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*The Syrian Refugee Labor Supply Shock in
Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon:
A Literature Review of Critical Impacts on Labor
Markets, Economies and Policies*

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Editor's note

This Working Paper is based on a reworking of a Master's thesis for the Master in Migration Studies. It was selected as the most outstanding Master Thesis during the academic year 2019-2020 and completed at Pompeu Fabra University.

Abstract

It is well documented that Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are the countries accepting the highest number of Syrian refugees in the world. Syrians have helped to increase the growth rate of economies and create jobs but concerns exist about competition and stagnation in wages for low skilled nationals due to the labor supply shock. This paper, based on a thorough exploration of the literature, finds a critical lack of sustained research on refugee impacts on host countries' labor markets, economies and politics in Middle Eastern contexts. It endeavors to identify the impacts of the Syrian refugee labor supply shocks in the host countries of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan on national economies and labor markets and on national policies.

Keywords

Labor markets, Syrian refugees, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon

Author's biographical note



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From forced migration to labor market integration: the national and international context of Syrian refugees' acceptance in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan in the light of a literature review

Labor migration is often a planned process on the part of both host country governments, employers and immigrants. Their objectives may differ, as determinants on the part of migrants may relate to income maximization or social networks (Massey 1990; Borjas 1989), while employers may be seeking to reduce labor costs or fill job vacancies that natives are uninterested in, and governments in host countries could be interested in overall economic growth. Labor immigration policy plays a large role in structuring if and how migrants can enter and legally work in host countries--government objectives can be rooted in concerns for economic efficiency, distribution, national identity, social cohesion and national security (Ruhs 2013; Freeman & Mirilovic, 2016).


Labor migration implies that migrants move for economic reasons, but there are some categories of migrants who move in a less optional context. Refugees in particular, are a notable group which often migrate unprepared for the host country labor market. Tubergen, Maas and Flap (2004) found that politically motivated immigrants, referring to refugees, are less favorably selected for the labor market than economically motivated immigrants. There are a number of resulting phenomena that can explain the low labor market performance of refugees. First, refugees experience a high degree of skills mismatch, due to issues with credentialing or documentation—thus, they are much more likely to be overqualified in their jobs than other migrants or natives (Dumont, Liebig, Peschner, Tanay & Xenogiani 2014). They may also experience discrimination in the work place or hiring process, which hinders their labor market prospects (Lundborg 2013) (Bloch 2007) (Archer, Hollingworth, Maylor, Sheibani & Kowarzik 2005). Several studies have described these effects as a “refugee gap”, referring to the cumulative disadvantages scarring refugee careers in comparison with other migrant groups (Bakker, Dagevos & Engbersen 2017).

Government motivations and capacity to accept labor migrants are often obvious, but how particular host countries accept large numbers of refugees, despite the associated political burdens, is not as clear. One answer could be humanitarian concerns or solidarity with refugees. In Karen Jacobsen's (1996) study of the topic, she identifies four other factors which explain host government responses to mass refugee populations. They are the costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with sending countries, political calculations about the local community's absorption capacity and national security (Jacobsen 1996). These factors show that while a host country may be willing to accept refugees due to international assistance, the

conditions of refugee life in the host country may reflect concerns about integration and local community absorption capacity or national security. Here, absorption capacity can refer to social, economic or political considerations about the integration process. Zeynep Şahin Mencütek and Ayat J. Nashwan's (2020) study of the voices informing labor market integration of Syrian refugees in Jordan echo Jacobsen's factors. The authors list four critical perspectives: the host state perspective, materialized through legal regulations about refugee employment; the refugee perspective that refers to refugees' access to labor market and challenges they face; the host community perspective that shapes the recognition, approval, or reactions of hosts to refugee employment; and the donor perspective which brings in international aid or advocates for rights.

While refugee economic integration has been studied at length in Europe and North America (Dumont, Liebig, Peschner, Tanay & Xenogiani, 2016) (Fasani, Frattini & Minale, 2018), less focus has been placed in developing host countries including those in the Middle East, despite the high volume refugee flow into countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. As demonstrated in Figure 1, Middle Eastern countries, including the countries of focus in this paper, host some of the highest concentrations of refugees in the world. In many cases, these countries in the Middle East are perceived as “gatekeepers” to Europe, accepting large refugee populations in exchange for funding and other forms of support (Sirkeci, 2017). This phenomenon has been termed “externalization” and has contributed, alongside geographic explanations, to the large refugee populations in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (Zaiotti, 2018). The persistence of externalization in a number of EU peripheries exhibits and reflects the role of international relations and politics in influencing policies that govern refugees. In refugee policies, host country governments play a balancing act between international and domestic political interests, in particular in low- or middle-income countries. Accepting refugees and distributing forms of assistance or partial labor market access work to comply with international standards promoted by international bodies like the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). Meanwhile, granting only temporary protection, limited or partial access to the labor market and overall protracted uncertainty (Biehl, 2015) can work to satisfy domestic concerns and sustain the prospect of return migration. However, regardless of host country governments plans, refugees inevitably find their way to the labor market and it is often considered a wise choice for governments to anticipate this with worker formalization.

Figure 1: Global Distribution of Refugees, (World Bank, 2018c)



In a Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang and Jimmy Graham's (2018) Center for Global Development report, the authors identify another five contextual factors that can affect the outcomes of extending labor market access to refugees: the extent of informal labor market access, the demographic and skill profile of refugees, labor market characteristics, geographic location and concentration and the policy choices and the political context. In Figure 2, those factors are briefly explored for each of the host countries of analysis in this paper.

Figure 2: Some Factors Affecting the Labor Market Integration of Refugees

Country	Turkey	Jordan	Lebanon
Refugee Population	3,579,008 (UNHCR, 2020c)	656,733 (UNHCR, 2020a)	910,256 (UNHCR, 2020b)
International Agreements	-EU-Turkey Deal	-Jordan Compact	-LCRP and EU-Lebanon Compact
Political Context	-The government did not characterize Syrian arrivals as refugees. The conflict in Syria was described as a humanitarian crisis. -Turkey has a heavily politicized view of refugees.	-The government depicted the refugee crisis as both humanitarian and developmental, securing more funding per capita -At times, the view of refugees was as an investment or opportunity for economic growth.	-Lebanon's history with Palestinian refugees largely informs treatment towards Syrians. -The government views refugees as very temporary guests without futures in the country.
Informal labor market access	-A large informal economy existed prior to the inflow of refugees.	-A large informal economy existed prior to the inflow of refugees. The Jordanian informal economy is larger than Turkey and Lebanon's.	-A large informal economy existed prior to the inflow of refugees.
Demographic and skill profile of refugees	-The refugee population mostly works in low skilled jobs. -Syrians are disadvantaged without Turkish language abilities.	-The refugee population mostly works in low skilled jobs. -Low skilled refugees can more easily access the informal economy than the formal but experience poor conditions. They can be found in sectors like agriculture, construction and manufacturing.	-The refugee population mostly works in low skilled jobs. -More than half of refugees are women and children (Government of Lebanon, 2020)
Labor market characteristics	-Strong distinction between the formal and informal labor markets due to the bureaucratic obstacles created after the arrival of the Syrian refugees.	-The large Egyptian economic immigrant population competes with refugees for work. -Syrians are only allowed to work in particular sectors	-The pre-existing Syrian economic immigrant population competes with new Syrians for work. -The overall standards of work in Lebanon including salary expectations have dropped (Cherri et al., 2016).
Geographic location and concentration of refugees	-Early in the crisis, refugees could be found almost exclusively at the border but now 98% of Syrian refugees reside outside the Temporary Accommodation Centers and a high concentration live in highly urbanized areas where there are more jobs. Still, many live in border cities where they have access to pre-existing networks and ties	- Jordan has used the encampment of refugees as a tool to keep Syrians who are deemed "surplus labor" out of the labor market but still 84% of refugees reside outside the camps (Turner, 2015). -Higher unemployment rate of Syrian refugees in camps compared those not in camps	-The Lebanese government has refused formal encampment of refugees in order to avoid their long-term stay -Refugee communities are often found near poor Lebanese communities... the situation is particularly acute in Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel and Bekaa governorates, where almost 75% of individuals are unable to meet survival needs (Government of Lebanon, 2020)

