

The Role of Gender Stereotypes in Hiring: A Field Experiment

M. José González*[†], Clara Cortina[†] and Jorge Rodríguez[†]

Department of Political & Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain

*Corresponding author. Email: mjose.gonzalez@upf.edu

[†]These authors have contributed equally to this article.

Submitted February 2018; revised December 2018; accepted December 2018

Abstract

Using correspondence testing, we investigate if employers discriminate against women based on stereotypes or prejudices. We sent four (two pairs of fictitious man–woman) résumés to 1,372 job offers from a broad selection of occupations. In one pair, candidates had equivalent curriculum vitae (CVs) except for their sex and their qualifications (meeting standards or higher). In the second pair, candidates differed by sex and parenthood status (with or without children). We interpret the observed differences in favour of men as signalling gender bias in recruitment. This bias is reduced when women have higher qualifications and increases when they have children. We interpret employers' openness to modify their decisions when candidates' personal characteristics differ from the group norm, and the absence of discrimination among highly qualified non-mothers, as evidence that gender bias in recruitment is largely grounded in employers' stereotypes rather than in prejudices.

Introduction

In this study, we use a correspondence testing approach to investigate whether employers discriminate against women based on stereotypes or prejudices. The correspondence test is an experimental technique that consists of sending pairs of résumés for job offers that are very similar in everything except the trait to be analysed—gender, in our case. Discrimination is established if candidates with the trait—females—have a lower probability of being selected for further screening. We sent two pairs of résumés to 1,372 real job advertisements appearing in two large local labour markets (Madrid and Barcelona) in Spain in 2016.

This research design allows us to address some issues insufficiently explored in the literature, namely the extent to which women experience subtle forms of discrimination based on the order in which they are selected for further screening. More importantly, unlike in many previous studies, we additionally estimate if gender discrimination varies by an applicant's parenthood status and level of qualifications. This allows us to assess to what extent employers' discriminatory practices are grounded in stereotypes about males and females' typical qualifications and prescribed roles as mothers and workers, rather than on unswerving prejudice against, or aversion towards, female workers. Finally, and as our research strategy combines within- and between-job comparisons of candidates' appeal to

employers, we add important controls to the analyses pertaining to job characteristics, like the degree of masculinization of the occupation, the level of authority required in the job, and the tightness of the labour market within which the job offer is posted.

Do Employers Favour Men?

The *gender discrimination hypothesis* states that gender bias in recruitment, that is, employers' conscious or unconscious preference for male candidates, is pervasive and it may arise for different reasons. According to economic theory, discrimination may be explained by employers' imperfect information on applicants' human capital characteristics, which are relevant for the job and also difficult to standardize on a résumé (Becker, 1985; Heckman, 1998). Employers use group-level statistical summaries (i.e., group averages) as proxies for these variables, and this explains why individuals from these groups are treated differently. Thus, in selecting candidates for a job opening, employers not only consider the observed and standardizable qualifications shown in candidates' curriculum vitae (CVs), but also rely on stereotypes about the typical level and dispersion of other difficult-to-standardise qualifications. This practice leads to forms of statistical discrimination based on rational assessments of productivity and risk regarding potential employees (Baumle and Fossett, 2005). Ascribed characteristics such as gender and age are used as potential proxies for traits that are difficult and expensive to measure in real contexts.

Some stereotypes are descriptive and based on knowledge of men and women's typical abilities. This knowledge can be direct, based on experience, or indirect and transmitted by trusted third parties. Thus, in our societies, in which the division of labour is gendered, men typically appear as possessing greater agentic and leadership qualities than women, and higher aspirations and commitment at work. In contrast, women are assumed to possess greater communal qualities associated with caring behaviours (Cuddy *et al.*, 2004). Other stereotypes are prescriptive, that is, based on cultural beliefs about what men and women ought or ought not do. They are often justified with reference to higher communal values that reinforce a system of patriarchal authority favouring men (Connell, 1995; Rudman and Glick, 2001). Prescriptions are accompanied by sanctions when someone violates them. Thus, working mothers who behave agentially may be perceived as lacking femininity and be subjected to a variety of sanctions (Connell, 1995; Benard and Correll, 2010).

Sociologists have repeatedly shown how the patriarchal character of organizational life reinforces the idea of separate spheres for women and men, and contributes to the perception that being an 'ideal worker' is incompatible with being a 'good mother' (Fuegen *et al.*, 2004; Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Benard and Correll, 2010; Glass and Fodor, 2011; Byron and Roscigno, 2014). The ideal worker is a 'committed' employee who sacrifices his most personal concerns, such as those derived from family responsibilities, for the sake of his career; a worker who is expected to drop all current engagements when a new and important work demand arises, devotes many hours to 'face time' at work when needed, or works late nights or weekends if necessary (Correll *et al.*, 2007). The ideal of the 'good mother', instead, places the child at the centre of the family and assumes that child care is the chief responsibility of the mother—an emotionally absorbing, labour-intensive, and time-consuming responsibility (Hays, 1996).

Descriptive stereotypes contribute to the generation of prescriptive views or beliefs about men and women's proper roles in society; and prescriptions typically lead to the desired outcomes. Hence, under the 'motherhood mandate', women are expected to be more family oriented and less committed to paid work, and thus, less productive than similarly qualified male workers (Russo, 1976; Hays, 1996). They are also expected to have higher rates of absenteeism, which, according to employers, eventually affects their productivity at work (Correll *et al.*, 2007). Employers' expectations may even be harmful to some employees, such as when pregnant women are determined to appear 'well' and remain at work even when feeling sick (Gatrell, 2011).

According to the theories discussed above, both descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes may influence hiring processes. We develop two hypotheses to test these possibilities. We expect that discrimination against female candidates will be *smaller* for candidates with higher levels of qualifications for the job. The reduction in the level of employers' discrimination against female candidates will indicate that they allow any perceived handicaps in women's unobservables to be compensated with candidates' higher observables. We will interpret a reduction in discrimination among applicants with higher standardized qualifications, as evidence that employers engage in *statistical discrimination based on descriptive stereotypes* or on shared beliefs about the typically different traits and abilities of men and women, which can be counteracted when candidates show higher qualifications.

Furthermore, we expect that discrimination against female candidates will be *higher* for candidates with

children. As before, the change in employers' level of discrimination against women will indicate that they are willing to adapt their stereotypes on women and men's qualifications when receiving further information on candidates' characteristics. However, the increase in discrimination will in this case show that their behaviour is based on prescriptions about the proper roles of men and women in society, punishing non-compliant women with higher discrimination when the stereotype of the good mother and worker is challenged. Hence, if discrimination increases when we restrict our sample to applications by job candidates with children, we will interpret this finding as evidence for *statistical discrimination based on prescriptive stereotypes*.

