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Why is identification as European more prevalent among the highly educated than among the less educated?

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For more than forty years, researchers and pro-European policy makers have puzzled about what leads individuals to identify themselves as Europeans (Belot, 2010; Díez Medrano, 2019). Some researchers have focused on this question in order to better understand processes of identity formation, since this is an emerging form of identification (see Hermann et al., 2004); others have focused on it, inspired by theories of nationalism and nation-state formation and because of a more general interest on the explanation of support of European integration and the European Union (see Smith, 1992). Meanwhile, policy-makers and civil servants in European Union institutions have been driven by their hope that they would use this knowledge to develop strategies to increase the prevalence of European identification in the population (Calligaro, 2013).

As of 2020, neither policy-makers nor researchers have made as much progress as they would have liked. European identification is certainly prevalent in the population of the European Union, but not as prevalent and deep as national identification. It is also unclear whether this prevalence has anything to do with policies and strategies initiated by European Union institutions. For decades, and despite the creation of European symbols, the institutionalization of rotating cultural capitals of Europe, and museums devoted to Europe's history and culture, among others, levels of European identification remained surprisingly stable. This is certainly due in part to the fact that while younger cohorts are more European than those that precede them, the older people become, the less European they tend to feel. In the context of an aging population, this leads to life-cycle effects cancelling cohort ones. Nonetheless, one would have expected more change from the European Union's policies and strategies (see Down and Wilson, 2013; Jung, 2008). It is only since 2010 that one witnesses a slow but steady increase in the proportion of citizens who identify as both Europeans and nationals.

Whereas European symbols and policies have failed to create a European demos, researchers have not been much more successful in unearthing major correlates of European identification. Most statistical models only explain a tiny portion of the variation in what we describe as "levels" of European identification. One of the most consistent findings in this literature is the relationship between education and European identification. More educated individuals identify themselves as European more than less-educated ones do. Education is a socio-economic variable with high reliability, whether one measures it as years of education completed or as the last earnt degree This

eliminates one source of error in the estimation of the strength of its relationship with European identification. Education can also be safely treated as exogenous to European identification. Unfortunately, we do not know what education stands for, really; also, measures of European identification are more diverse and much less reliable than measures of education, which introduces bias in statistical models. Finally, we do not know much about the nature of the relationship. It is unclear whether it is causal and, if it is, what are the mechanisms that intervene between education and European identification.

This working paper is an attempt to clarify the relationship between education and European identification. As I will show, one can reject some hypotheses pertaining to the individual level of explanation, thus narrowing the field of potential candidates.

The literature on European identification: A Survey

The literature on public opinion and European integration goes back to the early 1970s, when Ronald Inglehart and Jean-Jacques Rabier promoted the creation of the Eurobarometer, to monitor attitudes to the European Community (Inglehart and Reif, 1991). At the time, scholars did not quite differentiate between attitudes to the European Community and European identification (e.g. Inglehart, 1970; Hoffman, 1966). In the course of time, theorists and practitioners separated the two. This did not result, however, in a clear definition of what was meant by European identity or European identification in applied research. Those concerned with questions of concept definition have distinguished different dimensions. Among the dichotomies that have resulted from these efforts I would mention the distinction between cognitive and emotional dimensions (Citrin and Sides, 2004), cultural and civil dimensions (Bruter, 2003, 2004), identification as self-affirmation and identification as self-investment (La Barbera and Capone, 2016), and between reported self-identification and identification-in-practice (Favell, 2005). I personally find the distinction between "identification as" and "identification with" most useful, although the former could be further divided into a cognitive and an emotional component (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). "Identification as" refers to the group to which one subjectively belongs, and to which one would like to be ascribed by others. People who identify themselves as members of a particular group can do so in a purely self-classificatory way or, in addition to this, invest self-classification with emotion. The latter is what interests most those who study global transformation toward a cosmopolitan society. "Identification with", on the other hand, describes the extent to which one ties one's fate or emotional well-being to that of a particular group or its members. This is the dimension that interested early theorists of European integration and that probably interests policy-makers most nowadays.