Compared to Jacobsen's (1996) and Mencütek and Nashwan's (2020) studies, these factors account for more non-political phenomena and delve more into the labor market experiences as such. As these categorizations show, domestic and international policy interactions heavily shape the labor market participation and access of refugees. Often, governments heavily restrict refugee access to the labor market like in the case of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon due to the concerns described by Jacobsen, Mencütek and Nashwan and Clemens et al. This choice limits refugees' options and makes them vulnerable to mistreatment but does not stop refugees from seeking informal work. In fact, the majority of refugees work informally anyway. Even in this informal position, refugees have impacts on the labor market and economy as a whole. Still, denying refugees access to work permits is a policy choice with many implications and it is important to assess why governments are reluctant or entirely opposed to granting work permission.

Employment is considered an effective integration strategy but mass movements of refugees may be considered undesirable for integration, resulting in labor market restrictions (Bloch 2007). The undesirability of refugees in the labor market can be explained by many factors, most notably concern for domestic workers employment or wages and even concern about ethnic/sectarian tensions (Betts & Collier, 2015). A great deal of literature has studied the impact of refugee supply shocks or the same phenomenon under different names like "refugee inflows" (Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun & Tumen, 2015). Refugee supply shocks are defined in this paper as large refugee inflows, or more specifically, the phenomenon of large-scale movements of refugees into host countries and the subsequent impacts on labor markets, politics, society and the economy. George Borjas' (2017) studies of the impacts of multiple refugee supply shocks on labor markets, including the Mariel boatlift in 1980 and refugee flow of Jews to Israel in the early 1990s (Borjas & Monras, 2017), resulted in a conclusion that the humanitarian principles of encouraging mass refugee acceptance have distributional consequences for domestic labor markets. In Daniel Card's (1990) earlier study of the Mariel boatlift in 1980, he found that the large and sudden refugee inflow from Cuba to Miami had no effect on the wages or unemployment levels of local low-skilled workers. These studies differed in methodological approaches and in Borjas' (2017) view, Card's study neglected correlating wages and immigration across skill groups, resulting in vastly different results. Studies of other cases of refugee supply shocks have fallen on different sides of the debate. A study of the impact of internal refugees in Colombia found that the populations most affected by the supply shock were low-skilled and informal workers who were in direct competition with refugees for jobs and wages (Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez, 2016). These results suggest a potentially substantial impact

of refugee supply shocks but an opportunity for improved outcomes with distributional management of refugees throughout host countries and careful policymaking.

Other research has explored the impact of hosting refugees on host country economies. Many international organizations provide refugees with various types of cash assistance, food aid or housing in camps or other arrangements. This money has an impact, albeit an understudied one, on host country economies. Taylor et al. (2016) studied this impact in refugee camps in Rwanda and found that cash assistance to refugees has a significant positive impact on host country economies, specifically on the incomes of businesses and households near camps. Other studies in Tanzania have had similar results of a positive effect but some variation on the impact to households based on occupation (Maystadt & Verwimp, 2014). Similar studies assessing this impact have been conducted in the Middle East in the Syrian refugee supply shock context. It is important to note that refugees can have a net benefit on the economy despite substituting or displacing some groups of natives or economic immigrant workers, suggesting conflicting interests.

This paper is concerned with analyzing the main literature studying the economic and labor market impact and policy responses of host countries in the Middle East (including Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon) to the large Syrian refugee supply shocks. These countries experienced similar arrivals of refugees over a very short period of time in the past eight years as neighbors to Syria but some, like Turkey, experienced more sustained flows over time which have not been observed at every stage. As shown in Figure 3, currently Turkey has a registered refugee population of 4.1% (UNHCR, 2020c), Jordan has 6.4% (UNHCR, 2020a) and Lebanon has 13.3% (UNHCR, 2020b). These three countries host the highest number of Syrian refugees both in overall terms and proportionally to their population. While there are different dynamics in each country, they have a number of similarities. They are all classified as high middle-income countries (with average incomes per capita between \$3,996 to \$12,375) by the World Bank (The World Bank Group, 2020) and are affected similarly by regional phenomena like refugee flows and spill overs of conflict. Still, this forced stream of migration within the Middle East and to middle income countries in general is frequently neglected in the literature despite the high density of the population (Mahia, Arce, Koç & Bölük, 2019).

Figure 3: Basic Country Information

Country	Population (2020) (United Nations, 2019)	Size of refugee population (2020)	Refugee % of population	GDP per capita (World Bank, 2018b)	Unemployment rate (World Bank, 2020)	Change in GDP growth in percentage points 2012-2018 (World Bank, 2018a)	Surface area (sq. km) (World Bank, 2018c)
Turkey	84,339,067	3,579,008 (UNHCR, 2020c)	4.1%	\$9,370	12.9%	-1.97%	785,350
Jordan	10,203,134	656,733 (UNHCR, 2020a)	6.4%	\$4,241	14.6%	-0.71%	89,320
Lebanon	6,825,445	910,256 (UNHCR, 2020b)	13.3%	\$8,269	6.2%	-2.5%	10,450

In the rest of the paper, in the following literature Review section we explore the existing literature and summarize the main findings regarding impacts and subsequent policies to the supply shock in relation to the political context and policies; the impact of refugee supply shocks on natives in the labor markets; and impact of refugee supply shocks on the economy. The Gaps and Shortcomings in the Literature section will detail the limitations and gaps in this research and literature. Finally, the Conclusion section will summarize the findings, reiterate the importance of refugee labor market integration and offer insights into future policies.

Review of the literature on refugee supply shocks in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan: political context and policies and impacts on natives in the labor markets and on the economy

There have been a number of contributions to the literature on refugee supply shocks in the Middle East, even if they are disproportionately few in comparison to the magnitude of the inflow of Syrian refugees and the ensuing consequences for their labor markets and economies. Some of this literature focuses on the overall economy while other scholars are concerned with the labor market. Also important, is the literature on the policies and politics around refugee supply shocks, controlling refugee entry into the labor market. Here, the labor market integration is defined as employment and conditions of employment. The following table synthesizes some of the most relevant pieces of academic literature on the topic of the impacts and policies around refugee supply shocks in the Middle East. In Figure 4, the literature is listed in table to help reflect where there may be gaps. Sources in bold text can be considered the key, most up to date research, and are synthesized later in the text of the paper.

