the European Central Bank • I agree with a European Central Bank that absorbs the national debts of the Member States by means of Eurobonds • I agree with a European Central Bank that promotes growth policies • Don't know 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I agree with keeping the European Central Bank as it is <i>as proposed by the PP</i> • I agree with abolishing the European Central Bank <i>as proposed by Podemos</i> • I agree with a European Central Bank that absorbs the national debts of the Member States by means of Eurobonds <i>as proposed by Ciudadanos</i> • I agree with a European Central Bank that promotes growth policies <i>as proposed by the PSOE</i> • Don't know

!

Distribution of treatments and randomization

To check for the robustness of our random assignment, we perform balance tests by means of multivariate (multinomial and logistic) regressions (tables A5-A6), conditioning assignment to each experimental group on a set of predictors ranging from socio-demographic characteristics to ideology and voting preferences. The results confirm that the randomization procedure was implemented correctly, ensuring the reliability of the randomization of our treatments (the pseudo R-squared terms are always very small and the likelihood ratio chi-squared tests are non-significant).

Table A1: Distribution of treatments: (post) European elections (May 2014).

	Control		Party treatment		Ideology treatment		Total	
	N	% row	N	% row	N	% row	N	% row
PP	71	32.0	77	34.7	74	33.3	222	100.0
PSOE	69	35.6	63	32.4	62	32.0	194	100.0
IU	65	34.0	53	27.8	73	38.2	191	100.0
UPyD	55	33.5	61	37.2	48	29.3	164	100.0
CiU	12	28.5	18	42.9	12	28.6	42	100.0
ERC	36	30.2	47	39.5	36	20.3	119	100.0
PNV	2	25.0	2	25.0	4	50.0	8	100.0
Total	882	33.4	888	33.7	869	32.9	2639	100.0

Table A2: Distribution of treatments: (post) general elections (December 2015).

	Control		Party treatment		Total	
	N	% row	N	% row	N	% row
PP	94	52.8	84	47.2	178	100.0
PSOE	75	48.4	80	51.6	155	100.0
Ps	134	46.9	152	53.2	286	100.0
Cs	101	50.3	100	49.8	201	100.0
CDC	8	42.1	11	57.9	19	100.0
ERC	35	58.3	25	41.7	60	100.0
PNV	3	42.9	4	57.1	7	100.0
Total	796	50.4	784	49.6	1580	100.0

Table A3: Randomization test, multinomial logistic regression. Baseline: control – (post) European elections (May 2014).

	Party treatment	Ideology treatment
Female	0.008 (0.097)	0.002 (0.098)
Age (ref: 18-24)		
25-34	-0.321 (0.198)	-0.290 (0.204)
35-44	-0.323 (0.195)	-0.066 (0.198)
45-54	-0.349 (0.195)	-0.155 (0.199)
55-64	-0.331 (0.191)	-0.150 (0.195)
>=65	-0.302 (0.216)	-0.432 (0.226)
Education (ref: primary or less)		
Secondary	-0.181 (0.215)	-0.349 (0.212)
Tertiary	-0.181 (0.221)	-0.314 (0.218)
Live in a city (>200000)	-0.087 (0.106)	-0.014 (0.106)
Close to a political party	0.064 (0.107)	0.046 (0.107)
Ideology (ref: Centre)		
Left	0.174 (0.164)	0.098 (0.167)
Centre-left	0.027 (0.126)	0.125 (0.126)
Right	0.234 (0.162)	0.290 (0.164)
Vote recall (ref: Other + DK + NA)		
PP	-0.028 (0.204)	-0.015 (0.206)
PSOE	-0.083 (0.197)	-0.080 (0.198)
IU	-0.241 (0.206)	0.125 (0.193)
UPyD	0.118 (0.200)	-0.098 (0.211)
Ps	-0.098 (0.159)	-0.023 (0.158)
Cs	-0.091 (0.284)	0.097 (0.273)
CiU	0.389 (0.387)	0.055 (0.422)
ERC	0.221 (0.243)	0.033 (0.256)
PNV	-0.086 (1.006)	0.667 (0.873)
Constant	0.402 (0.282)	0.345 (0.283)
N		2639
Pseudo R-squared		0.005
Log-likelihood		-2883.492
Log-likelihood empty model		-2899.131
Log-likelihood ratio (χ^2)		31.280
P-value (χ^2)		0.925

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Results confirm that the random procedure was correct: non of the variable are significant, pseudo-R squared terms are always very small as well as the likelihood ratio chi-squared tests is not significant.

