

Online supplementary materials for:

**“Analyzing International Organizations:
How the Concepts We Use Affect the Answers We Get”**

May 4, 2021

Table of contents:

A. The Database of Informal IO Membership	APP-2
B. Full regression tables	APP-14
C. Supplementary figures	APP-20

1 The Database of Informal IO Membership

In this section of the appendix, we:

- Explain features of the basic informal IO dataset used in this paper, briefly outlining how it was coded and how it is similar to and different from other extant datasets;
- Explain the coding and data collection procedures used to generate the annual membership data, which is the crucial addition to the already-published version, and
- Provide some basic descriptive statistics that illustrate some of the top-level patterns in the membership data.

CONCEPTUALIZING INFORMAL IOS FOR THE DATABASE

We conceptualize informal IOs as international institutions that:

- (a) are created by states,
- (b) pass a basic threshold of institutionalization, defined in terms of a distinct corporate identity, regular meetings, and evidence of committee structures and common decision-making procedures, and
- (c) are established through an agreement that is not legally binding under international public law.

The first two features make informal IOs directly analogous to formal IOs: both are state-created bodies that exhibit sufficiently high levels of institutionalization that it makes sense to characterize them as organizations. They each fall within the scope of Harold Jacobson's widely-used definition

of an international organization as “an institutional structure created by agreement among two or more sovereign states for the conduct of regular political interactions.”¹ This shared essence distinguishes both from other types of international institutions, such as treaties, international soft law, public–private partnerships, and private governance arrangements, which are either not organizations (treaties, soft law) or are not (primarily) founded by states (public–private partnerships, private governance).² Formal and informal IOs nevertheless differ in terms of their basic legal nature. Indeed, this is the key distinction. While there are important empirical regularities across these bodies—for instance, informal IOs appear to have somewhat fewer state members, on average, and comparatively smaller secretariats—their contrasting legal foundations are what most sharply differentiate the two.

To create the basic dataset used in this paper, these criteria were operationalized using a number of more specific indicators. For instance, in order to determine (b) whether an agreement is “non-binding,” constitutive documents were examined for specific statements that clearly indicate the legal nature of a document (e.g., “This document does not establish binding obligations on members.”), or extensive use of precatory language (“hope,” “may” or “should” instead of “will,” “must,” or “shall,” for example). Certain practices or statements surrounding an agreement were also regarded as important for determining its legal nature, such as domestic ratification or how an agreement is classified in domestic records. Similarly, to determine (c) whether an informal body passes a reasonable threshold of institutionalization, sufficient for it to “count” as an organization, a body had to convene states at least once every two years. It also needed to reveal signs of internal differentiation and unique decision-making procedures. In practice, this meant that an organization

¹Jacobson 1979, p. 3.

²Though it may be useful to think soft law, public–private partnerships and private governance arrangements as varieties of “informal governance,” as conceived by Westerwinter et al. 2020, informal IOs are the most immediately analogous institutions to formal IOs

had to have at least two sub-bodies (such as a plenary and executive body), individuals with distinct roles (presidents, chairs, officers, secretaries, etc.), and evidence of stable decision-making rules, such as a constitutive document that explains voting procedures, who can be members of committees, and so forth. Finally, it was necessary to see some kind of collective output, such as resolutions, decisions, agreements, or reports, which signified that states acted in unison to achieve shared objectives.

The basic dataset was created by using these indicators to sift through hundreds of “candidate” organizations to determine which satisfied our criteria. For an organization to “pass,” a candidate had to receive positive scores on each indicator. Records of these coding decisions and supporting documents are on file with the authors, including records of candidates that were considered but ultimately rejected. The candidate bodies that were considered, it is important to note, were primarily derived from the Union of International Associations’ *Yearbook of International Organizations*. The *Yearbook* is a comprehensive directory of international bodies and is the same source used to generate the COW dataset, which means that the two databases can be readily combined to produce a more complete picture of the universe of IOs. This is a critical advantage of our data collection strategy, and aligns with the practices of others who have collected data on informal IOs as well, such as Vabulas and Snidal.³ It is worth acknowledging, though, that the *Yearbook* suffers from some known biases, as explained by Saunier in his comprehensive history.⁴ Organizations that operate in the developing world and conduct operations in a non-European language, for instance, may be underrepresented. Highly secretive organizations may also be less likely to show up, and the same is true of organizations that failed and quickly disappeared. These are important biases to

³Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Vabulas and Snidal 2020.