Figure 4: The Literature on the Impact of Refugees Grouped by Subtopic

	Host country of focus			
	Turkey	Jordan	Lebanon	World
Political Context and Policies	<p>-Governing through Uncertainty: Experiences of Being a Refugee in Turkey as a Country for Temporary Asylum by Biehl (2015)</p> <p>-Challenges to economic integration and social inclusion of Syrian refugees in Turkey by Bache (2019)</p> <p>-Tracing the Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal: The Momentum of the Multi-layered Turkish Border Regime by Heck & Hess (2017)</p> <p>- The Syrian refugee crisis: The EU-Turkey 'deal' and temporary protection by Rygiel, Baban & Ilcan (2016)</p> <p>-A new policy to better integrate refugees into host-country labor markets by Demirguc-Kunt, Lokshin & Ravallion (2019)</p> <p>-Do refugees impact voting behavior in the host country? Evidence from Syrian refugee inflows to Turkey by Altındağ & Kaushal (2020)</p> <p>-Refugees in Turkey; Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration by İçduygu & Millet (2016)</p> <p>-Syrian refugees in Turkey and trade union responses by Erdoğan (2018)</p>	<p>-Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian Refugees into the Labor Market in Jordan by Lenner & Turner (2018b)</p> <p>-Learning from the Jordan Compact by Lenner & Turner (2018a)</p> <p>- Employment of Syrian refugees in Jordan: challenges and opportunities by Mencütek & Nashwan (2020)</p> <p>- Securing economic livelihoods for Syrian refugees: the case for a human rights-based approach to the Jordan Compact by Al-Mahaidi (2020)</p> <p>-Trade-for-Refugee Employment: Nexing for Deterrence or Development in the EU-Jordan Compact? By Panizzon (2018)</p> <p>-Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan by Kelberer (2017)</p> <p>-The EU-Jordan Compact: a model for burden-sharing in refugee crises? by Grawert (2019)</p> <p>-The Jordan Compact: Lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts by Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille (2018)</p>	<p>-Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon by Janmyr (2016)</p> <p>- The Long-term Challenges of Forced Migration: Perspectives from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq by Chatty (2016)</p> <p>-Lebanon's Political Discourse and the Role of the UNHCR in the "safe and secure return" of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon into the so-called "secure" zones in Syria by El Chemali (2019)</p>	<p>-Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes by Jacobsen (1996)</p> <p>-The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration by Ruhs (2013)</p> <p>-The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey by Tsourapas (2019)</p> <p>-Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the spread of 'remote control' practices by Zaiotti (2018)</p>

Impact on native workers	<p>-Impact of the Syrian refugee influx on Turkish native workers: An ethnic enclave approach by Bağır (2018)</p> <p>-The impact of Syrian refugees on natives' labor market outcomes in Turkey: evidence from a quasi-experimental design by Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun & Tumen (2017)</p> <p>-The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market by Del Carpio & Wagner (2015)</p> <p>-Labor Market Integration of Syrians Refugees in Turkey: From Refugees to Settlers by İçduygu & Diker (2017)</p>	<p>-The impact of Syrian refugees on the labor market in neighboring countries: empirical evidence from Jordan by Fakhri & Ibrahim (2015)</p> <p>-The impact of refugees on employment and wages in Jordan by Fallah, Krafft & Wahba (2019)</p> <p>-The Effect of Refugee Integration on Migrant Labor in Jordan by Hartnett (2018)</p>	<p>-Towards Decent Work in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges in Light of the Syrian Refugee Crisis by Ajluni & Kwar (2015)</p> <p>-The Lebanese–Syrian crisis: impact of influx of Syrian refugees to an already weak state by Cherri., González & Delgado (2016)</p>	<p>- The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market by Card (1990)</p> <p>-Labour market effects of migration-related supply shocks: evidence from internal refugees in Colombia by Calderón-Mejía & Ibáñez (2016)</p> <p>-The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal by Borjas (2017)</p> <p>-The Labor Market Consequences of Refugee Supply Shocks by Borjas & Monras (2017)</p> <p>-Refugees in the UK Labour Market: The Conflict between Economic Integration and Policy-led Labour Market Restriction by Bloch (2007)</p> <p>-The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access by Clemens, Huang & Graham (2018)</p>
Impact on economy	<p>-The short and long-term impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish economy: a simulation approach by Mahia, Arce, Koç & Bölük (2019)</p> <p>-The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Turkey by Tumen (2016)</p> <p>-Is It Merely A Labor Supply Shock? Impacts of Syrian Migrants on Local Economies in Turkey by Cengiz & Tekguc (2017)</p>	<p>-The impact of refugees on employment and wages in Jordan by Fallah, Krafft & Wahba (2019)</p>	<p>-Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile by Masri & Srour (2013)</p> <p>-The Impact of the Syrian Displacement Crisis on the Lebanese Economy by Charafeddine (2016)</p>	<p>-Economic impact of refugees by Taylor et al. (2016)</p> <p>-Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population by Maystadt & Verwimp (2014)</p>

In the following review, the above pieces and other relevant literature will be divided and discussed by themes; subsection 1) regards political context and policies, subsection 2) regards the impact of refugee supply shocks on natives in the labor markets, specifically the impacts on natives and other migrants, and subsection 3) regards the impact of refugee supply shocks on the economy.

1) Political context and policies

The refugee influx response of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon represent part of an attempt to contain a global crisis regionally (Chatty, 2016). In all three countries many levels of governance play a role in the decision-making process around refugees. At the international level, the countries attempt to secure funding, attention and resources towards refugee management and offsetting the costs of hosting, as well as pursuing support for other foreign policy goals. Domestically, the countries need to account for impacts to the economy and the perceptions of natives to their employment status and labor market position. Often, these perceptions are shaped by non-labor market related issues like national security, geopolitics and ethnic divides, but they still have impacts on how governments can manage refugee populations in the labor market. Policies and politics are a crucial aspect of the economic and labor market issues with refugees. The domestic policy choices to grant legal status to refugees, exclude them from the labor market, not contribute to their upskilling and ignore their skill profiles are not supported by the plentiful research which indicates that properly accounting for refugees results in better economic and labor market performance for the hosting country.

Legal Status of Refugees

Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon bear some similarities in their legal approach to refugees, as all three refuse to acknowledge Syrians with the legal characterization of “refugees”. While Turkey is a signatory to the Refugee Convention of 1951, it is also one of the few countries still holding a geographical limitation (i.e., limited to European citizens), and therefore, was able to resist granting official refugee status to Syrian refugees, opting instead to treat them legally as “guests”, leading to the eventual establishment of a temporary protection scheme in 2014 (Içduygu & Millet, 2016). Meanwhile, both Lebanon (Janmyr, 2016) and Jordan are not signatories to the Refugee Convention of 1951 and thus, do not have any legal obligation to grant Syrian refugees with an official status. The Jordanian government also preferred to view refugees as “guests” (ILO, 2015), leading to ambiguous legal categories, sustained precariousness, and limited access to the formal labor market. Lebanon has opted to categorize refugees as “displaced

persons”, with a very temporary view of their stay, exhibited by the majority of Syrians living without even a residence permit (Government of Lebanon, 2020). There are also policies requiring refugees to pledge to return to Syria, despite the government being bound by the principle of nonrefoulement. In Maja Janmyr’s (2016) research on the legal system for Syrians, she finds that the Lebanese government, similarly to its Turkish and Jordanian counterparts, sees refugees akin to illegal immigrants, subject to detention/arrest and in some cases deportation. The policy choices of the three countries reflect some differences too. While Jordan has committed to the Jordan Compact initiative for the betterment of the Syrian refugees’ situations through ensuring access to the labor market, Turkey has explored different initiatives and institutional reforms, which have been heavily impacted by the ongoing controversy around the EU-Turkey Deal of 2016. Lebanon has largely avoided addressing refugees with national legislation, preferring to leave UNHCR to carry out refugee registration and protection services.