This working paper focuses on the first understanding of identification, "identification as". Those studying European identification have used four main theoretical perspectives to develop expectations as to who considers himself or herself "European": Constructionism, Social Identity, Optimal Distinction, and Transactionalist perspectives. The first one highlights the state's role in creating identifications, through naming, classifications, symbols and rituals, education policy, and welfare policy (see Breully, 1982; Mann, 1993). The second highlights people's tendency to identify themselves as members of those categories of ascription that provide them with a more positive self-image (see Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987; Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000; Kaina, 2012). The third one highlights people's tendency to identify themselves as members of communities that best contribute to satisfy their needs of belonging and differentiation from others (Brewer, 1991; 2001). Finally, the fourth perspective highlights the role of contact, communication, and exchange in creating feelings of belonging (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch et al., 1957; see also Recchi, 2014).

Each of the theoretical perspectives above leads to testable hypothesis. Empirical analysis of European identification has also tested narrower hypotheses or causal mechanisms. From a cognitive perspective, Inglehart, for instance, expects that more educated individuals have a greater capacity for abstraction, which leads them to identify themselves more often as member of large communities, communities that fall into the category that Benedict Anderson labels as "imagined" because its members do not know each other face to face (Anderson, 1983; Inglehart, 1970). Other authors hypothesize that people who score high on personality traits such extraversion or openness are more likely to identify themselves as members of broad communities than do people who score low on these personality traits (Curtis, 2016; Bayram, 2015). Then, from a rational-choice perspective, researchers have emphasized economic interest as shaping people's choices between identifications (Gabel, 1998; Chai, 2005; Fligstein, 2008). They hypothesize that people tend to identify themselves as members of those communities that benefit or are likely to benefit them economically. Finally, and complementing all perspectives, authors emphasize the role of socialization mechanisms, such as media, family, and school, in explaining the choice between identifications (Quintellier et al., 2014). One must highlight that this is the only approach that treats individuals not just as isolated atoms but as embedded in social relations. It leads to the expectation that individuals may identify themselves as Europeans, not because their worldviews, their psychological needs, their personality, or their behavioral orientation predispose them in that direction, but simply because those around them have taught them to see themselves this way.

Given the predominance of socio-psychological approaches to the study of identifications, it is not surprising that most empirical analyses of European identification focus on the role of individual indicators. One can describe the findings thus far as disappointing. Most models explain no more than 11% of the variance in European identification, no matter how this is measured. Once one removes the contribution of country of residence, the contribution by individual level variables goes down to 2-3 percent. One can speculate that both measurement error and a relative lack of salience of European identification partly explain these discouraging statistical findings. First, it is difficult to precisely attach labels or assign numbers to subjective states. Second, the less meaningful a question is, the more likely it is that answers will tend to be random. Because of this, it is probably sensible to trust reason, in this case theory or reasoned hypotheses, instead of concluding that forty years of theorizing and empirical testing have just been a waste of time and resources. I argue in this working paper that, in addition to these reasons, another explanation is that geographic and geopolitical location plays such an important role in people's identifications that there is little variance left to explain. Research restricted to the geographical region that serves as the object of identification both removes the geographical factor from the picture and conveys the false impression that there is a lot of room for sociological explanation.

Education and European identification

One of the most consistent statistical findings in the literature is the relationship between a person's level of education and his or her European identification. Regardless of how the latter is measured and how many control variables one includes in the analysis, more educated individuals identify themselves more as European than do less educated ones. One reason why the effect of education is so consistent is perhaps that our level of education strongly structures our social networks, especially our closest relationships. Less educated people hang out with less educated people and more educated people hang out with more educated people, and, because of this, whatever individual mechanisms operate between a person's level of education and his or her identification as European, will be reinforced by those sharing the same level of education around us. The little evidence we have on the effect of education and supranational identification also suggests that what we find for Europe can be made extensive to the rest of the world. In a rare article on the topic, Roose demonstrates that the socio-structural correlates of supranational identification are the same whether we examine them with respect to European identification or to other continental identifications (Roose, 2013). Roose does not follow this finding with systematic analysis of the education effect, but his line of argument directs our attention to causal mechanisms that must be features of all education systems.

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The relationship between education and European identification demands serious consideration for two reasons: The first one is that indicators of education are among the most reliable in the social sciences. People remember well at what age they stopped their full-time education or the highest degree they obtained and tend to tell the truth when asked for a survey. The second one is that to the extent that levels of education in the general population are on the increase, one can predict that education will push in the direction of greater prevalence of European identification in years to come.