Instead of (or in addition to) statistically discriminating women, employers, particularly males, may rely on gender prejudices, based on negative feelings about women, that similarly result in higher barriers to women's employment, especially in high-status occupations (England, 1994; Jaret, 1995). Prejudices are negative judgements about groups that carry a stigma. These judgements are irrational because—unlike statistical discrimination—they are not based on expectations about groups' productivities (Becker, 1985). It can arise at different stages of an individual's work history (pre-selection, job interview, or promotion), which makes it difficult to tackle the subject empirically (Baumle and Fossett, 2005). Psychologists have studied in detail the basis of prejudicial attitudes—see Hodson and Dhont (2015) for a recent review of this work. They have shown that prejudicial individuals are more likely to display automatic emotional responses of animosity or antipathy towards members of other groups, based on faulty and inflexible generalizations of their inferior qualities (Allport, 1954). Prejudices are often acquired at an early age and as a consequence, in the case of gender, of segregated socialization (Glick and Hilt, 2000). We propose to test this hypothesis of prejudicial discrimination by assessing if discrimination is significant also in the group of female candidates with the lowest probability of being statistically discriminated—the group of highly qualified non-mothers. In other words, if discrimination remains for the group of most clearly competent female candidates, we will interpret this finding as evidence for *discrimination based on prejudice*.

Gender Discrimination in Recruitment Decisions

Much of the evidence on gender discrimination derives from field experiments such as correspondence studies. These studies are considered to be the most reliable methods to reveal unequal treatment in hiring (Riach

and Rich, 2002), because, unlike observational studies, they can control for selection effects and problems associated with endogeneity. These effects occur, for example, when women themselves make employment and occupational choices that lead them to disadvantaged positions (Skyt Nielsen *et al.*, 2004; Sahni and Paul, 2010). While these choices may also respond to the same stereotypes and prejudices affecting employers, or anticipate these attitudes, they can generally only indirectly be attributed to discrimination (Lundberg and Startz, 1983).

In correspondence studies, fictitious individuals who have nearly identical résumés except for certain traits such as sex, apply for the same jobs, and differences in outcomes—usually callback rates—are interpreted as reflecting discrimination. The difficulty in correspondence studies is generally not with detecting discrimination but with identifying its sources—stereotypes or prejudices (Neumark *et al.*, 1996). To accomplish the latter, in many correspondence studies the experimenter varies the personal characteristics of the fictitious applicants to determine if differences in employers' rates of response vary accordingly between men and women (Larribeau *et al.*, 2013). For example, the experimenter may vary the parenthood status of the applicant within or across jobs, and ascertain if women are more discriminated against when they have children (Correll *et al.*, 2007; Albert *et al.*, 2011; Bygren *et al.*, 2017). If they are, this is attributed to employers' reliance on prescriptive stereotypes when making hiring decisions, based on beliefs that mothers should not be given a job because their place is at home. In other studies, the marital or age status of the applicant is modified, and used as an indicator of how likely they are to become a parent in the near future (Petit, 2007).

Still in other studies, qualities that are typically unobserved in a CV, like personality traits, are subtly added to candidates' résumés, and employers' reactions are identified and explored to reveal if women who display 'masculine' traits are penalized more than others (Weichselbaumer, 2004). Finally, in some studies what is varied is the level of standardized qualifications of the applicant, in the expectation that employers relying on stereotypes may consider that women's typical handicaps in unobservable traits are smaller (i.e., can be compensated) when they have higher standardizable qualifications—perhaps because only women who do not have these handicaps can achieve such higher qualifications (Larribeau *et al.*, 2013). In all cases, what allows distinguishing stereotypical from prejudicial discrimination is employers' disposition to change their hiring decisions against women when applicants' personal

characteristics diverge from gender stereotypical norms. Prejudicial discrimination, in contrast, is residually established as any discrimination left and exercised against the most favoured sub-group of women.

The evidence provided by correspondence studies on gender discrimination in hiring, and on its sources, is rather mixed. A few studies conclude that there is no discrimination (e.g., Albert *et al.*, 2011; Bygren *et al.*, 2017). Some others maintain that discrimination occurs only for some subgroups of female applicants, as expected under the hypothesis of statistical discrimination based on stereotypes (Petit, 2007). The remainder suggest that it occurs only in some contexts for some age groups (Albert *et al.*, 2011). Correspondence studies differ also in terms of the contexts that they choose to study. Some are located in countries with strong family policies promoting and facilitating mothers' employment, like Sweden or France (Petit, 2007; Bygren *et al.*, 2017); others in more traditional institutional contexts like Spain (Albert *et al.*, 2011; León and Pavolini, 2014); and still others, in societies with mixed gender equality records, like the United States or the United Kingdom (Neumark *et al.*, 1996; Correll *et al.*, 2007; Larribeau *et al.*, 2013).

Methods

We sent sets of fake *résumés* to a wide-ranging sample of 1,372 job openings/vacancies between June and November 2016 in the two largest Spanish cities. Madrid and Barcelona are two of the most economically dynamic cities in the country, with a larger supply of job offers and employment rates far above the national mean, which makes them particularly suitable for our experimental research. Spain has recently experienced a rapid and massive incorporation of women into the labour market and the educational system, but it still exhibits large gender inequalities. According to the Spanish Statistical Office, in 2016 the employment rate for the population aged 25–54 (typical motherhood ages) was 65.6 per cent for women and 77.4 per cent for men, a difference of almost 12 points; the prevalence of unemployment in the same age group was higher for women than for men (20.3 per cent vs. 16.3 per cent); part-time work was overwhelmingly done by women (24.1 per cent vs. 7.8 per cent); women earned 14.2 per cent less than men when comparing their average gross hourly earnings, and they represented only a third (31 per cent) of workers in managerial positions (Eurostat). Gender inequalities in the labour market can be partly attributed to the limited support of the welfare state for working parents and mothers' difficulties for reconciling

paid work and caring responsibilities (León and Pavolini, 2014). This explains why the presence of women in the labour market decreases with the number of children (according to Eurostat, in 2016 the employment rates for women aged 20–49 without children, with one or two children, and with three or more children were, respectively, 72, 67, and 52 per cent).