This lack of legal protection or acknowledgement across the cases is structurally connected to the limited labor market access of refugees. While many refugees participate in the labor markets of host countries, they lack formalization in large numbers, which limits their access to fair workplace conditions and legal redress. Here, it is crucial to mention the scholarly work which has criticized the role of livelihoods programs (trainings or cash assistance) as being insufficient, inconsistent or short-term aid to refugees. In Lebanon, for example, it has been documented that refugees frequently sell their World Food Programme food vouchers to their Lebanese neighbors in order to pay for rent (Carpi, Field, Dicker & Rigon, 2020). Organizations or governments offering such programs often neglect evaluation or produce their own internal assessments, creating a transparency problem and lack of knowledge on the economic needs of refugees. In Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, this results in the reality of refugees seeking informal employment opportunities out of desperation (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).

International Commitments

The role of international organizations is often to encourage humanitarian and developmental approaches to refugee labor supply shocks. This involves signing agreements with host countries, arranging funding for projects and support and placing pressure for particular policy agendas. At the international level, scholars have observed Turkey and Jordan employing strategies to leverage refugee populations for international economic assistance, geopolitical objectives and developmental projects (Tsourapas, 2019). This strategy has succeeded in some ways, for example, in securing the Jordan Compact and 2016 EU-Turkey Deal.

The EU-Turkey Deal pledged three billion euros to Turkey plus additional funds which would amount to six billion euros in total in exchange for controlling its EU borders and improving the living conditions of Syrians in the country in order to make border crossing to Europe undesirable (Heck & Hess, 2017). Bache (2019) underlines several features of the current legislation; only Syrians who have been under temporary protection for six months can be considered for work permits, only the employer can initiate the process, the employer must pay the necessary registration and bureaucratic fees, the employer must demonstrate that he or she is unable to hire a Turkish national for the same position, and more than 10% of workers in a workplace cannot be workers under temporary protection status. Clearly there are still many obstacles in the way of labor market integration, which reflects the degree of resistance that Turkey put up against the international community's pressures. Despite high expectations, Turkey did not develop highly accessible pathways to legal and social security through employment. Under the temporary protection regime of refugees, Syrians were supposed to have access to the labor market in select sectors and have other humanitarian needs met (European Council 2016), but in practice a very small number of permits in proportion to the working population have been issued (Rygiel, Baban & Ilcan, 2016) (Demirguc-Kunt, Lokshin & Ravallion, 2019). The latest Ministry of Labor and Social Security statistics show that less than 80,000 work permits were granted to Syrian refugees between 2011-2018 (Ministry of Labor, Social Services, and Family, 2018), while there are more than 2 million Syrian refugees who are between the working ages of 15-64 (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2020). Moreover, Demirguc-Kunt, Lokshin and Ravallion (2019) state that in March 2019, only 1.5% of the working age population of Syrian refugees held official work permits, corresponding to approximately 31,000 workers.

The Jordan Compact, a comparable international agreement to the EU-Turkey Deal, which was also signed in 2016, stipulated that the Jordanian government would expand legal employment opportunities for refugees to the tune of 200,000 work permits, in exchange for funding and more market access to the EU (Lenner & Turner, 2018). The Jordan Compact had a similar purpose to the EU-Turkey Deal from the perspective of both the Jordanians and Europeans. For Jordan, the Compact was seen as an opportunity that would open up the EU market for investments whilst creating jobs for natives and Syrian refugees. It has been argued that Jordan viewed the Compact as transforming a refugee crisis into a development opportunity, as it would allow for a levelling of the EU playing-field (Panizzon, 2018). Also, in framing the crisis as both a developmental and humanitarian issue, Jordan was able to secure significant international leverage and funding (Kelberer, 2017). The EU was interested in the Compact for

the same reasons as the EU-Turkey Deal, as it was expected to keep Syrians in Jordan and create suitable alternatives to onward migration to Europe (Grawert, 2019). The Jordan Compact has possibly gone the furthest of the Middle Eastern host countries in expanding economic opportunities for refugees, taking into account the informal nature of most refugee work, the cases of workplace abuse in sponsorship contexts and the burdens of submitting proof of social security and medical examinations (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker & Mansour-Ille, 2018). Still, the Compact has so far fallen short of its expectations for both Jordan and the refugee population as they estimate a total number of 35,000-40,000 work permits being held at one time by the Syrian refugees, compared to a number 292,000 Syrian refugees who are between the working ages of 18-59 (International Labor Organization, 2017) (Lenner & Turner, 2018). There are some reasons for the disappointing performance for Jordan including other global alternatives in Asia having preferential and more precedented market access to Europe and Jordanian manufacturers being more oriented towards the Middle East region and not recognizing the benefits of changing their standards to match the EU market's (Grawert, 2019). For Jordan, at the international level, a substantial consideration was its potential growth with a legally working refugee population. This factored less strongly into Turkey's political assessment, as it opted for using the opportunity for leverage and funding.

Jordan's strategy in the international community and success in gaining revenues for the state has proven advantageous for its approach towards refugees--this was the case for both Iraqi refugees in the 2000s and the contemporary Syrian refugees. Jordan's strategies and very high expectations resulted in more aid pledges (aid per capita) than any other regional host state. This allowed Jordan to spend a more substantial amount of resources per refugee on labor market-related assistance like work permits, even if results have been limited. Hence, an international and developmental approach to fundraising proved to be advantageous for both refugees and the Jordanian government, which was concerned with balancing refugee aid with domestic politics. While there were tensions between the Jordanian government and its citizens before 2016 over the refugee population, the Compact allowed previously depleted public resources to be replenished with a new source of funding (Kelberer, 2017).

Lebanon experienced a similar depletion of resources and humanitarian crisis but less consistent international support towards its goals. Despite European countries making funding promises towards the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015 - 2016 (LCRP), many ultimately did not provide the assistance, leaving Lebanon's projects for refugee participation in the labor market, including the Subsidized Temporary Employment Program, less effective than their counterparts in other countries (Charafeddine, 2016). The more recent LCRP of 2017-2020, an

update of the original, was described as seeking more medium-term solutions for both the Syrian refugee population and vulnerable Lebanese population. The LCRP was complemented with bilateral agreements like the EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities and Compact 2016-2020, which offered 400 million euros and additional funding towards the Lebanese commitments to improving the situation of refugees. Still, Lebanon's efforts were temporary and without a long-term future in mind for refugees. This is in contrast with the Jordan Compact, which was limited as well but had a view of refugees as agents for development.

In Figure 5, each of the policies are compared alongside the extent of their impact in practice. Proportionally, Jordan's efforts went the furthest in granting work permission, especially compared to Lebanon which has made very few commitments to integrating Syrian refugees into the labor market. In Turkey, large goals have been set but there is a striking dissonance with the results. In both Turkey and Jordan there is a requirement for employers to undergo the bureaucratic process of formalizing workers, which contributes to low rates of refugee integration due to a lack of interest on the part of employers in the extra tasks and further controls on pay to laborers.