Table A4: Randomization test, logistic regression. Baseline: control (post-) general election (December 2015).

	Party treatment
Female	0.191 (0.107)
Age (ref: 18-24)	
25-34	-0.042 (0.224)
35-44	-0.037 (0.221)
45-54	0.096 (0.223)
55-64	0.010 (0.221)
>=65	0.020 (0.241)
Education (primary or less)	
Secondary	0.023 (0.221)
Tertiary	0.049 (0.228)
Live in a city (>200000)	0.125 (0.114)
Close to a political party	0.083 (0.121)
Ideology (ref: DK + not applicable)	
Left	0.201 (0.231)
Centre-left	0.107 (0.200)
Centre	0.210 (0.202)
Right	-0.362 (0.220)
Vote most probable party (ref: DK+NA)	
PP	0.230 (0.209)
PSOE	0.009 (0.195)
IU	-0.107 (0.243)
UPyD	0.060 (0.456)
Ps	0.123 (0.159)
Cs	0.135 (0.176)
CiU	0.447 (0.486)
ERC	-0.397 (0.285)
PNV	0.219 (0.775)
Constant	-0.324 (0.332)
N	1580
Pseudo R-squared	0.011
Log-likelihood	-1083.553
Log-likelihood empty model	-1095.127
Log-likelihood ratio (χ^2)	23.150
P-value (χ^2)	0.452

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Results confirm that the random procedure was correct: non of the variable are significant, pseudo-R squared terms are always very small as well as the likelihood ratio chi-squared tests is not significant.

Descriptive statistics

Table A5: Distribution of responses to the experimental questions (%; post-European election May 2014).

	Control	Party treatment	Ideology treatment
<i>Statute of Autonomy</i>			
I agree with defending the current State of Autonomous Communities and even reducing it a little.	38.1	32.4	30.8
I agree with the proposal of a Federalist Reform of the State.	13.6	13.1	15.7
I agree with a Confederation	11.8	14.5	15.3
I agree with the independence of certain territory of the State	13.5	14.3	14.1
DK	23.0	25.7	24.1
<i>Reform of the Senate</i>			
I agree in leaving the Senate as it is.	2.9	5.1	3.7
I agree with abolishing the Senate.	60.7	43.4	49.2
I agree with a Senate of territories.	2.3	4.9	7.0
I agree with a Senate that represents the Autonomous Communities.	8.3	12.0	12.1
I agree with a Senate that represents the national diversities of the State.	9.2	9.3	8.2
DK	16.6	25.3	19.8
<i>The role of the ECB</i>			
I agree with keeping the European Central Bank as it is.	7.3	8.1	8.0
I agree with abolishing the European Central Bank.	10.9	14.9	14.9
I agree with a European Central Bank that absorb the national debts of the Member States	22.1	21.4	20.6
I agree with a European Central Bank that promote growth policies	24.7	18.2	24.5
DK	35.0	37.4	32.0

Table A6: Distribution of responses to the experimental questions (%; pre-general election December 2015).

	Control	Party treatment
<i>State of Autonomy</i>		
I agree with defending the current State of Autonomous Communities and even reducing it a little.	23.0	15.9
I agree with the proposal of a Federalist Reform of the State.	11.7	12.1
I agree with securing the right of the Regional government to celebrate public consultations over the territorial organization of the State	11.7	21.7
I agree with the independence of certain territory of the State	9.8	9.2
I agree with favoring the reform of the State of Autonomous Community, clarifying the competencies between the central administration and the Autonomous Communities	28.14	22.8
DK	15.70	18.2
<i>Reform of the Senate</i>		
I agree in leaving the Senate as it is.	2.4	5.0
I agree with abolishing the Senate.	62.8	50.6
I agree with a Senate of territories.	3.5	7.1
I agree with a Senate that represents the Autonomous Communities.	9.4	16.2
I agree with a Senate that represents the national diversities of the State.	6.4	4.2
DK	15.5	16.8
<i>The role of the ECB</i>		
I agree with keeping the European Central Bank as it is.	9.7	10.7
I agree with abolishing the European Central Bank.	11.7	22.7
I agree with a European Central Bank that absorb the national debts of the Member States	22.4	19.5
I agree with a European Central Bank that promote growth policies	21.0	18.2
DK	35.3	28.8