The sampling of jobs was designed to reflect the diversity of the labour markets in terms of the following: (i) the tightness or level of unemployment, which was proxied with the variable 'city' (the Spanish Statistical Office estimated the unemployment rates in Barcelona and Madrid in 2016 to be, respectively, 12, 5, and 14.8); (ii) the typical sex ratio of the occupations to which each job pertained, that is, male-dominated occupations (15–40 per cent women), mixed occupations not dominated by either sex (41–61 per cent women), or female-dominated occupations (62–83 per cent women); (iii), whether or not the tasks to be performed at work were managerial; and (iv) the average number of years of education of workers in the occupation, which we interpret as signalling the required level of qualifications for the job, that is, low, medium, or high.¹

However, it should be noted that the sample is far from being representative of all job openings in the two cities during the period of the experiment. First, the online Internet service we used to access the job openings, while widely used in both cities by job seekers, cannot capture other vacancies filled through more informal channels of recruitment (Fernández-Muñoz and Blasco-Camacho, 2012). Second, by design, we decided to send applications to an approximately equal number of job openings in each of the 18 types of jobs (occupations) that resulted from multiplying the three levels of education by the three sex ratios by the two decision-making categories in which we divided all job openings—see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of the 18 occupations and the number of jobs applied for in each occupation (an extended version of the methodology, the data used in this study and the Stata do-file to completely replicate this study are available as [Supplementary Data](#)).

In contrast to most previous correspondence studies, for each job opening we sent four fake applications.² The four applications consisted of two sets of matched CVs, with each set containing a CV from one male and one female with equivalent characteristics. The two sets differed in either candidates' level of skills/qualifications for the job or their parenthood status (see the four sets of *résumés* in Appendix 2). As noted in the previous section, we were interested in assessing the effect of these two factors on employers' gender discrimination practices. Thus, in approximately half of the job openings, we

sent four applications consisting of two sets of matched-paired male–female applications differentiated by candidates’ skills. Skill differentiation was introduced in the CVs by making adjustments to the résumés. In half of the applications the candidate met the strict requirements for the job offer (i.e., a shop assistant had the typical educational level for this position, up to secondary education according to the labour force survey, and a short work experience). In the other half of the applications, the candidate also met the strict requirements for the job offer, up to secondary education for a shop assistant, but additionally he/she reported speaking a foreign language, having longer work experience and holding supervisory roles in previous jobs. In each of these four applications, the parenthood status of the candidates was fixed to either a ‘with two children’ or ‘without children’ status, with this status alternating across the job openings. In the other half of openings, we sent four applications consisting of two sets of matched-paired male–female applications, this time differentiated by candidates’ parenthood status, that is, by whether or not they had children. In these four applications, candidates’ skills were fixed to either low or high, with each skill level alternating across job openings.

By sending two pairs of applications differentiated by candidates’ skills to half of the job openings and two further pairs differentiated by parenthood status to the other half, we considerably reduced the sample of job openings needed to detect significant differences in discriminatory practices against women based on candidates’ qualifications and parenthood status. Additionally, this research design allowed us to test if variations in gender discriminatory practices according to candidates’ characteristics occur within the same job opening (e.g., when the same hiring agent discriminates against women when two candidates display low qualifications or when they have children, compared to when they do not) or across job openings (e.g., when two agents from two different companies display differential treatment towards women), or in both cases.³

There is an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of sending match-paired applications to the same employer or single applications to multiple employers. We took this debate into consideration when choosing our research design and opted for the matched-pairs design. This design allows us to use the order in which the candidates were called back for an interview, thus helping to understand the multiple and subtle ways in which discrimination may be practised. The matched-pair approach is well established in the sociological literature—see, for instance, Quadlin (2018) or Bygren *et al.* (2017). Unmatched designs based on random allocation of

fictitious candidates across jobs guarantee that the treated and controlled arms are equivalent only in the expectation (on average across multiple replications of an experiment). A matched-pair design replicates the experiment on the same unit/employer, making the experiment more efficient and minimizing the risk of making Type II errors (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009).

Our decision to send four rather than two résumés to the same employer helped solve a problem often overlooked in matched-paired designs that send only two CVs. In the latter, the decision to decline a first invitation to attend a job interview issued to one of the fake candidates may increase the probability that the second fake candidate is selected, thus potentially obscuring the extent of discrimination. If employers’ hiring strategy consists of calling a fixed number of potential candidates for an interview, the probability of being on this list could be affected by other candidates’ (also fake candidates’) decisions to decline the invitation, giving an opportunity to a female candidate to be interviewed who otherwise might have never had this opportunity (especially in jobs with few applicants). By sending four résumés and by considering the order in which the candidates are selected, we avoid this problem and are better able to assess the extent of discrimination.

The age of all candidates varied randomly across job openings, but it was always within the range of 37 to 39 years. This age range was selected to reduce employers’ uncertainty about potential maternity or paternity leaves linked to future births. Each application used one of over 350 individual profiles created specifically for the study. The creation of such profiles and their online storage was required by the Internet service as a condition to apply for any of the job openings. To save resources, we decided to use the same profile for four different job openings. Each profile included a photograph randomly assigned to the corresponding fake male or female candidate and a résumé, standardized in the format required by the Internet service, without any cover letter. The standardized form of the résumé helped reduce any potential biases stemming from its layout.

Responses to the applications from interested employers, usually for the purpose of setting up an interview with the candidate, arrived in the form of either a call to a cell phone number or a message to an email account setup for groups of candidates never applying for the same opening. The fieldwork team used eight different cell phones to receive the phone calls and checked the email accounts of each of the fake candidates daily. Application rejections arrived in the form of messages sent explicitly by the web service or were inferred from

the absence of any contact from the prospective employer 4 weeks after the application was submitted.

Our research design raises several ethical concerns as it imposes an additional burden on employers who review fictitious job applications and participate in an experiment without giving informed consent. Deception and absence of informed consent are serious issues which in our case required the approval of an Ethical Consortium before the field work could start. The Consortium decided that detecting and understanding how gender discrimination operates within the Spanish labour market outweighed these ethical concerns.

Analytical Strategy

To assess the presence of discrimination, we analyse differences in response rates by sex in multilevel models, in which applications (level 1) are nested within job vacancies (level 2). This model allows us to take into account the auto-correlation of decisions made by the same employer regarding the set of applications we sent to them for evaluation. Multilevel models are common in matched-pair designs because they are more efficient, and the standard errors they estimate are unbiased (see [Uggen et al., 2014](#)). We estimate two types of models, according to whether the dependent variable is one of the following: (i) a binary variable measuring whether the candidate was or was not called back by the employer for further screening; or (ii) a limited interval variable reflecting the call order in which the candidates were called back, scaled from 0 (he or she was never called back), to 1 (he or she was called back in fifth place⁴), to 2, 3, 4, and 5 (he or she was called back before any other candidate). For the first set of analyses (a), we use multilevel logit models; for the second set (b), we use multilevel ordered logit models, which are more appropriate than OLS regression to estimate models in which the interval dependent variable's distribution is strongly skewed and bounded within a limited set of discrete, positive values ([Greene, 2012](#)).