Figure 5: Labor Market Access for Refugees in Policies and Practice, Compared

Country	Policies regarding access to formal labor markets	Extent of access to formal labor markets in practice
Turkey	EU-Turkey Deal of 2016: Foreigners who have refugee status or temporary protection can have access to work. However, to work independently or be employed, people with conditional refugee status are required to have a work permit issued before they can start working; they are eligible to apply for a permit six months after applying for international protection status (Clemens, Huang & Graham 2018).	In March 2019, only 1.5% of the 2.2 million working-age Syrian refugees (with another 1.5 million dependents) possessed official work permits, corresponding to roughly 31,000 workers. The workers who do not have a work permit are employed in informal jobs that offer less than the official minimum wage and often poor working conditions (Demirguc-Kunt, Lokshin & Ravallion, 2019).
Jordan	Jordan Compact: The Compact established in 2016 created a permit system for refugees, waiving fees, burdens of proof and medical examinations that were mandatory before. The Compact aimed to offer 200,000 new work permits to Syrian refugees (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker & Mansour-Ille, 2018).	While the Jordan Compact had lofty goals, envisioning the provision of up to 200,000 work permits for Syrians, only 80,000 work permits were issued to or renewed by Syrians by January 2018. This figure is slightly misleading (the actual number of permits valid at a time is around 35,000-45,000) and overall the Compact failed to meet its goals. The challenges experienced in the practice of the Compact revealed some weaknesses in the original plans (Lenner & Turner, 2018).

Lebanon	The Lebanese government has repeatedly emphasized that Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a country of resettlement (De Bel-Air, 2017). Still, Lebanon had two LCRP's consisting of initiatives for education, economic opportunity and jobs for Syrians. The plan included the Subsidized Temporary Employment Program (STEP) which aimed to incentivize companies to create jobs for low-skilled Lebanese and Syrian workers (IMF Country Reports, 2017).	Most refugees work as informal laborers, evidenced by the fact that 92% of workers do not have a work contract. 72% are hired on an hourly, daily, weekly or seasonal basis. Syrians are mainly working in occupations that provide very low income, social protection or job security (Masri & Srour, 2013; Government of Lebanon, 2020).
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Domestic Policy and Impacts

In Lenner and Turner's (2018) article on the politics of refugee integration into the labor market of Jordan, the authors describe the domestic political phenomena that have emerged as a result of the Jordan Compact. Even before the Syrian refugee supply shock, Jordan had a history of hosting migrant populations from around the Middle East and elsewhere. The labor market has depended on migrant labor market participation for several sectors, but the partial formalization of Syrian refugees and entry into those sectors is not without significant political obstacles. In fact, Jordan has been known to use the encampment of refugees as a tool to keep poor Syrians who are deemed "surplus labor" out of the labor market (Turner, 2015). Existing migrant workers from countries like Egypt or regions like South Asia may have been working without formalization for longer than Syrians and also contribute to established remittance flows to their countries of origin. The loss of this source of revenue would be politically dangerous for Jordan. Decisions preferring Syrians over Egyptians could threaten the flow of remittances and result in Egypt increasing export prices on gasoline to Jordan--ultimately this would have undesirable political consequences as Jordan relies on cheap access to Egyptian gasoline (Lenner & Turner, 2018b).

In Turkey, the refugee population, though not as large proportionally to the population in Jordan, has contributed heavily to political narratives and policy discussions. In turn, the labor market access of refugees has been more limited due to fears about job losses and wage decreases for natives. Several studies of Turkish politics have observed strong polarization in attitudes towards refugees across the political spectrum and political parties. However, the size of the refugee flow over time did not clearly correlate with a decrease in support for the ruling party, the AKP, or in electoral losses (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2020). This suggests that while the Turkish government may not need to respond dynamically to the refugee flow as it transforms, the anti-refugee sentiments are present and pervasive in politics. Hence, legislators must account for such

attitudes in the electorate and practice caution when legislating for refugees and their labor market access. Some studies have suggested that the increase in labor supply has created pressure on wage levels, especially in low skilled sectors, leading to further tension between the refugees and hosts (Içduygu & Diker, 2017). Also, polarized attitudes about refugees in politics have an effect on individuals who may be employers or employees in workplaces where refugees seek employment. Still, many employers recruit Syrian refugees to be able to pay below the minimum wage and avoid bureaucratic processes. This is a concern of the Turkish state, as native workers often feel threatened by refugee arrivals and turn to the political realm for protection. For example, Seyhan Erdoğan's (2018) qualitative research interviewing trade union representatives, members and stakeholders shows concerns from workers in sectors with large amounts of Syrian workers. Her interviews showed demands for the formalization of refugee workers in order to reduce unfair competition with natives and avoid a "race to the bottom" in terms of pay and quality of work. At the individual worker level, feelings about Syrian refugees were more explicitly exclusionary and intertwined with social, political and security-related concerns. The Turkish government has responded to such concerns with small-scale incentives (directed at 10,000 Syrians at most) for employers aimed at formalizing Syrian refugees in their workplaces (Biehl, 2015).

In Lebanon, some policy choices have been made to control the Syrian refugee population's access and impact on the labor market, economy and politics. The government has emphasized that it is not a country of resettlement or asylum. As Turner (2015) observes, the Lebanese government has refused formal encampment of refugees in order to avoid their long term stay and potential impact on pre-existing sectarian divides. However, communities have come into conflict over aid being distributed to Syrians despite nearby poor Lebanese populations also in need, reflecting the inevitability of tensions. More recent strictness about refugee entry and movement (refugee curfews as well) reflects a desire for control over both the labor market and sociopolitical attitudes around the refugees. There is a concurrent lack of strictness about Syrian refugees in the informal labor market, who receive a very low amount of work permits proportional to their population. Refugees registered with UNHCR are required to pledge not to work, while those not registered with the organization must be sponsored by an employer who pledges to be responsible for their employee. Agriculture, environment (cleaning) and construction are the only acceptable sectors for Syrian employment but it is clear that many Syrians work informally in other sectors as well (Janmyr, 2016). The Lebanese approach to refugees in the labor market shows a highly temporary view of refugees, informed by history and experiences with the Palestinian refugee population that the government does not want repeated

(Chatty, 2016). Furthermore, Lebanon has refused even creating a framework or migration regime, still denying the long-term presence of Syrians (El Chemali, 2019).

2) Impact of refugee supply shocks on natives in the labor markets

A substantial area of research in migration studies has been the impact of refugee supply shocks on natives, and more broadly, on their labor market performance. While there is less focus on the Middle East and the Syrian refugee supply shock within the region, some research has emerged in recent years as the Syrian Civil War has extended beyond expected and elongated the stay of Syrians.

Turkey

Turkey, the country hosting the most Syrian refugees, has experienced the labor market and impacts on natives taking center stage in public concerns. Evren Ceritoglu, Burcu Gurcihan Yunculer, Huzeyfe Torun and Semih Tumen's (2015) study of the impact of Syrian refugees on natives was one of the first to respond to the crisis with a labor market focus. The authors used a quasi-experimental design, more specifically a difference-in-differences (DID) statistical technique which allows for observation of a natural experiment, in this case, the Syrian refugee supply shock. The authors created two windows of time to reflect pre-immigration and post-immigration, 2010-2011 and 2012-2013. Using the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey from TURKSTAT, conducted annually with 400,000 individuals (Bağır, 2018), to compare these two windows of time reveals the causal effects of refugees on natives. The critical conclusion of this study was the element of informality in the Turkish labor force and its impact on native workers in the Syrian refugee supply shock context. As Syrian workers could enter informal employment opportunities without bureaucratic obstacles, native, low-skilled workers in informal jobs were substituted to some degree. Particularly vulnerable groups in the informal market like young workers and women entered unemployment or even inactivity. Thus, the impact on natives was high but mostly on issues of employment rather than on wage levels, which was frequently debated. The study was conducted in 2015, when the impacts of refugees could only be described as short term. The authors focused exclusively on border cities in south-eastern Turkey due to the relatively lower Syrian population in cities like Istanbul at the time. Also, prior to 2016, refugees hosted in Turkey were overwhelmingly not able to access work permits, meaning they posed little threat to formal employment and wage levels (Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun & Tumen, 2015). Other contemporaneous studies confirmed the precarity of the situation for natives in the

informal sector but insisted upon more rigorous methods involving data on the geographic distribution of refugees.