Given the robustness of the empirical correlation between education and European identification, it is surprising that we know so little about the mediating mechanisms. One of the few things we know is that a small part of the effect is captured by greater knowledge of foreign languages and that this mediating effect is more cognitive than social; that is, that familiarity with foreign languages impacts on European identification, not by making it easier for people to meet and make friends with other Europeans, but, by default, through cognitive processes that one still needs to identify, although one can speculate that increased awareness of being part of larger geographical and cultural spaces and reduced perceptions of cultural distance may play a part (Díez Medrano, 2018). In addition to this, as mentioned above Inglehart proposed that people with more education have a greater capacity for abstraction and thus a greater capacity to identify as members of abstract communities (1970). He also proposed and then examined a causal link between postmaterialist values and European identification (Inglehart, 1977). He did not provide a convincing justification for the proposition, however, nor did he provide empirical evidence that would demonstrate that this is the actual mechanism intervening in the relationship. Finally, as of late, scholars have emphasized the mediating role of studying and travelling abroad (e.g. Fernandez et al, 2016; Kuhn, 2012; 2015; Sigalas, 2010; Mol, 2013). The problem here is that while the causal precedence of education with respect to studying abroad, travel abroad, and European identification is relatively uncontroversial (e.g. to study abroad as an Erasmus student one must have reached an advanced level of education), one can assume a mutually reinforcing effect between international mobility and supranational identification, which researchers have not managed to disentangle.

Additional causal mechanisms, unexplored or explored only in restricted contexts, could potentially explain the correlation between education and European identification. This paper is an effort to propose and tests for the role of these alternative mechanisms. I first focus on the role of personality. Scholars and lay commentators have often related openness to tolerance and cosmopolitanism. More specifically, theory and research propose that openness and extraversion are connected to European identification (Curtis, 2016). Says Curtis that "openness to experience is demonstrated by intellectual curiosity, creativity, wide interests, and aesthetic appreciation" (p. 432), while extraversion

"measures how energetic, assertive, self-confident, talkative, and socially oriented one is." (p. 432). Curtis argues that since national identification is the norm, those who identify as Europeans must be people whose personality predisposes them to transcend this norm, which justifies the expectation that openness will correlate with European identification. In order to justify the prediction that extraverts are more likely to identify as Europeans, Curtis develops a more complex causal argument, where extraversion leads to European identification through people's propensity to make friends from other countries and through self-esteem and the resulting confidence in broadening one's sense of self (pp. 433-434). Meanwhile, research has also suggested that university education tends to promote both extraversion (Kassenboehmer et al., 2018). The only empirical test of the role of openness and extraversion, however, is Curtis'. Her article, however, focuses on Great Britain only and does not examine the extent to which these traits mediate the relation between education and European identification. In this paper, I examine these questions through two international surveys.

H1: The more open and extrovert people are or the more they value openness and extraversion, the more they identify with geopolitical units bigger than the national state. More educated individuals identify themselves more as Europeans than do less educated ones, in part because they are more open and extrovert or because they value openness and extraversion more.

Another alternative mechanism that can mediate the relation between education and European identification is the content of education (see Verhaegen et al, 2013). Using data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (2009), Verhaegen and co-authors demonstrate that students who claim to have learnt about other European countries in school identify themselves more as European than do those who claim not to have learnt about other European countries. I propose that education, just as fluency in foreign languages and being in a binational couple (see Díez Medrano, 2018 and Díez Medrano, 2020), increases awareness about one's geopolitical location and familiarity with other countries and cultures: Directly, through curricular contents, and then indirectly, through instilling the habit of reading and, at the same time, increasing reading and listening comprehension, which then makes people more receptive to information on other countries transmitted by media and other channels of communication. Instructors and the curriculum may also socialize students into identifying with geopolitical units that transcend the nation-state.

Awareness is a precondition for identification. One cannot identify as part of a group or a geopolitical space whose existence one does not know. We develop our identity in a world that is organized and re-organized into categories and classifications. These categories of knowledge tend to have fuzzy boundaries and often controversial meanings, but they are precise enough to allow people to organize their experience and communicate with others. Spatial and geopolitical categories and classifications,

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as well as the meanings attached to them, are part of the constructed world into which we are socialized. Because of this, most people learn that the space in which they are born and live is part of a country, a continent, the earth. These spatial categories may be more or less salient in people's minds, but salient enough to prevent individuals who live in Italy to think and state that they live in Uruguay and Africa, or to prevent individuals who live in Ghana to say that they live in Stockholm, which is part of Asia. They may not have a precise map of the world in their heads and they may even place countries in the wrong continent, but with few exceptions that reflect the fuzziness of the boundaries and meanings of categories of classification, they surely know in which country and continent they live.