We use random intercepts because two characteristics used to distinguish the male–female matched pairs were forced to vary randomly. In half of the job openings, the two pairs differed in skill level and had the same parenthood status, which changed randomly for all four candidates across jobs. In the other half, they differed in parenthood status and had the same level of skills, which changed randomly across jobs. Hence, there were two possible sources of variation in skills and parenthood statuses: variations among fake candidates applying for the same job and variations among fake candidates applying for different jobs.

In all models, the independent variables of substantive interest are candidates' sex, qualification level, and parenthood status. In all models, we test whether differences in callback probabilities between men and women differ for candidates with alternative skills and parenthood status via two-way interaction effects between gender and each of the other variables of interest. In all models, we also use two types of controls, linked to the characteristics of either the applications or the job openings.⁵ For the former, the characteristics are: the order in which the application was sent within the set, and whether it was within a set of two, four, or six applications (and for the four-application sets, whether the trait that was fixed for all candidates was their level of skills or parenthood status). Among the latter controls, we included the number of other applicants that had applied for the job at the time we sent our first application, whether or not the job bestowed supervisory and decision-making power; the level of education required by the job; whether the three-digit occupational category to which the job belonged was male or female dominated, or mixed; and the city in which the job was offered.

Results

We start the presentation of the results by displaying the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. [Table 1](#) summarizes the number of applications and callback rates obtained for groups of fake applicants defined by their sex, skill level, and parenthood status.

The overall callback rate was 9.3 per cent⁶ (see lowest right-hand corner of [Table 1](#)), which is within the standard of previous audit studies ([Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004](#); [Quadlin, 2018](#)) despite the high unemployment rate of the country. As expected, candidates with higher qualifications on their résumés were called in larger numbers than candidates with lower qualifications (11.6 per cent vs. 6.7 per cent). Additionally, childless candidates received more callbacks than candidates with children (10.2 per cent vs. 8.4 per cent). More importantly for this study, men were called back in higher proportions than women (10.9 per cent vs. 7.7 per cent). Finally, [Table 1](#) shows that even in the sub-group of women subject to lower discrimination (highly qualified non-mothers) men were called back in higher proportions than women (13.6 per cent vs. 12.4 per cent).

The results in [Table 1](#) may indicate the presence of discriminatory practices against women, but robust hypotheses testing can only be carried out after controlling for the effects of relevant explanatory variables, and

Table 1. Number of applications and callback probabilities by candidates' sex, skill level, and parenthood status

	Candidates' skill levels and sex									
	Low			High			Total			
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	
Candidates' parenthood status										
Childless	<i>f</i>	664	662	1,326	730	728	1,458	1,394	1,390	2,784
	<i>P</i>	0.093	0.048	0.071	0.136	0.124	0.130	0.115	0.088	0.102
With children	<i>f</i>	649	649	1,298	769	769	1,538	1,418	1,418	2,836
	<i>P</i>	0.076	0.049	0.062	0.126	0.079	0.103	0.103	0.066	0.084
Total	<i>f</i>	1,313	1,311	2,624	1,499	1,497	2,996	2,812	2,808	5,620
	<i>P</i>	0.085	0.049	0.067	0.131	0.101	0.116	0.109	0.077	0.093

Table 2. Multilevel logit of being called back for an interview, by candidates' sex, level of qualification, and parenthood status, and controlling for key characteristics of the application and the job opening

	Coefficient	SE
Female	-0.86 ^{b,c}	0.242
High skills	0.57 ^b	0.200
Female # high skill	0.43 ^c	0.267
With children	-0.28	0.186
Female # with children	-0.34 ^c	0.256
Masculinised occupation	-1.45 ^b	0.296
Feminized occupation	-1.34 ^b	0.328
Non-managerial	-1.15 ^b	0.270
Low education job	-0.71 ^b	0.300
High education job	-1.50 ^b	0.306
Barcelona	1.26 ^b	0.255
No. of applications	-0.00 ^b	0.001
Order of application	0.01	0.057
4 application sets (parenthood status fixed)	0.76	1.225
4 application sets (skill level fixed)	1.51	1.219
6 application sets	-0.56	1.293
Constant	-3.80 ^b	1.260
/lnsig2u	2.03 ^b	0.133
Sigma_u	2.76 ^b	0.183
Rho	0.70 ^b	0.028

Notes: Baseline: male, low skilled, childless, mixed occupation, managerial, mid-education job, Madrid, 0 previous applicants, sent first, only two applications sent.

^bSignificant at the 0.01 level.

^cDirectional test.

after conducting inferential significance tests. These analyses are conducted in a multilevel logit model framework, the results of which are presented in Table 2.

Focussing on the variables of substantive interest, the results in Table 2 suggest that women are significantly

more discriminated against by employers than men. These gender discriminatory practices are not significantly different among candidates with lower and higher qualifications or among candidates with and without children.⁷ However, the direction of the differences is as expected in our two hypotheses concerning statistical discrimination—higher gender discrimination among less qualified applicants and among candidates with children.

We next test if the lack of significant interaction effects between candidates' gender and level of skills and between gender and parenthood status also manifests in the multilevel ordered logit model that uses a more refined dependent variable. This variable measures not only whether candidates are called back for an interview but also the order in which they are called if they are selected for the interview. Table 3 summarizes the results of this multilevel ordered logit model.

The cut points at the bottom of the table indicate the thresholds on the latent variable governing the probability across all jobs that a candidate would be chosen with a different priority or not at all. Cut point 1 is the estimated threshold on this latent variable used to distinguish candidates chosen in the last (fifth) place compared to candidates who were not selected for an interview (whose cut point is set to 0). Cut point 2 is the estimated threshold on the latent variable used to distinguish candidates chosen in fourth place from those chosen in fifth place; and so on until cut point 5, which is the estimated threshold that separates candidates chosen in first place from candidates chosen in second place.