It is important to note that geographic concentration of refugees in certain regions and distribution across a host country can lead to significant variation in the intensity of labor supply shocks, the extent of pressure put on public infrastructure, public services, and the housing market in the regions. Moreover, it can also lead to increased demand for public services that may lead to the creation of jobs in the formal economy and overall economic growth. Therefore, the geographic concentration of refugees in the receiving countries is one of the essential factors that affect the labor market access of refugees. As it was stated before, Syrian refugees in Turkey mostly reside outside of refugee camps, with 2% living in Temporary Accommodation Centers in Turkey (UNHCR, 2020c), although this was not always the case.

Another study took specific note of the importance of geographic variation in its methodology. Using the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey of 2011 and 2014, data on the distribution of Syrian refugees across Turkey and data on the origin cities of Syrian refugees, Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) assessed the impact on the labor market in each separate subregion of the country rather than the whole or just selected subregions. This approach was meant to account for differing geographic concentration of refugees, as more could be found more densely in border regions like Gaziantep and Hatay at the time. Del Carpio and Wagner's findings echo Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun and Tumen's (2015), as refugees are found to displace informal, low skilled natives. However, Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) make further discoveries about sectors and wages. First, they find that women working informally in agriculture in particular are vulnerable to displacement by refugees. On the topic of wages, large stocks of refugees allow for occupational upgrading and vertical mobility of natives in formal employment and therefore, wage increases. However, the finding of an overall increase in wages could also be explained by some workers being displaced and exiting the labor market, i.e. becoming inactive. Finally, their inclusion of data made available in 2014 allowed for a better understanding of the impact of refugees across the country, rather than just the south-eastern border of Turkey. While cities like Istanbul would be less affected at the time (at a refugee-population ratio of 2%), their evolution in later years would be critical.

The conditions at the time of writing the Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) and Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun and Tumen's (2015) studies warranted sustained research on the topic and further exploration as the stay of refugees elongated. A later study conducted by Yusuf Kenan Bağır (2018) responded to the need for answers to long term questions about refugee stay. As refugees began to participate in high levels of internal movement from border regions to urban

centers, new dynamics and impacts on natives unfolded (Korkmaz, 2017). Bağır's (2018) research responded to this movement by categorizing it into two different waves; primary migrations and secondary migrations. Primary migrations refer to the initial migration of Syrians into the border regions of Hatay, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa. This wave was captured in Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun and Tumen (2015) and Del Carpio and Wagner's (2015) studies using a difference-in-differences technique with 2011 as the pre-treatment date for comparison. In this case, the comparison group was made up of secondary migration regions with few refugees but a high degree of similarity with affected regions. Still, time of treatment was relevant for the study and Bağır (2018) problematized the pre-treatment date of 2011 selected in earlier works, as earlier than 2013 most refugees in Turkey lived in camps. Also, the Syrian Civil War's commencement in 2011 had its own impacts on the labor markets of Turkey's border regions. Hence, selecting a pre-treatment date of 2012 and a post treatment year of 2015 allows for a delineation of refugee supply shock impacts from Syrian Civil War impacts as well as a smaller time frame between the pre and post treatment.

Bağır's results for primary migration zones at the borders are consistent with previous findings, as low skilled natives experience the effect of lower employment levels and wages in these regions. Also, women experience more displacement than men, which is confirmed by earlier studies. However, he finds that secondary migration areas also experience impacts, although no statistically significant impacts on employment levels. The impact on secondary migration areas is more wage-related, as low skilled, informal workers in these regions were found to experience high levels of wage reduction correlated with the growth of the ratio of migrants to the regional population. Workers with high levels of education and skills did not experience their wages decreasing, supporting earlier findings that refugees compete with low skilled natives in the labor market, especially in cases of informality and a lack of work permits for refugees (Bağır, 2018). On the other hand, Doruk Cengiz and Hasan Tekguc's (2021) study of the same period, 2012-2015 revealed no impact to the employment of Turkish natives without a high school diploma. Furthermore, natives with a high school diploma or higher enjoyed an average wage increase of 5.7 percent, explained by increased opportunity in construction and entrepreneurship as a response to the presence of refugees.

In summation, despite the magnitude, changing nature of internal movement of refugees and their long-term stay, an insufficient amount of literature has come forward. From studies conducted with data from 2015 or earlier, it appears that any impact on natives in Turkey was limited to low skilled, informal workers particularly those near the border with Syria. In addition, some groups like women may experience further displacement effects. The lack of further

research on the years after 2015 indicates an either unconcerned approach to the situation on the part of scholars, or lack of available data or funding to explore the later developments.

Jordan

Meanwhile in Jordan, similar studies have attempted to study the refugee supply shock in the country. An ILO report by Stave and Hillesund (2015) conducted surveys and semi-structured interviews in early 2014 to gather information on the composition of the Jordanian labor market and Syrian refugee population. The survey of 3,800 households in three governorates of Jordan and 800 households in Zaatari refugee camp, found that while labor force participation rates did not change after the inflow of the refugees, the unemployment rate has increased, especially for the youth, lowest-educated and poorest parts of the population. Regarding the distribution of Jordanian workers in various industries, the study did not find significant changes. However, they found that 30% of Jordanian workers in the construction and agriculture sectors before the Civil War are no longer employed in these sectors, indicating that they might have been substituted out of these sectors. They suggest that the vast majority of Syrian refugees are coming from rural areas in Syria and they possess relatively lower education than their Jordanian counterparts. Moreover, Syrian refugees are more willing to work for lower wages than their Jordanian counterparts. Still, Stave and Hillesund do not survey for changes in wages and do not prove that Jordanian wages have dropped.

Another study conducted in 2015 used data gathered in similar governorates of Jordan and employed vector autoregressive (VAR) tests to find that the refugee inflow did not have a significant effect on the labor market in Jordan. Even at an individual governorate level, there is no significant relationship between an increase in refugees and labor market outcomes. These labor market outcomes include unemployment and employment levels and labor force participation. Explanations for these results range from the concentration of refugees in camps at the time of the data collection to the informality of refugee work (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2015).

More recently, Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft and Jackline Wahba's (2019) study using the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey of 2010 and 2016 found a consistent result with Fakih and Ibrahim's, of areas dense with refugee populations having no worse labor market outcomes than regions unaffected by refugee flows. The later survey conducted in 2016 captured the post-Jordan Compact period, allowing researchers to capture the impact of refugees entering formal employment. This dimension has not been studied in the Turkish case nor in other Jordanian studies. Fallah, Krafft and Wahba (2019) found that refugee populations reported working without permits in sectors that few Jordanians work in (informal, irregular work), supporting the conclusion that Syrians compete more with economic immigrants in the country, like Egyptians.

Moreover, they found that the high concentration of Syrian refugees in some areas resulted in shifts from the private sector to the public sector for Jordanian workers, a higher degree of formalization, and higher wages (a percentage point increase of the refugee population increases wages by 0.9%) due to the increased demand for services. Overall, this most recent data dating back to 2016, which accounts for some number of refugees as formalized workers, geographic concentration of refugees in particular regions and a longer time frame finds that there is little effect on natives. Other studies in both Turkey and Jordan were lacking in some of these regards.