⁴Saunier 2019.

remember when using this source. However, they are likely to affect both our dataset and the COW dataset equally.

A more comprehensive discussion of basic concepts, indicators, and coding procedures can be found in Roger (2020).⁵ In the following, we briefly distinguish the unique characteristics of the basic database, offer several illustrative examples of the organizations it contains, and provide some basic descriptive statistics, so that users can situate it relative to other similar efforts. The types of informal IOs it contains are different, first of all, from the formal bodies that appear in the COW dataset. To enter the COW dataset, bodies must be created by states, exhibit indications of institutionalization, and be established by “an internationally recognized treaty.”⁶ Thus, for instance, an institution like the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which started in 2008, is included: it has state members, has a secretariat based in the United Arab Emirates, and its founding statute is an international agreement that establishes binding obligations under international public law (that is, it is a “treaty”). It meets all three criteria—states, legal formality, and institutionalization—and is the type of body included in the COW dataset. In total, the most recent version of the COW dataset estimates that nearly 500 such institutions have existed, which vary significantly in size and mandate. Around 350 are classified as “currently active,” as of 2014.

These institutions are both similar to and differ from those included in the database of informal IOs. They are similar in that they meet the first two criteria: informal IOs are created by states and exhibit indications of institutionalization sufficient to differentiate them from ad hoc meetings and non-organizations. They differ only in terms of the third: they are not established by “an internationally recognized treaty.” Instead, they are founded by deliberately non-binding agreements.

⁵Roger 2020, see, especially, Chapter 2 and the Data Appendix, “Building the Database of Informal International Organizations”.

⁶Pevehouse et al. 2004.

As an example, consider the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM). The CEM has a stable and permanent membership of states who meet regularly in a committee structure with clear decision-making rules, and who have produced a variety of collective outputs, like reports and resolutions. In addition, it has an independent secretariat based at the International Energy Agency. It therefore meets the first two criteria, and appears to be very similar to many of the formal IOs found in the COW dataset. However, it differs considerably in terms of its legal basis, since its founding document deliberately eschews legally binding obligations. The CEM framework document notes the institution’s “voluntary” structure (Art. I a.) and concludes by emphasizing that the framework “does not create any legally binding obligations between or among the CEM Members” (Art. XII e.). As an international institution that possesses member states, exhibits evidence of institutionalization, and has a non-binding founding document, the CEM “counts” as an informal IO. In total, the basic database of informal IOs—which relies on the same source material as the COW dataset—records 260 bodies that meet this criteria, of which just over 200 were considered “active” in 2010.

Next, it is worth noting the differences between the institutions included in the database of informal IOs and the related one created by Vabulas and Snidal.⁷ There are two key differences. The first, as noted earlier in the paper, is that the database includes bodies that have independent secretariats. Vabulas and Snidal see the lack of a secretariat as a defining feature of IOs. In fact, however, many non-binding (i.e. informal) bodies possess these. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) offers an example. In many ways, APEC closely resembles the types of formal IOs included in the COW database. It was created by states in 1989 and has an independent secretariat based in Singapore. The legal basis for the secretariat is provided by a headquarters agreement with the national government of Singapore, signed in 1994. Under this agreement,

⁷Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Vabulas and Snidal 2020.

APEC is able to enjoy—within Singapore—many of the privileges and immunities that formal IOs are typically afforded. Yet, at bottom, the constitutive agreement establishing APEC is non-binding under international public law. Accordingly, the organization is regularly cited as a prime example of informal cooperation.⁸ This sort of arrangement is, in fact, quite typical of informal IOs and through such means many informal bodies are able to attain greater degrees of institutionalization than Vabulas and Snidal admit.⁹ This fact is recognized in the database of informal IOs used here, which requires organizations to pass a basic threshold of institutionalization but does not establish an upper limit.