The values of the cut points give a sense of the distance (in terms of probability) of falling into each category of the dependent variable. The 'distance' between the score 0 assigned to the baseline and cut point 1 is much larger (3.683) than the distance between cut points 1 and 2 (3.691–3.683 = 0.008). The scaling of the

Table 3. Multilevel ordered logit of being called back for an interview, by candidates' sex, level of qualification, and parenthood status, and controlling for key characteristics of the application and the job opening

	Coefficient	SE
Female	-0.57 ^{a,b}	0.229
High skills	0.28	0.185
Female # high skill	0.47 ^{a,c}	0.251
With children	0.21	0.178
Female # with children	-0.56 ^{a,b}	0.245
Masculinised occupation	-1.19 ^b	0.241
Feminized occupation	-2.33 ^b	0.329
Non-managerial	-0.71 ^b	0.225
Low education job	-0.08	0.257
High education job	-0.94 ^b	0.261
Barcelona	1.19 ^b	0.219
No. of applications	-0.00 ^b	0.001
Order of application	0.53	0.998
4 application sets (parenthood status fixed)	0.75	0.989
4 application sets (skill level fixed)	-0.75	1.053
6 application sets	0.04	0.054
Cutpoint 1	3.68 ^b	1.036
Cutpoint 2	3.69 ^b	1.036
Cutpoint 3	3.80 ^b	1.037
Cutpoint 4	4.03 ^b	1.038
Cutpoint 5	4.60 ^b	1.040
Variance constant	4.44 ^b	0.663

Notes: Baseline: male, low skilled, childless, mixed occupation, managerial, mid-education job, Madrid, 0 previous applicants, sent first, only two applications sent.

^aDirectional test.

^bSignificant at the 0.01 level.

^cSignificant at the 0.05 level.

cut points in the dependent variable allows the coefficients in Table 3 to be interpreted as per a regular multi-level model with an interval dependent variable, as the change in the mean of the dependent variable per unit change in each independent variable (for continuous independent variables), or as the difference in the predicted mean of the dependent variable between any category of interest and the baseline category represented by candidates who were never called back (for categorical independent variables).

The effects of the controls on the mean of the rescaled variable trend in the same direction as those estimated previously for the logit model. Application characteristics have no impact on whether or not candidates are selected for an interview and the order in which it occurs. In terms of job characteristics, those that typically have a mixed male–female composition, that do not require much decision-making, that require

medium levels of education, that were offered in Barcelona, and that received lower numbers of applications from non-fake candidates, all display higher scores in the optimally rescaled dependent variable, meaning that these candidates were given priority over other candidates by employers in the selection process.

The coefficients for the variables of substantive interest also trend in the same direction as in the multilevel logit model. The main difference is that the interaction effects between candidates' gender and skills and between candidates' gender and parenthood status are now significant (directional tests). The results show that applications by women are given significantly less priority by employers than applications by men, thus confirming the hypothesis on *gender discrimination*. This penalty is reduced if they have higher observable qualifications (see the positive coefficient for the interaction between sex and skills), thus confirming the hypothesis on *discrimination based on descriptive stereotypes*—that women's disadvantage can be at least partially offset with higher standardizable qualifications, possibly because these qualifications compensate for any deficits in unstandardizable skills unobservable to us, the experimenters, which employers associate with female candidates. The results also show that women's disadvantage increases significantly when they are mothers (see the negative coefficient for the interaction effect between sex and having children), thus confirming the hypothesis on *discrimination based on prescriptive stereotypes*—that women face a double disadvantage as females and mothers, possibly because employers expect their productivity at work to be negatively affected by their family commitments. Finally, the results show that contrary to what was posited in the hypothesis on *prejudicial discrimination*, discrimination against women is not significant for the group of women with the highest probability of being called back for further screening—highly qualified non-mothers. This can be more easily appreciated when an equivalent model to the one displayed in Table 3 is estimated in which the reference category for the candidates' skills variable is switched to 'high skills'. In this model, the coefficient for female's main effect is negative (-0.10) but non-significant ($P = 0.305$ in a directional test).

Figure 1 displays the probabilities for male and female candidates with low and high levels of qualifications and with and without children, predicted by the multilevel ordered logit in Table 2.

The discrimination faced by females relative to males crystallises into an overall significant reduction of approximately 35 per cent in the probability of being called back for an interview⁸ This penalty varies




Figure 1. Predicted cumulative probabilities of being selected for an interview in different orders, by candidates' productivity marks and gender

significantly according to candidates' qualification levels and parenthood status. It is 23.4 per cent lower if women have higher skills, but increases to 46.6 per cent if they have lower levels of qualifications than similar men. It declines to a 20.3 per cent lower callback probability if they do not have children, but it rises to a 46.7 per cent lower probability if they do. Even in the most favourable case (highly qualified non-mothers), women experience a penalty of 6.7 per cent compared to their male counterparts, but it is statistically insignificant.

By fitting a multilevel multinomial logit model and comparing its results with those yielded by the multilevel ordered logit, we tested the parallel regression assumption that, on average, the estimated coefficients in this latter model are constant across all categories of the dependent variable. We could not reject this assumption.⁹ However, we found some differences between specific coefficients that helped refine our previous findings.¹⁰ Thus, we found that the weakening of gender discrimination among highly qualified candidates occurs significantly only if candidates are *not* called in first or second position.¹¹ The higher probability that more qualified candidates have of being selected applies to men when they are high on the list of employers' prospective candidates, while for women it applies only when they are in lower positions. This finding suggests that the mechanism by which women may overcome any perceived deficits in productivity with higher observable qualifications, operates only when employers run out of

candidates. In contrast, the penalty for mothers applies mainly to women's chances of being given priority consideration (of being called in first or second position).¹²

Conclusion and Discussion

We have tested whether employers discriminate against women in the labour market in two major Spanish cities (Madrid and Barcelona). To assess if such discriminatory practices do indeed occur, we carried out a correspondence study in which we sent fake and equivalent résumés from non-existent male and female candidates to a large and heterogeneous sample of job openings advertised via the main Internet service operating in both cities. We then waited to see if employers reacted more favourably to men's applications than to women's applications.

In contrast to most existing studies into gender discrimination, we sent more than one set of matched-pair male–female applications to each job opening. The sets were differentiated by candidates' skill levels—sufficient to meet the requirements of the job or clearly in excess of these requirements—and by their parenthood status—with or without children. This design allowed us to test some important hypotheses about the extent to which employers base their discriminatory practices on an aversion to women, possibly rooted in segregated forms of gender socialization during childhood, or on the use of informational and evaluative shortcuts based

on gender stereotypes about female and male applicants' different qualifications and proper roles in society. If employers adapted their decisions to applicants' personal characteristics, taking into account how much these deviate from cognitive expectations and social prescriptions, they would be committing statistical discrimination grounded on stereotypes. If they adopted the same discriminatory behaviour regardless of candidates' idiosyncrasies, their behaviour could be more easily attributed to an invariant emotional response, and to prejudicial discrimination.