In Jordan, the research suggests similar outcomes with the Turkish case. In both cases informal and low skilled workers are impacted but in the Jordanian case this group is mostly comprised of economic immigrants. There may even be wage increases and upward mobility for native workers due to the arrival of Syrians. While the Jordanian case has slightly more recent data and variables considered in the research, it is still dated to 2016. The data from 2016 may capture the short-term impacts of the labor formalization of some Syrian refugees but thousands have been formalized since and may have had different impacts to native workers a few years into their status.

Lebanon

Rigorous studies and scholarly works in Lebanon, specific to the topic of impacts on natives in the labor market, have not been conducted. Wage data in Lebanon has been described as scarce, making it a difficult characteristic of labor markets to study (Ajluni & Kawar, 2015). Some simple observations can be made, however, about the current state of Lebanese workers. For example, the labor force has increased by 50% since 2011 and 34% of natives are unemployed. Also, the overall standards of work in Lebanon including salary expectations have dropped (Cherri, Arcos González & Castro Delgado, 2016). For example, the increase in labor supply has decreased wages for unskilled laborers likely due to the low wages that Syrians are willing to work for (Turner, 2015). Still, the Lebanese labor market previously depended on Syrian labor that left prior to the Syrian Civil War. This worker population measured around 400,000 in the informal sector before the onset of the war in March 2011. The return of this labor and absence of formal, strict encampment of refugees has restocked the prior levels of Syrian workers (De Bel-Air, 2017).

3) Impact of refugee supply shocks on the economy

The issue of the impact of refugees on the economy is generally not well studied in the Middle East, although many studies on Turkey are available. Impact on the economy can be

measured in several ways including growth of the GDP, overall income inequality, increase/decrease in the incomes of businesses or households exposed to refugee populations or changes in the price of goods or housing.

In Turkey, the effect of refugees on the economy has been generally positive both early on in the crisis and long term. As Tumen (2016) finds in his study of the effect of refugees on the Turkish economy, the flood of new informal, cheaper labor allowed for labor cost advantages and subsequently cheaper prices of items produced in particular informal labor-intensive sectors. While this may have contributed to substitution of Turkish workers it was considered a benefit to the economy. Another potential benefit to natives was the creation of new, improved-quality housing which allowed for natives to leave lower cost housing to the Syrian refugee population. In fact, the number of housing units in Turkey increased by 33% since refugee arrival (Cengiz & Tekguc, 2017).

While it may appear from Tumen's (2016) study that refugees are good for the economy but bad for native workers, the reality may not be so simple. Some low skilled workers are certainly displaced from the informal labor market but there is a concurrent increase in Turkish workers' participation in the formal labor market, suggesting complementarity of the refugee population with the natives. Also, Syrian migration allowed for the growth of capital and new business in Turkey, as refugees contributed to a 24% increase in new companies, both owned by Syrians and Turks. Overall, Cengiz & Tekguc (2017) found using a difference-in-differences methodology that between 2012-2015, migration has contributed to new regional demand which was complemented with the absorption of a new supply of labor. These authors consider the refugee inflow to be a benefit to both the economy and native workers.

The most future-oriented research on the subject was conducted by Ramon Mahia, Rafael de Arce, Ahmet Ali Koç and Gülden Bölük in 2019. Their research is informed by the protracted status of refugees in Middle Eastern host countries and they focus primarily on the effects on economic growth in the short, medium- and long-term using simulation methods and a principle of maximum plausibility for setting the conditions. One crucial assumption they make is that refugees pose no negative side effects to native workers (in employment or wages), a claim which has not been totally proven, as other researchers have found negative effects on informal workers and positive ones on formal workers. This assumption requires some criticism and weariness of the final results. In the short term, the researchers find a 2% increase in the GDP and overall increase in production across sectors. They also find new native employment opportunities and impact from Syrian workers in production effects and demand/consumption particularly in industries like manufacturing, real estate and energy. These findings suggest that with

appropriate and targeted planning, the economic integration of refugees will contribute to economic growth. In the mid and long-term simulations, which correspond with the years 2023 and 2028, the impact of refugees on the GDP will increase to 4%. Native employment opportunities created by Syrian integration will reach 265,000 by the end date of 2028. This study supports the idea that hosting refugees can become an economic opportunity and advantage for host countries, if handled well (Mahia, de Arce, Koç & Bölük, 2019).

In Jordan, some studies demonstrate that a higher density of refugee inflow in a particular location can also create demand for jobs in the formal sector through the increased demand for public services (Fallah & Krafft & Wahba, 2019).

In Lebanon, much more research exists on the impact of the now decades-old Palestinian refugee population on the economy. On the topic of Syrian refugees, there appear to be mixed impacts on the economy. Early research on the topic conducted by Masri and Srour (2013) showed the slowing of economic growth as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis and Civil War. This finding was supported later, with scholars finding the GDP growth to slow from 10% in 2010 to 1% in 2014, after refugee arrival (Cherri, Arcos González & Castro Delgado, 2016). However, it is difficult to attribute this slowing of growth specifically to the arrival of refugees, as Syria had been a main source of trade with Lebanon for many years. In the housing market, Masri and Srour (2013) found that Lebanon had an almost opposite experience to Turkey's, seeing a drop in construction permits issued, high demand for housing and subsequent increase in the cost of rentals. In Raed Charafeddine's (2016) summary of the economic effects of refugees on Lebanon, he listed a number of income generating aspects of refugee hosting including increased consumer spending, the influx of funds from UNHCR and other organizations and the creation of new small and medium sized businesses. These results reflect a similar effect of refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, as most experience benefits through new supply of labor and demand for services. Still, further research on Lebanon and Jordan is needed to make a rigorous comparison.

In the introductory section, Figure 1 showed an overall decrease in growth rate from 2012-2018 in the four countries. Figure 6 shows the GDP growth rate over time in each year, which is a less simplified view of the evolution. In Turkey, for example, there have been years of high growth, well above the growth rate in 2012 (see years 2013, 2015 and 2017), as well as years of slower growth. This fluctuation can also be seen in Jordan. In Lebanon, as previously mentioned, the Syrian Civil War played a large role in shaping the declining economic growth of the country due to prior trade and reliance. In 2010, the Lebanese GDP growth rate was 8.037% and in 2011 it was 0.918%, reflecting the intensity of the Civil War's impact to the economy. Only from 2012

to 2013, did large numbers of refugees migrate to Lebanon. This evolution shows that the economy was already weakened by the War and likely by many other factors not included in this simplistic analysis. Overall, it is very difficult to find causation in the refugee arrival with this limited variable.

Figure 6: GDP Growth Rate % Over Time (World Bank, 2018a)

Country	GDP Growth Rate %							Change in growth rate 2012-2018
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
Turkey	4.8	8.5	5.1	6.0	3.2	7.5	2.9	-1.97%
Jordan	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.4	2.0	2.1	1.9	-0.71%
Lebanon	2.7	2.6	1.8	0.4	1.6	0.5	0.2	-2.5%

Main gaps and shortcomings in the literature

While some rigorous literature on the subject has been produced, this paper has demonstrated that at present there are many shortcomings and gaps in the research which need addressing given the importance of the Syrian refugee supply shocks for national development, labor markets and political dynamics in the three countries, and for the stability of the region and beyond at large.


In terms of policies and political context, there has been plenty of general political analysis on the refugee inflows and subsequent political rhetoric. Political rhetoric is much more regularly studied in Europe and other Western host countries, possibly due to the concentration of research funding and scholarly interest outside of the Middle East. Still, there are clear sociocultural differences within the Middle East that are often neglected. Across the globe there is not much research related to the policies managing the refugee impacts on the labor market and economy. Research on Lebanon in particular is lacking in this regard, as several policies and initiatives like STEP, the three-year program that incentivizes the creation of new jobs for low skilled Syrian workers, has not been studied. This often leaves international organizations or host country governments, which can portray successes/failures of policies alongside their political interests, to disseminate their own findings with a less critical approach.