The second way in which the database of informal IOs differs from Vabulas and Snidal's effort concerns how we think about the actors ("states") that establish informal IOs. They define states in a highly restrictive way that equates the idea with heads of state and cabinet level officials exclusively. The database of informal IOs used here opts for a somewhat broader definition of the state that aligns more closely with the one used in the COW database, which does not refer to "the cabinet in a parliamentary system, or the executive branch more broadly, but rather the ensemble of [national] institutions that constitute the machinery for making authoritative value allocations within a state."¹⁰ This means that the dataset excludes bodies created by private actors and "trans-governmental networks" created by subnational actors, like cities or regional governments, but, as Wallace and Singer explain, explicitly includes organizations "whose delegations are appointed by governmental agencies or ministries."¹¹ This broader definition recognizes, as the International Law Commission has stated, that many "important international organizations have been established by

⁸Kahler 2000.

⁹Indeed, in practice the possess of a secretariat is quite common among informal bodies, though they are typically much smaller in comparison with their formal counterparts, see Roger 2020, pp. 28–29.

¹⁰Jacobson 1979, p. 17.

¹¹Wallace and Singer 1970, p. 247.

State organs other than governments or by those organs together with governments.”¹² Using this definition means that at least some of the entities that Vabulas and Snidal exclude as examples of “transgovernmental networks” are included here, but, in fact, this improves the conceptual alignment between the database of informal IOs and the COW dataset, which, due to the broader definition it utilizes, actually includes many bodies established by non-cabinet level officials, such as the Universal Postal Union, the Nordic Council, the Bank for International Settlements, the African Tax Administration Forum, among many others.

Next, it is worth briefly explaining the relationship between the database of informal IOs and several other related efforts to classify and map international institutions. It differs, for instance, from the few databases that measure “emanations,” like the one developed by Tana Johnson and the earlier effort by Cheryl Shanks and her co-authors.¹³ As both have demonstrated, these institutions appear to be very prevalent. However, because they are created through the legislative acts of other organizations, the mode through which they are created is very different from the institutions we consider, as well as those in the COW dataset. Membership, in addition, is often automatic, and although such institutions can achieve a degree of independence in practice this is often conditioned by the design of voting rules and other related means of political insulation.¹⁴ All of this means we cannot directly compare emanations with formal and informal IOs, as defined above, without

¹²United Nations 2009, p. 43. The ILC’s judgement is based on observation of common practice, where formal and informal bodies commonly recognized as IOs have been created by other state-based actors. But, a more general point is that when “State organs” interact across borders they do so on the basis of the authority they are granted within a state structure, and often with the full knowledge of or in direct collaboration with political executives, who have the capacity to restrain them if desired. Under domestic law, such bodies typically have full authority to sign non-binding agreements, provided this is done in consultation with executives, and may also be granted explicit treaty-making authority, although exactly how this occurs varies somewhat from state to state (Hollis et al. 2005). For these reasons, under international law executives are regarded as granting explicit or implicit consent to the creation of IOs by other “State organs.” As a result, as Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill have explained in their opinion on the legal status of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, membership by non-executive state-based actors “can be considered equivalent to participation by States” (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 1999, p. 10).

¹³Shanks et al. 1996; Johnson 2014.

¹⁴Johnson 2014.

making additional assumptions. In the future, it would be worthwhile collecting data on these institutions, since there are specific instances where it they may matter a great deal, as we note in our article. However, given these considerations, our dataset is strictly limited to institutions that are directly analogous to formal IOs—like those in COW—and de jure independent from other institutions.