Emphasizing the high salience of basic geographical and geopolitical categories and people's awareness of their own geopolitical location is necessary for a correct assessment of previous studies of European identification and a correct understanding of what one is trying to explain. For since these studies are conducted in countries that are located in the European continent, they are already selecting on the main factor that enters into one's identification as European and which differentiates those who identify themselves as European from those who do not, which is the geographical location. All respondents born and raised in those countries (except those at the fringes of the continent) know that they live in a European country and that they are, from that geopolitical perspective, European. The variance that one is trying to explain in studies of European identification is therefore the very small slice of the total variance that is not accounted for by the geographical location in the European continent. No wonder then that studies have failed to explain more than 11% of this remaining variance. There is very little to be explained! And since so much of one's identification as member of a geopolitical category depends on one's actual spatial location (one could certainly add a family trajectory into the picture to account for the effect of migration), it is likely that the relative practical and cognitive salience of the nested geopolitical locations for individuals also affects their disposition to identify themselves as Europeans. This is the point where education intervenes, for the school and university play a significant role in making larger geographical and geopolitical memberships more salient in people's minds, just as, perhaps, travelling to or working in other countries in Europe may make them more salient on a practical level. The higher the level of education that one attains, the greater the probability that geography, history, economics, literature and other subjects dealing with society will discuss topics that refer to geopolitical units bigger than the national state, and the greater the probability that one's European location becomes more salient in people's minds. Although awareness and familiarity probably play the greatest role in explaining why more educated individuals express a stronger sense of being European than less-educated ones do, one should also mention a second-order consequence of greater awareness, which is the perception of smaller cultural

differences between countries than one would otherwise have. There is indeed an abundant socio-psychological literature that emphasizes the role of familiarity in reducing perceptions of cultural distance, which in turn, facilitate the emergence of bi-cultural and pan-cultural identifications.

The educational system does not only make people aware that the place where they live is nested in geopolitical categories such as countries, continents, or the world are large; it also provides these categories with meaning and valence. This is important because scholars have often described the European Union as an elite project, created by elites and benefitting elites (for a synthesis, see Best et al., 2012). We also know from previous research that these elites, especially high officials at the European Commission, have invested significant resources in promoting a sense of Europeanness in the population (Calligaro, 2013). It is then conceivable that, as members of the educated elites, teachers and academic personnel would be receptive to these efforts and then contribute to instilling a European identification among their students, more so in higher grades when the geographical scope of the educational content tends to widen. One may also expect variation across European countries, dependent on how national political culture has conceptualized, or framed Europe, the European Union, and European integration (Díez Medrano, 2003). In countries, like the United Kingdom, where Europe has been constructed as a threat to national identity, educators may align their teaching less with the European Union institutions' agenda and students may be less receptive to positive messages about Europe. In other countries, like Spain, where Europe has been constructed as the solution to the country's modernization problems, educators may more enthusiastically embrace this agenda. Because of this, one would predict variation in the relationship between education and European identification. It should be stronger in countries like Spain and weaker in countries like the United Kingdom.

Because the role that educational systems play in familiarizing students with the world outside their country is to some extent independent from its role in presenting a positive or negative image of Europe, one cannot develop clear expectations as to the relationship between education and European identification that results from these potentially contradictory effects. It is thus an empirical issue. In general, however, since most European countries conceive European integration in a positive light and European identification as compatible with national identification, the relationship should generally be positive.

H2a: The more educated individuals are, the more aware they are that they are part of geopolitical spaces beyond the national state, the less they feel that they are culturally different from nationals from other countries, and, therefore, the more they identify as Europeans.

H2b: The more educated individuals are, the longer they have been exposed and socialized into feeling that they are European, and, because of this, the more they identify as European.