Features of the Spanish party system

Table A7: Spanish party positions in the 2014 European election and the 2015 general election

Party	Chapel Hill		ParlGov	CIUPANEL			
	2014 European election		2015 general election	2014 European election (II)	2015 regional election (IV)	2015 general election (V)	
	EU integration	Left-Right	Left-Right	Left-Right	Centre-periphery	Left-Right	Left-Right
PP	6.80	7.30	7.60	8.52	3.05	8.80	8.63
PSOE	6.70	3.80	3.70	3.83	5.17	3.86	3.89
IU	4.60	2.00	2.0	2.00	6.37	1.48	1.61
UPyD	6.30	5.67	-	-	3.72	5.70	5.79
<i>Ciudadanos</i>	6.67	5.56	6.00	6.91	3.87	7.67	7.12
<i>Podemos</i>	4.44	1.67	1.20	3.79	6.16	1.60	1.94
CiU/CDC	6.30	6.20	7.40	5.70	8.43	6.25	6.11
ERC	5.56	3.67	3.10	2.68	8.94	1.96	2.25
PNV	6.44	6.30	6.20	5.06	8.17	5.14	5.22

Note: EU integration Chapel Hill Expert Survey: 1-7 scale with 1 'Strongly opposed', 2 'Opposed', 3 'Somewhat opposed', 4 'Neutral', 5 'Somewhat in favor', 6 'In favor', 7 'Strongly in favor'; Left-Right position Chapel Hill Expert Survey: 0-10 scale with 0 'Extreme Left' and 10 'Extreme Right'; Left-Right position ParlGov Expert Survey: 0-10 scale with 0 'Left' and 10 'Right'; Left-Right position CIUPANEL self-reported: 0-10 scale with 0 'Left' and 10 'Right' - for CIUPANEL II question is from pre-electoral survey CIUPANEL I; Centre-Periphery position CIUPANEL: 0-10 scale with 0 'Spanish government should strengthen its power' and 10 'Autonomous communities should increase their power over different domains'. Info from CIUPANEL IV is derived from the full sample of round four, so values for center-periphery slightly deviate from those reported by Figure 2 (which is instead based on the full sample for CIUPANEL V).

Characteristics of the samples

The following table shows a comparison of the distribution of some basic socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. sex, age, CCAA and education) and the basic groups considered in the experiment in waves 2, 4 and 5 of the CIUPANEL project and two National Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) studies with the same variables in a national post-European election study carried out by the CIS (post-EU election – study 3028 May-June 2014 and pre-General Election – study 3117 October-November 2015). To increase comparability, for the CIS studies we only report figures for internet users. As it can be seen, the distribution of the variables considered in our samples approximates quite well that obtained by the CIS studies, in particular with the exception of education as our samples over-represent more educated people and respondents who feel close to a party. We therefore use census data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) on education to re-run the main models on treatment effects after weighting our sample (see Tables A11 and A21).

Table A8: Characteristics of the sample.

	CIUPANEL II (May 2014)	CIUPANEL V (December 2015)	CIS MD3028 (May-June 2014)	CIS MD3117 (October-November 2015)	INE 3rd quarter	INE 4th quarter
Female (%)	48.8	49.0	48.8	49.1	50.8	50.8
Age (mean)	46.1	47.2	40.2	42.5	42.2	42.5
<i>Education (%)</i>						
Primary or lower	5.9	6.3	5.0	8.1	24.1	22.9
Secondary	54.4	50.0	65.3	64.4	48.5	49.3
Tertiary	38.9	42.5	29.6	27.2	27.4	27.8
Close to a party (%)	51.9	63.3	38.8	-	-	-
Left-Right scale (mean)	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	-	-
<i>Vote (%)</i>						
PP	8.4	11.3	8.8	21.4	-	-
PSOE	7.4	9.8	8.5	20.5	-	-
IU	7.2	5.5	6.3	6.9	-	-
UPyD	6.2	1.3	3.6	0.9	-	-
Ps	11.9	18.1	10.3	17.5	-	-
Cs	3.2	12.7	1.8	21.3	-	-
CiU/CDC	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.4	-	-
ERC	4.5	3.8	3.1	3.5	-	-
PNV	0.3	0.4	0.8	1.7	-	-
N	2639	1580	1599	12090	-	-

Note: In the CIS studies the left-right scale ranges from 1 to 10 while in the CIUPANEL it is from 0 to 10, so we compare means from normalized values of each scale (re-scaled from 0 to 1). Information about voting is based on vote recall for CIUPANEL II and CIS MD3028 and on vote probability (party with highest probability) for CIUPANEL V and CIS MD3117. The experiment on party cues in CIUPANEL V was carried out on a subset of respondents (characteristics are very much similar to those of the whole sample).