Finally, it is important to emphasizing that our dataset also differs from a number of other databases that catalogue so-called “public–private partnerships,” such as the one developed by Westerwinter.¹⁵ Many of these institutions may include states as members, may exhibit fairly high levels of institutionalization, and may be informal in nature as well. However, by definition, these institutions are characterized by heavy involvement from non-state actors, like multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and private foundations. While it certainly makes sense to classify such institutions as examples of “informal governance”—a broader category—this fact makes them quite different from the sort of bodies included in the COW and informal IO datasets.¹⁶ Last, there are a number of datasets that catalogue various international agreements, often within an issue-area.¹⁷ While these datasets may include state-created agreements, and may even include those establishing formal or informal IOs, this category of institution does not require high levels of institutionalization. Thus, they are much more encompassing in nature.

CODING PROCEDURES AND EXTENDING THE BASIC DATASET

The key difference between the already-published version of the informal IO dataset and the one used in this paper is the inclusion of annual membership data. This innovation represents a significant

¹⁵Westerwinter 2019.

¹⁶Westerwinter et al. 2020.

¹⁷Von Stein 2018; Mitchell et al. 2020.

advance over the previous version, which only included start and end dates and basic information on the “founding members.” It makes the data much more compatible with the most advanced version of the COW dataset and correspondingly much more useful for scholars studying these important institutions. To generate this data and to ensure compatibility with COW, we relied entirely on their coding rules, though our data collection efforts are not quite so extensive. For instance, they code membership in terms of six different categories: “no membership,” “full membership,” “associate membership,” “observer,” “missing data,” and “state not system member.” We collected data on all of these categories and coded them identically. Likewise, as in the COW dataset, a state is counted as become a member (of whatever type) in the calendar year when it first shows up in sources as having attained a designated status. It is then coded as having “no membership” if and when there is no longer evidence of membership in an IO. For full details explaining how membership is coded in the COW data (and our own), see Pevehouse et al. (2004) and the online codebook available at: https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/IGOs/IGO_codebook_v2.1.pdf.

We were able to collect virtually complete membership data for 244 of the 260 bodies contained in the database of informal IOs (i.e., 94 percent). Our data collection procedure relied a range of sources: IO websites, the annual reports of IOs, government documents of various kinds, direct correspondence with IO secretariats and officials from member states, newspaper reports, and reliable secondary sources.¹⁸ In many cases, these sources provided specific entry and exit dates for all members and we relied on these statements to generate the yearly data. In other instances, membership data had to be built up from yearly records, such as the annual reports of IOs or online participants lists recorded by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (www.archive.org/web/).

¹⁸As described in the paper, a few formal IOs found in the COW dataset are reclassified as informal IOs in the basic dataset. When this was so, we have simply relied on the COW coding of membership.

When doing so, we counted a state as having first attained membership in the calendar year when it first appears in such a record, unless other statements and information indicated that this happened on a prior date. Correspondingly, when a state permanently ceases to show up in membership records it is counted as having terminated membership in the year after it last appears. In a relatively small number of cases, a state appeared to be missing from the records in a particular year but otherwise maintained a solid record of membership. Unless we located specific evidence indicating that it did indeed leave during this time period, we count this as error and record a continuous record of membership. Electronic copies of all documents used to generate the membership data are on file.

BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INFORMAL IO MEMBERSHIP

In total, the database of informal IOs contains observations for 204 states, 86 years (from 1925 to 2010, inclusive), and 256 informal IOs. These data show that there are important empirical differences between patterns of membership in formal and informal IOs. Some of this has already been described in the paper. Here, we note that informal IOs tend to have smaller membership than formal IOs, on average, although these differences are not as significant as some might think. In general, there tend to be more formal IOs with nearly universal membership. But, if we exclude these bodies, membership patterns are much more similar. The dataset also reveals that states have different compositions of formal and informal IO membership. We illustrate these divergences visually in figure 2. Table APP-1 picks out the individual states with the most formal, informal, and total IO memberships, as well as the fewest memberships. Reading across the columns in table APP-1, reinforces the finding from figure 2 that formal and informal IO membership is

positively correlated, as the same states that lead in formal membership also tend to lead in informal membership. Nonetheless, membership is not identical, informing the argument in this paper that concepts and measures of IO membership can be meaningfully mismatched. A similar pattern holds for low levels of membership.