In the pages that follow, I examine in detail the relationship between education and European identification. Then, I explore the role of personality and the content of education with various comparative surveys that provide information on supranational identification in both European and non-European countries. While I will be able to directly test for the effect of openness and extraversion, my test of the effects of the content of education will be largely indirect. Because of this my conclusion regarding the role of personality will necessarily be more solid than the one concerning the role of the content of education. Regarding the latter, one would expect that if the education system's main contribution to the development of European identification is through exposing students to other parts of the world in which one's country is nested, then we would observe that individuals all over the world identify with the continent and other meaningful geopolitical areas beyond the national state, and that the relationship between education and supranational identification is comparable across the world. If the positive or negative representations attached to potential supranational categories of identification and agents representing or acting in the name of those supranational categories of identification play a relatively more important role than just awareness and familiarity then we would expect that supranational identification would be more prevalent in Europe, and more particularly in European Union member states. Along the same logic, one would also expect that non-EU member states display lower levels of European identification and that Britons would display lower levels of European identification than other nationalities in the European Union. Finally, one would expect that the relationship between education and supranational identification would be stronger in EU member states than in non-EU European states and weaker in the United Kingdom than in other EU member states.

Data

I use three comparative surveys conducted in the middle years of 2010s: 1) the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2016, 2) the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 2013, and 3) the 6th wave of the World Values Study (WVS) conducted between 2011 and 2014. One advantage of using these three different surveys is that, together, they include a large number of European and non-European states. Another advantage is that each of them taps on different dimensions of identification, through different questions. This will help assessing the robustness of some of the statistical findings, especially those concerning the relationship between education and identification, adjusted for age and country of residence. The ESS from 2016 includes a very large

number of European countries and for the first time included a survey item that measures emotional attachment to Europe. The ISSP from 2013 included a module on National Identity. In one of the items in the survey questionnaire, respondents were asked how close they feel to the continent in which their country of residence is nested. Finally, the WVS from 2011-2014 includes an item that asks respondents whether they consider themselves part of the specific supranational polity to which their country belongs or, alternatively, to the continent or sub-continental region in which the respondents live. Most supranational polities to which countries belong are recent or lack entitativity, which makes them largely invisible to the population and raises the possibility of random answers to the question. Because of this, and with the exception of countries where the question refers to the European Union, I have examined only the small subset of countries that asked about a continent or a sub-continental region. The answers to the ESS item on emotional attachment to Europe range from 1 to 10, whereas the answers to the ISSP and WVS items range from 1 to 4.

Since studies of European identification have rarely explained more than 11% of the variance, and since these studies show that just a few variables account for most of this explained variance, I will limit my analysis to those few variables, which are education, age, and country of residence. The analysis is restricted to respondents who are citizens of the country of residence and to respondents who were 23 years and older at the time of the survey so as to eliminate respondents who are still enrolled at lower levels of the education and may continue studying in the future. I measure education through the age at which respondents finished full-time education. Those who finished at or later than their 24th birthday have been coded as 24.

In order to evaluate the role of personality characteristics and values in the explanation of the relationship between education and European identification, the analysis also includes indicators of the relevant values and personality traits. The ESS survey includes all twenty-one items of Schwartz's value classification while the WVS survey includes one item for each of Schwartz's value dimensions. Schwartz's ten-dimensional classification of values is meant to "represent the broad and basic motivations that are relevant to a wide variety of attitudes and behavior across the different domains of life." (p. 261, 2003). I have followed Schwartz's claim that the ten basic values can be integrated into a two-axis structure consisting in two orthogonal dimensions: self-Enhancement vs. self-transcendence and openness to change vs. conservatism. Based on Curtis' hypothesis concerning the impact of openness on identification, I will focus mainly on the roles of openness (self-direction, stimulus seeking), and self-enhancement (achievement, hedonism) values, as well as in the role of lack of openness (tradition, conformity, security) values. Note that self-enhancement in Schwartz's conceptualization and measurement bear great similarity with extraversion. The WVS survey also

includes two items for each of the personality types corresponding to the Big Five classification (Openness, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) (on the Big Five, see John and Srivastava, 1999; McCrae and Costa, 1992). I have followed Schwartz empirical approach to the measurement of values and coded them so that the scores reflect the relative salience of each of these personality traits.