Models

Table A9: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the effects of the experimental treatments - (post-) European election (May 2014).

	ECB		Autonomies		Senate	
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>						
Party cues	1.365*** (0.196)	0.304*** (0.041)	1.023*** (0.196)	0.222*** (0.041)	1.358*** (0.197)	0.285*** (0.038)
Ideological cues	0.600** (0.200)	0.119** (0.039)	0.370** (0.181)	0.089** (0.043)	0.880*** (0.200)	0.169*** (0.037)
Constant	-1.270*** (0.150)	- -	0.214 (0.126)	- -	-1.475*** (0.155)	- -
Pseudo R-squared	0.052	-	0.029		0.050	-
N	771	771	768	768	821	821

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; AMEs: Average Marginal Effects.

Table A10: Wald tests of significant differences between treatment effects from binary logistic models – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	Effect (x)	Effect (y)	(x)-(y)	(χ^2)	p-value
Party cues-Ideological cues (ECB)	1.365	0.600	0.765	17.62	0.001
Party cues-Ideological cues (Autonomies)	1.023	0.370	0.653	10.91	0.001
Party cues-Ideological cues (Senate)	1.358	0.880	0.478	7.48	0.006

Table A11: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (post) European election (May 2014) (weighted sample).

	ECB		Autonomies		Senate	
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>						
Party cues	1.311*** (0.200)	0.293*** (0.042)	0.999*** (0.202)	0.217*** (0.042)	1.328*** (0.202)	0.280*** (0.040)
Ideological cues	0.538** (0.205)	0.107** (0.040)	0.388* (0.187)	0.092** (0.044)	0.788*** (0.205)	0.151*** (0.038)
Constant	-1.241*** (0.153)	- -	0.223 (0.130)	- -	-1.441*** (0.158)	- -
N	766	766	763	763	815	815

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; AMEs: Average Marginal Effects.

Table A12: Wald tests of significant differences between treatment effects across issues from Binary logistic models – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	Effect (x)	Effect (y)	(x)-(y)	(χ^2)	p-value
<i>Party cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB-Autonomies	1.365	1.023	0.342	1.66	0.198
ECB-Senate	1.365	1.358	0.007	0.00	0.980
<i>Ideology cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB-Autonomies	0.600	0.370	0.230	0.79	0.376
ECB-Senate	0.600	0.880	-0.280	1.12	0.290

Table A13: OLS models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (post-) European election (May 2014).


	ECB	Other 2 domestic policies
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>		
Party cues	0.304*** (0.041)	0.246*** (0.032)
Ideological cues	0.119** (0.041)	0.118*** (0.032)
Constant	0.219*** (0.029)	0.419*** (0.023)
R-squared	0.068	0.061
N	771	940

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A14: Wald tests of significant differences between treatment effects across issues from OLS models – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	Effect (x)	Effect (y)	(x)-(y)	(χ^2)	p-value
<i>Party cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB–Other 2 domestic issues	0.30	0.25	0.08	1.56	0.211
<i>Ideology cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB–Other 2 domestic issues	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.976

Figure A2: Marginal effects of party and ideology cue treatments by type of issue – (post-) regional election (May-June 2015).




Note: The x-axis reports the marginal effects of the experimental treatments (party and ideological cues) on voter competence by type of issue (logistic regression). The lines on both sides of the points represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.

Table A15: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (post-) regional elections (May-June 2015).