Table APP-1: Countries with the most and fewest IO memberships (2010)

Country	Formal IOs	Country	Informal IOs	Country	Total IOs
France	113	Canada	78	France	189
Netherlands	101	United States	77	Italy	165
Spain	101	France	76	United Kingdom	165
Finland	100	United Kingdom	69	Germany	165
Belgium	100	Germany	69	Spain	162
Norway	99	Italy	67	United States	161
Sweden	98	Australia	67	Canada	161
Italy	98	Japan	64	Netherlands	160
Denmark	98	Mexico	62	Norway	150
Portugal	97	Spain	61	Sweden	149
United Kingdom	96	Netherlands	59	Belgium	149
Germany	96	Brazil	56	Portugal	148
Timor-Leste	27	Marshall Islands	6	Timor-Leste	33
San Marino	25	Micronesia	6	Kiribati	32
Kiribati	25	Afghanistan	6	Andorra	32
Micronesia	24	Tajikistan	5	Liechtenstein	30
Tuvalu	23	Somalia	5	Micronesia	30
Andorra	23	Tuvalu	4	San Marino	29
Nauru	22	San Marino	4	Palau	29
Palau	21	Eritrea	4	Nauru	28
Liechtenstein	20	Turkmenistan	3	Tuvalu	27
Taiwan	7	North Korea	3	Taiwan	21

2 Full regression tables

Table APP-2: IOs as forums for socialization

	Physical integrity scores			
	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)
Greenhill IO context	0.256** (0.095)			
Formals only IO context		0.269** (0.102)		
Informals only IO context			0.186** (0.059)	
Total IO context				0.276** (0.098)
Lagged dependent variable	0.532** (0.022)	0.524** (0.023)	0.517** (0.023)	0.521** (0.024)
FDI	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Trade	0.004** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Population density	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Polity	0.014** (0.005)	0.014** (0.005)	0.015** (0.005)	0.014* (0.005)
Regime durability	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)
Common language	0.024 (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)	0.028+ (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)
Common colonial history	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.022 (0.020)
Neighbourhood effect	0.035 (0.021)	0.036+ (0.021)	0.034 (0.021)	0.032 (0.021)
Hard PTA	-0.082 (0.090)	-0.079 (0.090)	-0.110 (0.090)	-0.100 (0.090)
Soft PTA	0.116+ (0.070)	0.114 (0.070)	0.113 (0.070)	0.107 (0.070)
Civil war	-0.401** (0.096)	-0.400** (0.096)	-0.414** (0.096)	-0.406** (0.096)
International war	-0.505** (0.124)	-0.492** (0.122)	-0.444** (0.114)	-0.484** (0.119)
GDP (log)	0.101** (0.034)	0.102** (0.034)	0.095** (0.034)	0.097** (0.034)
/cut1	1.918** (0.452)	1.957** (0.473)	1.483** (0.315)	1.929** (0.442)

/cut2	2.621** (0.450)	2.661** (0.471)	2.186** (0.308)	2.632** (0.439)
/cut3	3.266** (0.452)	3.306** (0.474)	2.829** (0.316)	3.277** (0.442)
/cut4	3.850** (0.452)	3.890** (0.474)	3.414** (0.317)	3.861** (0.443)
/cut5	4.618** (0.456)	4.658** (0.478)	4.182** (0.322)	4.630** (0.447)
/cut6	5.354** (0.460)	5.393** (0.481)	4.920** (0.328)	5.365** (0.451)
/cut7	6.118** (0.464)	6.156** (0.485)	5.684** (0.331)	6.130** (0.455)
/cut8	7.141** (0.476)	7.179** (0.497)	6.708** (0.343)	7.155** (0.467)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,226	2,244
Pseudo R^2	0.283	0.283	0.283	0.283
Log likelihood	-3412	-3412	-3384	-3411
Number of countries	137	137	137	137