Finally, in order to more directly test for the role of awareness of and familiarity with the world outside in mediating the relationship between education and supranational identification, I use a series of items in the WVS 2011-2014 that measure how frequently respondents rely on various sources in order to obtain information about the world. I conducted factor analysis to create two latent indicators, one reflecting reliance on traditional media and another one reflecting interpersonal face-to-face or online communication. As stated above, education can contribute to greater awareness of and familiarity with geopolitical categories of identification beyond the national state in a direct way, through the materials presented in class, and indirectly, through making people more attentive to news about the world outside, which in turn increases people's awareness of and familiarity with geographical areas beyond the national state, and thus makes it more likely that they will identify more with those broader geopolitical spaces in which one's country is nested. I would thus anticipate that controlling for the degree of exposure to news about the world mediates the relationship between education and supranational identification.

Analysis

Supranational identification

Column 2 in Table 1 displays levels of emotional attachment to Europe. Except for Russia, they are in generally in the range between 5 and 6, which indicates just a moderate level of emotional attachment. They are significantly below those obtained for emotional attachment to the country of residence, with average values between 7 and 8 (not shown). Roose questions the assumption that European identification reflects the growing role that the European Union plays in people's lives and the European Commission's efforts to instill it in the population (Roose, 2013). His work, just as Jung (2008), shows that supranational identification is pervasive across the world and is not more prevalent in the European Union than elsewhere. Table 1 replicates his and Jung's findings with recent survey data.

Table 1. Emotional Attachment to Europe, Closeness to Continent, and Feeling of being Part of Continent, by Country of Residence

	ESS 2016 (Range 1-10) Emotional Attachment	ISSP 2013 (Range 1-4) Closeness to Continent	WVS 2011-2014 (Range 1-4) Feeling of Being Part of Continent/European Union
Austria	5.70 (2.570)		
Belgium	5.33 (2.464)	2.59 (0.869)	
Switzerland	5.80 (2.298)	2.21 (0.770)	
Czechia	6.57 (2.331)	1.97 (0.797)	
Germany	6.19 (2.403)	2.21 (0.776)	2.42 (0.850) (EU)
Estonia	5.36 (2.598)	2.67 (0.828)	1.89 (0.761) (EU)
Spain	6.33 (2.433)	2.22 (0.932)	
Finland	6.28 (2.176)	2.54 (0.784)	
France	5.74 (2.486)	2.47 (1.006)	
United Kingdom	4.38 (2.570)	3.05 (0.810)	
Hungary	7.07 (2.394)	1.79 (0.765)	
Ireland	5.10 (2.480)	2.84 (0.877)	
Iceland	5.86 (2.082)	2.43 (0.751)	
Italy	5.40 (2.540)		
Lithuania	5.20 (2.541)	2.60 (0.740)	
Netherlands	5.52 (2.104)		2.43 (0.733) (EU)
Norway	6.38 (2.262)	2.05 (0.798)	
Poland	6.72 (2.353)		1.88 (0.679) (EU)
Portugal	5.70 (2.577)	2.34 (0.842)	
Romania			2.14 (0.943) (EU)
Sweden	6.16 (2.298)	2.43 (0.846)	1.96 (0.770) (EU)
Slovenia	5.21 (2.580)	2.52 (0.914)	2.07 (0.617) (EU)
Denmark		2.30 (0.845)	
Slovak Republic		2.31 (0.790)	
Latvia		2.97 (0.831)	
Croatia		2.74 (0.874)	
Turkey		3.26 (0.989)	2.70 (0.932) (EU)
Russian Federation	2.12 (2.381)	3.43 (0.753)	
Georgia		3.24 (0.852)	2.57 (0.841) (Europe)
Israel (Jews)		2.46 (1.026)	
Israel (Arabs)		2.61 (1.007)	
Australia			2.29 (0.757) (Asia)
China			2.05 (0.649) (Asia)
Taiwan		2.46 (0.781)	1.90 (0.538) (Asia)
Japan		2.10 (0.803)	
South Korea		2.75 (0.833)	
Hong Kong			1.91 (0.550) (Asia)
Philippines		2.76 (0.925)	
India		2.40 (1.172)	
Pakistan			1.92 (0.885) (Asia)
South Africa		2.32 (1.009)	
Mexico		2.22 (0.994)	2.54 (0.967) (North America)
United States		2.20 (0.912)	1.90 (0.714) (North America)
Argentina			1.93 (0.983) (Latin American Community)

Notes: ( ) Standard Error

All models control of age and for country of residence.

Universe: Population 23 and older and citizens of country of residence; Age at end of education coded so that 24=24 and over.

<u>Countries in ESS</u>: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Lithuania, Slovenia, Norway, Switzerland, Ireland Russia.