	ECB		Autonomies		Senate	
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log-odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log-odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>						
Party cues	1.104*** (0.200)	0.259*** (0.045)	0.974*** (0.183)	0.234*** (0.042)	1.551*** (0.242)	0.250*** (0.036)
Ideological cues	0.503* (0.205)	0.110* (0.045)	0.453* (0.180)	0.113* (0.045)	0.686** (0.265)	0.084** (0.032)
Constant	-0.969*** (0.148)	-	-0.192 (0.124)	-	-2.151*** (0.203)	-
N	662	662	758	758	742	742

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; AMEs: Average Marginal Effects.

Figure A3: Marginal effects of party and ideology cue treatments on competence in the ECB policy position by levels of political knowledge on the EU – (post-) European election (May 2014).



Note: The x-axis reports the marginal effects of the experimental treatments (party and ideological cues) on voter competence by type of issue (logistic regression). The lines on both sides of the points represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Political knowledge scale is an additive index built on three factual questions (the indicators come from the pre- European election wave one).

Table A16: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the contingent effect of experimental treatments by political knowledge – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	ECB
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>	
Party cues	1.580*** (0.327)
Ideological cues	0.884** (0.334)
Political knowledge on EU scale (0-3)	0.162 (0.219)
<i>Interaction</i>	
Party cues*Political knowledge on EU	-0.241 (0.291)
Ideological cues*Political knowledge on EU	-0.322 (0.301)
Constant	-1.418*** (0.253)
N	771

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A17: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (pre-) general election (May 2015).

	ECB		Autonomies		Senate	
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>						
Party cues	1.542*** (0.153)	0.356*** (0.032)	1.123*** (0.139)	0.272*** (0.032)	1.525*** (0.156)	0.336*** (0.031)
Constant	-1.152*** (0.116)	- -	-0.413*** (0.097)	- -	-1.371*** (0.122)	- -
Pseudo R-squared	0.098	-	0.055	-	0.094	-
N	820	820	899	899	846	846

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; AMEs: Average Marginal Effects.

Table A18: Wald tests of significant differences between treatment effects across issues from logistic models – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	Effect (x)	Effect (y)	(x)-(y)	(χ^2)	p-value
<i>Party cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB-Autonomies	1.542	1.123	0.419	4.52	0.033
ECB-Senate	1.542	1.525	0.017	0.01	0.935

Table A19: OLS models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	ECB	Other 2 domestic policies
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>		
Party cues	0.356*** (0.032)	0.291*** (0.025)
Constant	0.240*** (0.023)	0.321*** (0.017)
R-squared	0.130	0.134
N	820	906

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A20: Wald tests of significant differences between treatment effects across issues from OLS models – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	Effect (x)	Effect (y)	(x)-(y)	(χ^2)	p-value
<i>Party cue treatment effect</i>					
ECB–Other 2 domestic policies	0.36	0.29	0.07	3.07	0.079

Table A21: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments – (pre-) general election (May 2015) (weighted sample).

	ECB		Autonomies		Senate	
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>	<i>log odds</i>	<i>AMEs</i>
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>						
Party cues	1.657*** (0.162)	0.380*** (0.033)	1.133*** (0.145)	0.274*** (0.033)	1.621*** (0.164)	0.359*** (0.032)
Constant	-1.211*** (0.123)	- -	-0.389*** (0.101)	- -	-1.380*** (0.128)	- -
N	810	810	888	888	835	835

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; AMEs: Average Marginal Effects.

Table A22: Binary penalized logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments by party – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	ECB	Autonomies	Senate
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>			
Party cues	1.637*** (0.385)	1.028* (0.476)	1.186** (0.462)
Ideological cues	1.071** (0.392)	0.132 (0.400)	0.962* (0.473)
<i>Vote choice (ref: PP)</i>			
PSOE	1.003* (0.398)	-1.960*** (0.380)	-1.144 (0.751)
IU	-1.055 (0.579)	-2.010*** (0.387)	-0.062 (0.565)
UPyD	0.687 (0.427)	-	2.476*** (0.471)
CiU/ERC	-	0.855 (0.532)	-
PNV/CiU	-	-	1.304 (0.683)
<i>Interaction</i>			
Party cues*PSOE	-0.924 (0.522)	-0.249 (0.595)	1.210 (0.839)
Party cues*IU	0.641 (0.680)	0.261 (0.613)	0.843 (0.677)
Party cues*UPyD	-0.339 (0.549)	-	-0.134 (0.622)
Party cues*CiU/ERC	-	1.780 (1.564)	-
Party cues*PNV/CiU	-	-	1.271 (0.935)
Ideological cues*PSOE	-0.966 (0.531)	0.679 (0.538)	1.378 (0.847)
Ideological cues*IU	0.779 (0.674)	0.197 (0.536)	0.668 (0.673)
Ideological cues*UPyD	-1.269* (0.589)	-	-0.699 (0.621)
Ideological cues*CiU/ERC	-	0.723 (0.887)	-
Ideological cues*PNV/CiU	-	-	-0.594 (0.889)
Constant	-1.560*** (0.311)	1.213*** (0.280)	-2.152*** (0.386)
N	771	768	821