Replications of Greenhill 2010: table 2, model 1

Ordered probit model with lagged dependent variable

Outcome variable: 8-point Cignarelli and Richards Physical Integrity Score

Unit of observation: country years, 1981–2000

IO context: Mean physical integrity score of common IGO members

Independent variables lagged one year

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Table APP-3: IOs as tools for democratization

	Δ M&P IOs (2.1)	Δ Formal IOs (2.2)	Δ Informal IOs (2.3)	Δ Total IOs (2.4)
Democratization	0.337** (0.101)	0.314** (0.100)	0.032 (0.046)	0.294** (0.114)
Autocratization	-0.125 (0.086)	-0.084 (0.078)	0.021 (0.038)	-0.015 (0.090)
Stable Democracy	0.245** (0.073)	0.229** (0.059)	0.052 (0.057)	0.368** (0.074)
M&P IOs	0.001 (0.003)			
Formal IOs		0.014** (0.003)		
Informal IOs			0.065** (0.008)	
Total IOs				0.026** (0.003)
Dispute	-0.054** (0.018)	-0.023 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.023 (0.020)
Hegemony	-23.114** (7.392)	-21.766** (8.167)	4.631 (3.578)	-17.380+ (9.321)
Year	-0.059** (0.018)	-0.057** (0.020)	0.022* (0.009)	-0.034 (0.023)
Former Communist	0.988** (0.199)	0.907** (0.196)	0.480** (0.156)	1.429** (0.228)
Independence	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002+ (0.001)
North America	-0.248 (0.160)	-0.355** (0.119)	-0.183+ (0.095)	-0.351* (0.156)
South America	-0.250 (0.153)	-0.435** (0.123)	-0.280** (0.095)	-0.589** (0.167)
Middle East	-0.107 (0.138)	-0.300* (0.137)	0.025 (0.052)	-0.365* (0.152)
Asia	-0.308* (0.145)	-0.355* (0.140)	-0.008 (0.056)	-0.191 (0.150)
Oceania	-0.539** (0.154)	-0.462** (0.161)	-0.073 (0.088)	-0.353* (0.160)
Europe	-0.391* (0.154)	-0.488** (0.144)	0.091 (0.099)	-0.297 (0.194)
Constant	124.627** (37.813)	118.325** (42.194)	-44.642* (18.257)	71.325 (47.854)
Observations	4,665	4,665	4,665	4,665
Number of countries	173	173	173	173
R^2	0.051	0.085	0.410	0.220

Replications of Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006: table 2, model 1.1

OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors
Outcome variable is number of new IOs joined, $\Delta_{t,t-1}$
Period of observation: 1965–2000
Reference region is Africa
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Table APP-4: IOs as signals of cooperative intentions

		IEA ratification		
	*(3.1)	(3.2)	(3.3)	(3.4)
Bernauer et al. IOs	0.011** (0.004)			
Formal IOs		0.013** (0.004)		
Informal IOs			0.001 (0.007)	
Total IOs				0.008* (0.003)
Trade openness	-0.125* (0.054)	-0.132* (0.054)	-0.037 (0.049)	-0.120* (0.057)
Polity	0.010+ (0.006)	0.011+ (0.006)	0.016* (0.006)	0.011+ (0.006)
GDP per capita (log)	0.931 (0.617)	0.999 (0.617)	0.467 (0.654)	1.003 (0.638)
GDP per capita (log, squared)	-0.039 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.044 (0.039)
SO ₂ per capita	0.090** (0.034)	0.092** (0.034)	0.054 (0.035)	0.092** (0.035)
Number of other countries ratified	0.023** (0.002)	0.023** (0.002)	0.022** (0.002)	0.023** (0.002)
Share same income group that ratified	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Share same region that ratified	0.030** (0.002)	0.030** (0.002)	0.031** (0.002)	0.031** (0.002)
GDP (log)	-0.073 (0.070)	-0.080 (0.068)	0.057 (0.061)	-0.060 (0.072)
Africa	-0.506** (0.147)	-0.527** (0.147)	-0.412** (0.158)	-0.455** (0.148)
North America	-0.547** (0.158)	-0.506** (0.158)	-0.703** (0.189)	-0.582** (0.167)
Latin America	-0.543** (0.124)	-0.541** (0.124)	-0.478** (0.129)	-0.523** (0.124)
East Asia	-0.461** (0.140)	-0.420** (0.144)	-0.683** (0.164)	-0.481** (0.145)
West Asia	-0.713** (0.159)	-0.711** (0.159)	-0.789** (0.167)	-0.696** (0.164)
Time	-0.328** (0.017)	-0.328** (0.017)	-0.329** (0.017)	-0.328** (0.017)
Time ²	0.010** (0.001)	0.010** (0.001)	0.010** (0.001)	0.010** (0.001)
Time ³	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Constant	-9.394**	-9.645**	-8.396**	-9.759**