The different variations we constructed on candidates' CVs during the experiment—variations in skills which met or exceeded the posting or variations in parenthood status (with or without children)—further allowed us to test two hypotheses about the extent to which stereotypical discrimination was based on descriptive or prescriptive stereotypes. The results of our analyses supported the hypothesis about the overall presence of gender discrimination and the two hypotheses about statistical discrimination based on descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes, but we could detect the latter only when we used a refined version of our dependent variable that considered the order in which employers called the candidates back for an interview. In contrast, we could not detect a significant presence of prejudicial discrimination against the group of women with the highest probability of being selected for further screening.

The paper makes both empirical and methodological contributions to the field of gender discrimination in the labour market. Empirically, we were able to demonstrate that employers do discriminate against women in their hiring processes. More importantly, in line with previous research (Neumark *et al.*, 1996; Baumle and Fossett, 2005; Correll *et al.*, 2007), we have provided strong evidence that this discrimination has a 'statistical' basis, as it is grounded in employers' stereotypes about the potentially lower productivity of female applicants. We have shown that these deficits are associated both with potential gaps in abilities that are difficult to include in a standard résumé and with mothers' and fathers' prescriptive roles as, respectively, committed housekeepers and workers.

We have also contributed to improving the experimental approach applied to correspondence studies by sending two, rather than just one, set of matched-pair, male–female applications to the same job opening. The sets distinguished pairs of candidates by the factors we were interested in examining in terms of their effects on gender discriminatory practices—candidates' qualifications and parenthood status. By alternating the factors

by which pairs of candidates were distinguished, we could save resources and significantly reduce the requisite sample size for the experiment. Additionally, this design allowed us to consider potentially undesirable experimental effects in matched-pair correspondence studies linked to the decision to refuse employers' invitations to attend a job interview when these invitations occur. In a typical correspondence study, in which two applications are sent to the same job opening and there are few other credible applicants, a refusal by, for example, a fake male applicant to continue in the selection process might increase the probability of approaching the fake female applicant, thus obscuring the extent of discrimination against women. Such experimental effects are less likely to occur when there are several fake male and female candidates and can be captured by considering the order in which successful candidates are called for further screening.

This study is not without limitations. First, as previous research on the sources of discrimination has noted (Heckman, 1998; Neumark, 2012), stereotypical discrimination may be based, not only on expectations or prescriptions about men and women's average qualifications, but also on the dispersion of such qualifications in the two sexes, resulting in higher or lower uncertainties about candidates' future productivities. A second limitation is that we cannot confirm if mothers' double disadvantage as women and parents is the result of employers' prescriptive views about their 'natural' nurturing roles, as we interpreted it here, or of their expectations about mothers' lower commitment to work. That parenthood status is not associated with lower effort is demonstrated by our finding that fathers have a higher probability of being selected for further screening than non-fathers. Hence, we think it reasonable to conclude, in line with previous studies (Benard and Correll, 2010), that any expectations about mothers' lower commitments to work are based on prescriptive views about their proper place at home. In any case, both interpretations are complementary rather than alternative.

Finally, more work is needed to assess the characteristics of jobs that foster or mitigate discrimination against women vis-à-vis employers' hiring practices. We controlled for some of the key job characteristics that the literature has previously argued could affect gender discriminatory practices. Our sampling strategy was intended to explore discrimination across a wide range of contexts and occupations, giving the same weight to each. This helped us obtain analytical estimates of discrimination and its forms that are insensitive to the specific distribution of jobs in the labour markets analysed. This was only partially accomplished, since we could

not find as many jobs as planned that required significant decision-making. Very probably, this had the effect of underestimating gender discrimination, as this has been shown to be lower in jobs that require fewer agentic qualities from workers. More research is necessary to assess if the characteristics and requirements of the jobs and labour markets where they are placed exert a moderating or exacerbating influence on gender discrimination. This line of inquiry, too, shall be the focus of our future work.

Notes

- 1 We used micro-data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (second quarter) to estimate the main characteristics of occupations (sex ratios and required levels of education). We classified occupations according to three broad categories: low level, with a mean of primary education (delivery men/women, waiting persons, sales clerks, foremen/women, head chefs, and store managers); medium level with a mean of secondary education (computer technicians, estate agents, office clerks, heads of logistics, warehouse managers, and supervising clerks); and high level with a mean of university degree (industrial engineers, tax advisors, physiotherapists, marketing directors, senior lawyers, and senior nurses). The degree of decision-making was derived from the wording of the job offer. Managerial jobs required some of the following characteristics: decision-making (made explicit in the advertisement), assuming responsibilities, supervising tasks, making decisions on objectives but not on procedures, experience more important than education, normally entail high earnings. Non-managerial jobs did not explicitly mention decision-making, entailed low responsibility, no supervising tasks, decisions on procedures but not objectives, and the job offers valued more education than experience and entailed low earnings. We validated the design of the correspondence study with a pilot that took place between mid-June and mid-July in 2016 for six occupations. The purpose of the pilot was to test whether main treatments (i.e., skills and parenthood status) were clearly identified by employers. We also conducted interviews with HR managers to understand how they viewed and identified main characteristics in online *résumés*.
- 2 In 13 of the job openings applied for, the employer closed the selection process before we could send all four applications. In all cases, we were able to send at least one pair of matched male–female applications and observe employers’ reactions. Sending a set of four applications for each posting at one time would give rise to suspicion of fake CVs. We decided to send job applications for each post randomly with a time interval of 45 minutes between each. We sent six applications for a subsample of job openings (about 8.4 per cent of the total number of applications) in the pilot study to assess if the between-jobs comparisons yielded the same results as the within-jobs comparisons. In the analyses reported, we control for the number of applications sent to each job.
- 3 In our design, we also explored the possibility that the differential treatment shown by the same employer towards women with one trait of interest (e.g., low skills) could vary according to the other trait of interest (e.g., if they had children) by sending six applications to a small subset of job openings (79 job openings, or about 8.5 per cent of all vacancies applied to). These subsets contained three pairs of matched male–female applications. Two pairs differed in one of the characteristics of interest (e.g., low vs. high level of qualifications), while they had the same trait corresponding to the second differentiation (e.g., they all had children). The third pair had the opposite trait in this second differentiation (e.g., they did not have children) and either one of the two traits of the first differentiation (e.g., they had low qualifications). The characteristics of the pairs were alternated across job openings to have all possible combinations and comparisons. In the analyses, we controlled for the number of applications sent to each job opening: two (when the employers closed the application process before we could send all four applications), four, or six. In the most typical case in which we sent four applications, we controlled for whether the trait that was fixed in all four applications was candidates’ qualification levels or parenthood status.
- 4 See note 3 above. While in principle a candidate could be called back in sixth place, we did not observe any instance in which this possibility materialized.
- 5 The main results hardly change with or without controls.
- 6 It is possible that this rate may be underestimated, as some of the applications appeared in the online

service as not having been read by the employers, and we could not ascertain whether this was indeed the case or if it simply reflected that the service had not updated the status of these applications.