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A23: Binary penalized logistic models explaining competence and the effect of experimental treatments by party – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	ECB	Autonomies	Senate
<i>Treatment (ref: control)</i>			
Party cues	2.211*** (0.349)	1.296*** (0.330)	1.890*** (0.422)
<i>Vote choice (ref: PP)</i>			
PSOE	0.677 (0.357)	-0.980** (0.333)	-0.231 (0.570)
Ps	0.101 (0.334)	-0.799** (0.279)	-0.513 (0.520)
Cs	0.423 (0.342)	-0.252 (0.287)	2.820*** (0.413)
CDC/ERC	-	1.244** (0.409)	-
PNV/CDC	-	-	0.374 (0.944)
<i>Interaction</i>			
Party cues*PSOE	-0.911 (0.485)	-0.232 (0.477)	0.413 (0.652)
Party cues*Ps	-0.710 (0.439)	0.150 (0.416)	0.680 (0.588)
Party cues*Cs	-0.976* (0.460)	-0.026 (0.445)	-0.003 (0.590)
Party cues*CDC/ERC	-	-1.087 (0.633)	-
Party cues*PNV/CDC	-	-	-0.324 (1.095)
Constant	-1.420*** (0.259)	-0.084 (0.205)	-2.320*** (0.359)
N	820	899	846

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A24: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the contingent effect of experimental treatments by party age – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	ECB	Senate
	<i>log odds</i>	<i>log odds</i>
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>		
Party cues	1.376** (0.226)	1.856*** (0.279)
Ideological cues	0.806** (0.226)	1.475*** (0.282)
<i>Type of party (ref.: Traditional)</i>		
New party	0.495 (0.344)	2.684*** (0.363)
<i>Interaction</i>		
Party cues*New party	-0.052 (0.456)	-0.769 (0.506)
Ideological cues*New party	-1.014* (0.501)	-1.204* (0.495)
Constant	-1.386** (0.175)	-2.354*** (0.240)
Pseudo R-squared	0.059	0.161
N	771	821

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A25: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the contingent effect of experimental treatments by party age – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	ECB	Autonomies	Senate
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>			
Party cues	1.791*** (0.243)	0.878*** (0.204)	2.123*** (0.329)
<i>Type of party (ref.: Traditional)</i>			
New party	-0.079 (0.235)	-0.472* (0.194)	1.615*** (0.313)
<i>Interaction</i>			
Party cues*New party	-0.398 (0.314)	0.475 (0.280)	-0.746** (0.371)
Constant	-1.107*** (0.178)	-0.170 (0.137)	-2.472*** (0.278)
Pseudo R-squared	0.103	0.059	0.14
N	820	899	846

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A26: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the contingent effects of experimental treatments by party EU position – (post-) European election (May 2014).

	ECB
	<i>log odds</i>
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>	
Party cues	1.195*** (0.215)
Ideological cues	0.357 (0.223)
<i>Type of party (ref.: Pro European)</i>	
Soft-Eurosceptic party	-1.739** (0.541)
<i>Interaction</i>	
Party cues*Soft-Eurosceptic party	1.186 (0.625)
Ideological cues*Soft-Eurosceptic party	1.591* (0.616)
Constant	-0.986*** (0.161)
Pseudo R-squared	0.071
N	771

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table A27: Binary logistic models explaining competence and the contingent effect of experimental treatments by party EU position – (pre-) general election (December 2015).

	ECB
	<i>log odds</i>
<i>Treatment (ref.: control)</i>	
Party cues	1.580*** (0.189)
<i>Type of party (ref.: Pro-European)</i>	
Soft-Eurosceptic party	-0.262 (0.254)
<i>Interaction</i>	
Party cues*Soft-Eurosceptic party	-0.064 (0.328)
Constant	-1.069*** (0.140)
Pseudo R-squared	0.101
N	820

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Variable description

Gender: dichotomous question recoded into a dummy: (1) Female, (0) Male.