<u>Countries in WVS</u>: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, USA, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Turkey, Georgia

<u>Countries in ISSP</u>: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Georgia, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, United States

<u>Identification</u>: (ESS): "How emotionally attached you are to Europe"; (WVS) "I see myself as part of [European Union/Asia/Latin America/North America]; (ISSP) "How close do you feel to [Europe/Middle East/Asia/America]"

The ISSP and, in a more limited sense, WVS data show that the prevalence of supranational identification is similar in European and non-European countries. Averages between 2 and 2.5 on a scale from 1 to 4 also suggest that continental identification is neither very relevant nor very strong. The statistical figures also demonstrate the primary role that geographical location plays in determining people's sense of belonging and help explain why statistical models focused on European identification in European countries fail to explain much of the variance. This is well illustrated by the case of Russia when one compares data on supranational identification from ESS and ISSP. In ESS, respondents were specifically asked about their emotional attachment to Europe and the resulting average, at 2.12, is well below averages for other countries in the survey, including non-EU member states. In ISSP, however, Russian respondents were asked how close they feel to Europe or Asia and the resulting average, at 3.43, is high and higher than in all European countries in the survey. The contrast between the ESS and ISSP findings can only be explained by the fact that, geographically, Russia strands Asia and Europe. Many respondents who are asked about their emotional attachment to Europe only, as is the case in ESS, may express low emotional attachment to Europe because in geographical terms they perceive Russia as more part of Asia than of Europe, even when they live in the country's "European" side. Needless to say, it is in countries like Russia, Turkey, and so on, which spread between two continents or whose geographic position in one continent is not obvious, where social, cultural, and political factors in explaining identification are likely to play a significant role. But in a country like Luxembourg, for instance, no imaginative social or political construction would succeed in making its native population believe that they are American or that they are not European in some ways. Individuals may vary in their emotional attachment for reasons that we as social scientists can illuminate but we should be strongly aware that we are dealing with the marginal variation in identification that is left to explain once one takes into account the much more important role of geographical location. As one can see in Table 1, emotional attachment to Europe, with the exception of Russia, generally fluctuates between 4 and 8, which is just forty percent of the range for this scale. Meanwhile, closeness to the continent in which one's country is located fluctuates between 2 and 3, which is just one third of the total range for this variable.

Since continental identification is basically as strong in European and non-European countries, one can infer that the marginal variation that is left after taking into account a country's geographical location mainly reflects the impact of general individual and socio-cultural factors. In fact, one can say that membership in the European Union plays no role whatsoever in explaining European identification or identification as part of the European Union. In this respect, the WVS data for Germany and the Netherlands show that identification as part of the European Union is weaker than is Mexico's identification as part of North America. This can be interpreted as failure by European

Union institutions or simply as reflecting the fact that national governments show little motivation to change this, both independently and as members of the European Council, while primary and secondary socialization institutions mainly contribute to reproduce national identifications.

Education and European identification

Column 1 in Table 2 displays the multiple regression coefficient corresponding to the relationship between education and emotional attachment to European, while holding country of residence and age constant. The effect is positive and shows that a ten-year difference in the age at which one finished full-time education corresponds to a just above one-point increase in emotional attachment to Europe. The relationship between the two variables is therefore small, as one would expect based on the discussion above. While research shows that this is the best and most consistent socio-demographic predictor of European identification, the relationship between geographical location in Europe and European identification is so strong that there is little additional variance to be explained and it is unlikely that any individual-level variable would capture much of this remaining variance.

Personality

This paper's goal, however, is not to provide a better explanation of European identification but to provide insight into the mechanism that relates education and European identification. I will start the analysis by focusing on the role of values and personality. Theory and common sense suggest that people who value openness and who are more open should identify as Europeans more than should people who value it less and who are less open. Researchers have also found an empirical relationship between extraversion and European identification (Curtis, 2016). Finally, some research suggests that university education makes people more extrovert (Kassenboehmer et al, 2018). We should thus expect these two traits to mediate the empirical relationship between education and European identification. Column 2 in Table 2 allows us to examine the validity of this expectation. It shows that two of the value dimensions that Schwartz associates to being open, stimulation and universalism, and two of the value dimensions that Schwartz associates to being extrovert, achievement and hedonism, correlate positively with European identification, as one would expect. Other results do not conform to expectations. People who value conformism more, instead of expressing a weaker emotional attachment to Europe than do those who value conformism less, as one would expect, express more emotional attachment. Also, neither the relative value attached to self-direction nor the value attached to tradition and security show statistically significant associations with emotional attachment to Europe. One can thus only cautiously infer that openness and extraversion values