- 7 This conclusion also holds for the differences in the partial or marginal effects of sex across skill levels and parenthood status that can be calculated from Table 2, which are available upon request.
- 8 We report the cumulative probabilities of being selected in all possible orders for an interview against the probability of not being selected at all.
- 9 $\chi^2 = 24.02$, $P = 0.089$. The Brant test is not implementable in the software we used to estimate the multilevel ordered logit. Hence, we fitted a generalized structural equation model with two levels of analysis (jobs and candidates) and with the multinomial logit as the link function. Because of low callback counts at higher orders of selection, we recoded the dependent variable into only three levels: never called; called in third, fourth, fifth, or sixth place; and called in first or second place. The χ^2 value reported above corresponds to a Wald test for the linear equality of all coefficients.
- 10 Full details of these results are available upon request.
- 11 The interaction effect for women and skills is -0.83 (standard error = 0.36) for the contrast between being called in a third, fourth, fifth, or sixth place or never but only -0.42 (standard error = 0.35) for the contrast between being called first or second or never.
- 12 The interaction effect for being a woman and having children is -0.47 (standard error = 0.35) for the contrast between being called in the last place and -0.77 (standard error = 0.33) for the contrast between being called with high priority and never.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are available at ESR online.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Julia Rubio, Juan Ramon Jiménez, Guillem Subirachs for their contribution to the field work. The authors also thank the Barcelona MAR Health Park Consortium for reviewing the ethical aspects of this research, and the four anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.

Funding

This research has been supported by Recercaixa2014.

References

- Albert, R., Escot, L. and Fernández-Cornejo, J. A. (2011). A field experiment to study sex and age discrimination in the madrid labour market. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, **22**, 351–375.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Baumle, A. K. and Fossett, M. (2005). Statistical discrimination in employment: its practice, conceptualization, and implications for public policy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, **48**, 1250–1274.
- Becker, G. S. (1985). Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor. *Journal of Labor Economics*, **3**, S33–S58.
- Benard, S. and Correll, S. J. (2010). Normative discrimination and the motherhood penalty. *Gender & Society*, **24**, 616–646.
- Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. *American Economic Review*, **94**, 991–1013.
- Bruhn, M. and McKenzie, D. (2009). In pursuit of balance: randomization in practice in development field experiments. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, **1**, 200–232.
- Bygren, M., Erlandsson, A. and Gähler, M. (2017). Do employers prefer fathers? Evidence from a field experiment testing the gender by parenthood interaction effect on callbacks to job applications. *European Sociological Review*, **33**, 337–348.
- Byron, R. A. and Roscigno, V. J. (2014). Relational power, legitimation, and pregnancy discrimination. *Gender & Society*, **28**, 435–462.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Correll, S. J., Benard, S. and Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: is there a motherhood penalty? *American Journal of Sociology*, **112**, 1297–1339.
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T. and Glick, P. (2004). When professionals become mothers, warmth doesn't cut the ice. *Journal of Social Issues*, **60**, 701–718.
- England, P. (1994). Neoclassical economists' theories of discrimination. In Burstein, P. (Ed.), *Equal Employment Opportunity: Labor Market Discrimination and Public Policy*. New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 59–70.
- Fernández-Muñoz, Á. and Blasco-Camacho, M. (2012). *Estrategias de Búsqueda de Empleo*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Financieros.
- Fuegen, K., Biernat, M., Haines, E. and Deaux, K. (2004). Mothers and fathers in the workplace: how gender and parental status influence judgments of job-related competence. *Journal of Social Issues*, **60**, 737–754.
- Gatrell, C. J. (2011). 'I'm a bad mum': pregnant presenteeism and poor health at work. *Social Science & Medicine*, **72**, 478–485.