Age: age in years (>18);

Education: What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? (01) *No sé leer ni escribir*; (02) *Estudios primarios incompletos (hasta 5º EGB/5º primaria)*; (03) *Estudios primarios completos, EGB, hasta 6º o 7º (inclusive) 6º primaria o 1º ESO (inclusive)*; (04) *Estudios secundarios, primer ciclo, EGB hasta 8º o 1º BUP (inclusive), 2º ESO o 3º ESO (inclusive)*; (05) *Estudios secundarios, segundo ciclo: Bachillerato*; (06) *Estudios secundarios, segundo ciclo: Hasta 2º BUP o 3º BUP (inclusive)*; (07) *Estudios secundarios, segundo ciclo: FP, 4º ESO o 1º Bachillerato LOGSE (inclusive)*; (08) *Bachillerato y FP: Hasta COU (inclusive)*; (09) *2º FP LOGSE, 2º Bachillerato (inclusive)*; (10) *Estudios tercer grado, primer ciclo: Facultades universitarias, diplomaturas*; (11) *Estudios tercer grado, primer ciclo: Escuelas universitarias no técnicas*; (12) *Estudios tercer grado, primer ciclo: Ingenierías técnicas*; (13) *Estudios tercer grado, primer ciclo: Otras enseñanzas que exigen el Bachillerato Superior o Titulación equivalente*; (14) *Estudios de tercer grado, segundo ciclo: Facultades universitarias, Licenciaturas*; (15) *Estudios de tercer grado, segundo ciclo: Escuelas técnicas superiores*; (16) *Escuelas de tercer grado, segundo ciclo: Estudios eclesiásticos, militares y otros superiores*; (17) *Estudios de tercer grado, segundo ciclo: Estudios no reglados, de nivel equivalente al universitario*; (18) *Estudios de tercer grado, tercer ciclo: Doctorado, Masters, estudios de postgraduado*; (71) *Otros*. Recoded into dummies: (1) Primary or lower (codes from 01 to 03); (0) other; (1) Secondary education (codes from 04 to 09); (0) other; (1) Tertiary education (codes from 10 to 18); (0) other.

Habitat: categorical (1) less than 50,000 inhabitants, (2) between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants, (3) more than 200,000. Recoded into a dummy: (1) more than 200,000, (0) other.

Vote recall: “Which party did you vote for (in the last European elections on May 2014)?” Choice among a list of party labels, then recoded into a series of dummies: (1) PP, (0) other; (1) PSOE, (0) other; (1) IU/UP, (0) other; (1) UPyD, (0) other; (1) Ps, (0) other; (1) Cs, (0) other; (1) CiU, (0) other; (1) ERC, (0) other; (1) PNV, (0) other.

Probability of voting: “We have a number of parties in Spain, each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties?” The question was repeated for a list of party labels. We then identified the most probable party and created a series of dummies for: PSOE, PP, IU/UP, UPyD, Ps, Cs, CDC, ERC and PNV.

Political knowledge on the EU (scale): For each of the following items, could you please let us know whether you believe they are ‘true’ or ‘false’? If you do not know, just mark ‘don’t know’ and pass on to the next item: 1) Switzerland is a member of the European Union; 2) the European Union is composed of 28 member states; 3) Each member of the European Union elects the same number of representatives to the European Parliament. Answers: (0) false, (1) true, (0) don’t know. The final scale (0-3) is an additive index of answers to the three items (1 point if ‘true’, 0 points if ‘false’ or ‘don’t know’).

Self-reported party position left-right dimension: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”, where would you place these parties on the following scale? (List of parties; scale from 0 ‘Left’ to 10 ‘Right’)

Self-reported party position center-periphery dimension: Nowadays, the Autonomous Communities can legislate together with the central government and the general courts over different aspects of citizens’ daily life such as the health system and education. Some people think that in Spain the Autonomous Communities should increase their power while others think that their power should be reduced in favor of the Spanish government. What would you think is the position of these parties on the following scale? (List of parties; 0 ‘Spanish government should strengthen its power’ and 10 ‘Autonomous communities should increase their power over different domains’).