Even in the cases of Jordan and Turkey there are many questions connecting labor market/economic issues with political ones that are unanswered in political science literature, like how the skill and education profile of natives substituted by refugees contribute to how refugee supply shocks are discussed and politicized nationally. There is also a lack of research corresponding policy choices with outcomes for natives, immigrants and sometimes refugees.

Given the existence of Jordan Compact and EU Turkey Deal since 2016, it should be expected that scholars would focus more efforts on observing effects of formalizing workers to the labor market position of natives and the overall economy. While host countries are granting permits to a small number of refugees proportional to their population, there are changing dynamics which require frequent study. As mentioned previously, refugees are moving internally from their original sites of settlement, changing expectations of governments and their futures and having transformative effects on the host countries (Esen & Binatli, 2017). Also, host country governments are regularly reconsidering the extent or rate at which integration will occur. For example, Turkey's offer of citizenship to a group of carefully selected Syrians showcases an awareness of the high skilled, highly educated among the refugees who may benefit Turkey in the long run with integration.

In the literature on the impact of refugees on natives in the labor market, some topics are understudied like income inequality and youth labor market entry. There is an overall lack of recent focus, as international organizations and some researchers have devoted more attention to the welfare of refugees. This is justified with the protracted humanitarian crisis, dynamic changes in refugee governance and lack of data on refugees, but the conditions of the labor market are a specific site for the improvement of outcomes for both refugees and natives (Biehl, 2015). In Turkey, Bağır's (2018) study is the most recent on the topic but uses data from 2015. As evidenced in Figure 7, a large number of refugees, over two million, have arrived since 2015, meaning that studies using earlier data have not accounted for the full size of the refugee supply shock. Also, a large degree of internal movement has occurred since 2015 (Korkmaz, 2017). This suggests that an updated study is needed using more recent Turkish Household Labor Force Surveys and further data on refugees.

Figure 7: Syrians by Date of Arrival (UNHCR 2020a, 2020b, 2020c)



In Jordan, there is more recent data from 2016 but a similar lack of research. Still, the Jordanian refugee flow has been relatively stable since 2014, meaning that at least the population size has not changed drastically. Also, the Jordanian government has been known to heavily restrict refugee movement, making internal movement less of a concern for researchers (Turner, 2015). Still, the possibility of movement and changes to the formal status of refugee workers through the Jordan Compact warrant further research. Another area for further exploration could be the dynamics of immigrants and refugees in competition in the labor market. In Jordan, for example, there is a high number of migrant workers in the labor market. The 2015 Population Census of Jordan showed that there were over 1.6 million non-Syrian migrants residing in the country (Department of Statistics Jordan, 2015). Lenner and Turner (2018) emphasize that the informal labor market of Jordan relies heavily on the irregular migrant labor and non-enforcement or selective enforcement of labor laws. Fallah, Krafft and Wahba (2019) suggest that the economic migrants in Jordan were confined to low-skilled, informal jobs in the private sector. As the Literature Review section showed through several studies, Syrian refugees mainly compete in this same area of informal work. Hartnett's (2019) research demonstrates that the arrival of Syrian refugees and attempts to formalize their employment through the Jordan Compact had adverse, substitutional effects on the situation of Egyptian labor migrants. Out of the literature on the subject, only Harnett's study focuses specifically on the dynamics between an economic migrant population and refugee one. Some studies suggest the relevance of Palestinians in Lebanon or Jordan but overall do not study direct effects. Other groups that may experience strong impacts to their labor market participation include women and the youth. Some

studies briefly mentioned women and the youth being substituted at a higher rate than their male counterparts and seeking upskilling or becoming inactive. However, no studies focused specifically on the impact to these groups.

In Lebanon, there is a general absence of studies on the impact of refugees on natives in the labor market, impact on the economy and policy. Research focuses more on humanitarian issues facing refugees in Lebanon and (in)access to public resources like healthcare or education. The existing literature summarizes data without manipulation and is generally produced by international organizations or banks, which should be a source of concern to scholars concerned with creating evidence-based and unbiased literature.

On the impact on the economy, the topic is most recently and consistently studied with the case of Turkey. Most scholars focus on indicators like growth of GDP but there are other areas that are heavily affected like public finances and the age structure/fertility rates of the host country which are understudied (Esen & Binatli, 2017). Few studies exist on Jordan and Lebanon despite the existence of several phenomena and programs which would suggest some economic growth. For example, in both countries the governments provide cash assistance to refugees which should contribute to the local economies as demonstrated in studies of many refugee host communities (Taylor, Filipowski, Alloush, Gupta, Irvin, Valdes & Gonzalez-Estrada, 2016). Also, the majority of refugees in both countries are not living in encampments, suggesting frequent contact and impact on the host country economy.

In all of the three areas covered in our literature review, many scholars expressed that a major limitation was the lack of data. While labor force surveys are useful, more information is often needed to accurately reflect the situation of refugees or other migrant groups. In most cases, the skill set and credentials of the refugee population is not well known by host country governments or researchers. This makes topics like the complementarity of refugee workers with nationals, heavily researched by George Borjas, David Card and others, not well observed in the Middle East. This kind of knowledge would be a benefit to researchers, host country governments and refugees alike. Hence, data collection should be a priority.

Conclusion: A need for more independent research as a basis for better policies

The labor market integration of refugees is an essential step to their security and wellbeing in host countries. Integration in the labor market grants Syrians a degree of independence and allows them to support themselves beyond the basic cash assistance offered to most refugees. Also, scholars have described the limited, inconsistent and non-evidenced based nature of

livelihoods programming, and suggested that these weaknesses will force refugees to seek labor market opportunities eventually, regardless of host country wishes (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). It is important to note that participation and integration are not equal processes—integration involves formalization which grants refugees more far-reaching legal protections like fair wages and the ability to speak out against exploitative employers, discrimination or other workplace conditions. Participation without work permission in the labor market is informal and always lacking in transparency. More widespread formalization of labor is desirable to many refugees as well as national groups, like trade unions and low skilled workers who experience substitution effects of refugees. Despite the rhetoric of many host governments, Syrian refugees are not a “temporary problem” and most research both in the Middle East and elsewhere indicate that proactive policies are better both for the host country and for refugees. While certainly imperfect and still limited, the Jordanian approach to refugees has more consideration of the long-term stay of refugees by viewing the population as a development opportunity. Also, the approach of controlling the economic zones (both sectoral and geographic) where refugees can work seems to be effective in protecting the interests of nationals. Still, the policies still have a long way to go in scope and in the issue of considering refugee perspectives—the original Jordan Compact, for example, was not drafted with any input from Syrians.

Policies have certainly evolved in last four years since Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon began responding more actively to the crisis. However, there is a critical shortage of recent research on these transformations and an excessive reliance on international organizations to conduct analyses. Several groups were found to benefit or be substituted by refugee workers in the latest research using data from 2015-2016, suggesting a need to analyze the transformation alongside newer phenomena in refugee movement and length of stay. The shortage of independent research will have a domino effect on future policies, which will not be made with the most recent and accurate context and evidence in mind. In the future, policymakers may depend on dated research or be more heavily swayed by political dynamics/rhetoric than on evidence. To avoid such an outcome, further funding and research focus must be placed on the labor markets of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon and the impact that the Syrian refugee labor supply shock has had.

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