- Glass, C. and Fodor, É. (2011). Public maternalism goes to market: recruitment, hiring, and promotion in postsocialist Hungary. *Gender & Society*, 25, 5–26.
- Glick, P. and Hilt, L. (2000). Combative children to ambivalent adults: the development of gender prejudice. In Eckes, T. and Trautner, H. M. (Eds.), *The Developmental Social Psychology of Gender*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, pp. 243–272.
- Greene, W. H. (2012). *Econometric Analysis*. 7th Edition, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Hays, S. (1996). *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Heckman, J. J. (1998). Detecting discrimination. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 12, 101–116.
- Hodson, G. and Dhont, K. (2015). The person-based nature of prejudice: individual difference predictors of intergroup negativity. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 26, 1–42.
- Jaret, C. (1995). *Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Relations*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Larribeau, S., Maslet, D. and Peterle, E. (2013). Une mesure expérimentale de la discrimination homme/femme à l'embauche. *Revue D'économie Politique*, 123, 333–351.
- León, M. and Pavolini, E. (2014). 'Social investment' or back to 'familism': the impact of the economic crisis on family and care policies in Italy and Spain. *South European Society & Politics*, 19, 353–369.
- Lundberg, S. and Startz, R. (1983). Private discrimination and social intervention in competitive labor markets. *American Economic Review*, 73, 340–347.
- Neumark, D. (2012). Detecting discrimination in audit and correspondence studies. *Journal of Human Resources*, 47, 1128–1157.
- Neumark, D., Bank, R. J. and Van Nort, K. D. (1996). Sex discrimination in restaurant hiring: an Audit Study. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111, 915–941.
- Petit, P. (2007). The effects of age and family constraints on gender hiring discrimination: a field experiment in the French financial sector. *Labour Economics*, 14, 371–391.
- Quadlin, N. (2018). The mark of a woman's record: gender and academic performance in hiring. *American Sociological Review*, 83, 331–360.
- Reskin, B. F. and Roos, P. A. (1990). *Job Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women's Inroads into Male Occupations*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Riach, P. A. and Rich, J. (2002). Field experiments of discrimination in the market place. *The Economic Journal*, 112, F480–F518.
- Ridgeway, C. L. and Correll, S. J. (2004). Motherhood as a status characteristic. *Journal of Social Issues*, 60, 683–700.
- Rudman, L. A. and Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and Backlash toward agentic women. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57, 743–762.
- Sahni, H and Paul, S.L. (2010). Women in top management and job self selection. *Social Science Research Network Electronic Journal*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2870673> (December 2018).
- Russo, N. (1976). The motherhood mandate. *Journal of Social Issues*, 32, 143–153.
- Skyt Nielsen, H., Simonsen, M. and Verner, M. (2004). Does the gap in family-friendly policies drive the family gap? *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 106, 721–744.
- Uggen, C. et al. (2014). The edge of stigma: an experimental audit of the effects of low-level criminal records on employment. *Criminology*, 52, 627–654.
- Weichselbaumer, D. (2004). Is it sex or personality? The impact of sex-stereotypes on discrimination in applicant selection. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 30, 159–186.
- M. José González** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political and Social Science at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona (Spain). Her research interests include family formation, child care, fatherhood, domestic work, and gender inequalities. Her recent work has appeared in *European Journal of Women's Studies*, *European Societies*, and *Population Research and Policy Review*.
- Clara Cortina** is a Lecturer in the Department of Political and Social Science at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona (Spain). Her research interests include changes in partnership and family dynamics in contemporary Europe. Her recent work has appeared in *Demographic Research*, *Review of Economics of the Household*, *European Journal of Population*, and *Population and Development Review*.
- Jorge Rodríguez** is an Associate Professor Serra Hunter in Sociology and Criminology at the Department of Political and Social Sciences in Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona (Spain). His research interests include occupational change, social mobility, status attainment, and social capital from a cross-national perspective, criminology and its studies of violence against women. His recent work has appeared *Social Science Research*, *European Political Science Review*, *European Sociological Review*, and *Sociological Methods and Research*.

Appendix 1: Occupations According to the Required Levels of Education, Sex Ratios, and Degree of Decision-Making: Number of Vacancies and Applications (in Parentheses) in Each of the Sampled Occupations

	Male-dominated	Mixed	Female-dominated		
Non-Managerial	Delivery men/women 93 (374)	Waiting persons 97 (462)	Sales clerks 84 (336)	Low	Educational level
	Computer technicians 104 (416)	Estate agents 108 (432)	Office clerks 94 (376)	Medium	
	Industrial engineers 70 (280)	Tax advisors 107 (428)	Physiotherapists 71 (296)	High	
Managerial	Foremen/women 34 (136)	Head chefs 108 (432)	Store managers 24 (96)	Low	
	Heads of logistics 77 (308)	Warehouse managers 58 (232)	Supervising clerks 40 (198)	Medium	
	Marketing directors 64 (256)	Senior lawyers 108 (432)	Senior nurses 31 (130)	High	

Appendix 2: Samples of Resumes for a Tax Advisor*

Resume ≠ 1 (Mother)

Marta Gutierrez Ramírez
Date of birth: July 2, 1977
Street X, n° - Barcelona
email@yahoo.com

Experience

Tax advisor
C & O Auditors
March 2014—currently

Tax advisor
GRUPO GTA CONSULTING
February 2011 to January 2013

Tax advisor
AUDIAXIS Taxers SL.
March 2004 to November 2006

Tax advisor
CARSOE Industries
February 2000 to September 2001

Education

Business Administration and Management
University of Girona
October 1994-November 1998

Languages

English B2

Resume (uploaded)

Additional information (optional):

Married with children.

I graduated in Business Administration and Management, specialized in taxation.

I am passionate about my work, and I want to continue learning.

Resume ≠ 2 (**Childless woman**)

Cristina Castillo Martínez

Date of birth: December 14, 1979

Street X, n° - Barcelona

email@yahoo.com

Experience

Tax advisor

Hewlett Packard

March 2014—currently

Tax advisor

SerSERVICE

January 2011 to December 2012

Tax advisor

GRUPO EMPRESARIAL RIBE ALAT SL.

Julio 2008 to December 2010

Tax advisor

AUDILEX

March 2004 to November 2006

Tax advisor

TGG Legal Servicios Jurídicos, fiscales y asesores financieros

February 2001 to September 2001

Education

Business Administration and Management

Pompeu Fabra University

September 1996 to September 1999

Languages

English B2

Resume (uploaded)

Additional information (optional):

Married, no children.

I am a tax consultant in Barcelona, where I live with my husband. I love my job, and I am demanding with my own work.

Resume ≠ 3 (Father)

Marc Domínguez Molina
Date of birth: January 1, 1979
Street X, n° - Barcelona
email@yahoo.com

Experience

Tax advisor
BIOCOP PRODUCTOS BIOLÓGICOS
March 2014—currently

Tax advisor
Financial Projects DUA
February 2011 to December 2012

Tax advisor
SEGESTION S.L.
July 2008 to December 2010

Tax advisor
AGROFRESC, S.L.
March 2004 to November 2006

Tax advisor
PLETA AUDITORES
February 2000 to September 2001

Education

Business Administration and Management
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
October 1995-November 1998

Languages

English B2

Resume (uploaded)

Additional information (optional):

Father of two kids.

Tax expert:

- Company law: advice to the company and its partners in all phases of their social life
- Commercial contracting: banking, collaboration, agency, franchise, distribution, etc.
- Bank and financial Law

Resume ≠ 4 (**Childless man**)

José Antonio Cortés Rubio
Date of birth: August 27, 1979
Street X, n° - Barcelona
email@yahoo.com

Experience

Tax advisor
SECONDA Obras y Construcciones S.A.
March 2014—currently

Tax advisor
Aruba Advisors
January 2011 to December 2012

Tax advisor
MAZARS ASOCIATE LAERS AND TAX ADVISORS
July 2008 to December 2010

Tax advisor
AUDITIA IBERIA
March 2004 to November 2006

Tax advisor
Granja d'en Roca
February 2000 to September 2001

Education

Business Administration and Management
University of Barcelona
October 1996-November 1999

Languages

English B2

Resume (uploaded)

Additional information (optional):

Married, without children.

I am a tax consultant and accountant. I have worked in five companies so far. I have learned a lot from all of them, and they have all supported me throughout my career to achieve current position.

*Resumes included a personalized telephone number, address, and e-mail. The names of universities and companies are real.