	(2.970)	(2.974)	(3.105)	(3.022)
Observations	574,196	574,196	574,196	574,196
Number of countries	155	155	155	155
Pseudo R ²	0.197	0.197	0.195	0.196
Log likelihood	-27208	-27199	-27257	-27221

Replications of Bernauer et al. 2010: table 3, model 2

Logistic regression with cubic time polynomials

Outcome variable: country *i* ratification of treaty *j* in year *t*

Unit of observation: country-treaty-year, 1950–2000

Robust standard errors clustered by country

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

3 Supplementary figures




Figure APP-1: Human rights context of IOs across formal and informal IOs at four points in time




Figure APP-2: Number of formal and informal IOs joined annually at four points in time




Figure APP-3: Standardized coefficients across replication case studies

References

- Brownlie, Ian and Guy Goodwin-Gill (1999). *Joint opinion*. Accessed on April 19, 2021. URL: <http://archive.ipu.org/finance-e/opinion.pdf>.
- Hollis, Duncan, Merritt Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington (2005). *National Treaty Law and Practice*. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Jacobson, Harold K. (1979). *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*. Knopf.
- Johnson, Tana (2014). *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*. Oxford University Press.
- Kahler, Miles (2000). “Legalization as strategy: the Asia-Pacific case”. *International Organization* 54 (3), pp. 549–571.
- Mitchell, Ronald B., Liliana B. Andonova, Mark Axelrod, Jörg Balsiger, Thomas Bernauer, Jessica F. Green, James Hollway, Rakhyun E. Kim, and Jean-Frédéric Morin (2020). “What we know (and could know) About international environmental agreements”. *Global Environmental Politics* 20.1, pp. 103–121.
- Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke (2004). “The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0”. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 (2), pp. 101–119.
- Roger, Charles B. (2020). *The Origins of Informality: Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, and Why It Matters*. Oxford University Press.
- Saunier, Pierre-Yves (2019). “Everything one wants to know about international organizations? A biography of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 1909-2016”. *International Organizations and Global Civil Society: Histories of the Union of International Associations*. Ed. by Daniel Laqua, Wouter van Acker, and Christophe Verbruggen. Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 171–203.
- Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan (1996). “Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations, 1981-1992”. *International Organization* 50 (4), pp. 593–627.
- United Nations (2009). *Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-First Session (4 May–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2009)*.
- Vabulas, Felicity and Duncan Snidal (2013). “Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements”. *The Review of International Organizations* 8 (2), pp. 193–220.
- (2020). “Cooperation under autonomy: Building and analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 2.0 data set”. *Journal of Peace Research*. OnlineFirst.
- Von Stein, Jana (2018). “Exploring the universe of UN human rights agreements”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62.4, pp. 871–899.
- Wallace, Michael and J. David Singer (1970). “Intergovernmental organization in the global system, 1815–1964: A quantitative description”. *International Organization* 24 (2), pp. 239–287.
- Westerwinter, Oliver (2019). “Transnational public–private governance initiatives in world politics: Introducing a new dataset”. *The Review of International Organizations*, pp. 1–38.
- Westerwinter, Oliver, Kenneth W. Abbott, and Thomas Biersteker (2020). “Informal governance in world politics”. *Review of International Organizations*.