correlate with greater emotional attachment to Europe. At the same time, the statistical results in Column 2 of Table 2 cast doubt on the significance of openness and extraversion in mediating the relationship between education and European identification. This is the conclusion that one reaches when one compares the coefficient for education in columns 1 and 2. A coefficient of 0.11 in column 2 compared to a coefficient of 0.12 in column 1 shows that Schwartz's value dimensions only account for a trivial portion of the relationship between education and European identification.

I have conducted a partial replication of the analysis performed with the ESS data, this time with the WVS data. One will expect that if education mediates the effect of education, it should do so both in European and non-European countries, whether the referent is Europe or another supranational geographical or geopolitical unit. The WVS, as described above, included one item per value dimension in Schwartz's classification. In addition, however, it includes two items per personality trait along the Big Five classification. It is on the basis of this scale that Curtis et al. claim that personality and European identification are related. The results obtained in columns 3 to 6 are not conclusive. Of the eight value items included in the model, only the ones corresponding to universalism and security perform as expected (see column 4). Individuals with universalistic values identify more as part of the continent (or the European Union for those who reside in an EU member state) in which their country is nested than those without universalistic values, and individuals who value security more identify less as part of the continent in which their country is nested (or the European Union for those who reside in an EU member state) than those who value security less. The relationship between the other value dimensions and feelings of membership in a supranational geographical or geopolitical unit are not statistically significant. Similarly, none of the Big Five personality traits included in column 5 shows a statistically significant association with feelings of being a part of a continent or the European Union. Only when one includes extraversion alone, as in column 6, is the effect in the predicted direction and statistically significant. The statistical results in columns 3 to 6 also show that values and personality play no role in mediating the effect of education. When one controls for either values or personality the coefficient for the effect of education remains unchanged.

Table 2. The Effects of Education and Personality on European and Other Supranational Identifications

	ESS 2016 (1) (Range:1-10)	ESS 2016 (2) (Range:1-10)	WVS 2011-2014 (3) (Range:1-4)	WVS 2011-2014 (4) (Range:1-4)	WVS 2011-2014 (5) (Range:1-4)	WVS 2011-2014 (6) (Range:1-4)	ISSP 2013 (7) (Range:1-4)
Age of completion of full-time education	**0.12** **(4.0E-03)**	**0.11** **(4.0E-03)**	**0.01** **(2.0E-03)**	**0.01** **(2.0E-03)**	**0.01** **(3.0E-03)**	**0.01** **(3.0E-03)**	**0.02** **(1.0E-03)**
Values							
Self-Direction		-0.04 (0.02)		6.0E-03 (9.0E-03)			
Achievement		**0.13** **(0.02)**		-5.0E-03 (9.0E-03)			
Stimulation		**0.08** **(0.02)**		-5.0E-03 (8.0E-03)			
Universalism		**0.26** **(0.03)**		**0.05** **(9.0E-03)**			
Hedonism		**0.10** **(0.02)**		-1.0E-03 (9.0E-03)			
Conformism		**0.08** **(0.02)**		-8.0E-03 (8.0E-03)			
Tradition		-0.02 (0.02)		-2.0E-03 (8.0E-03)			
Security		-0.02 (0.02)		**-0.03** **(9.0E-03)**			
Personality							
Open					-0.02 (0.02)		
Extraverted					0.03 (0.02)	**0.03** **(0.02)**	
Conformist					-0.01 (0.02)		
R-Square	0.177	0.182	0.136	0.141	0.147	0.147	0.143
N	31524	31524	8699	8699	4772	4772	36212

Notes: ( ) Standard Error

Bold: Significant at 0.05 level of significance, two-tailed

All models control of age and for country of residence.

Universe: Population 23 and older and born in country of residence; Age at end of education coded so that 24=24 and over.

Countries in ESS: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Lithuania, Slovenia, Norway, Switzerland, Ireland Russia.

Countries in WVS (models 3 & 4): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, USA

Countries in WVS (models 5 & 6): Brazil, China, Germany, Ecuador, Netherlands, Pakistan

Countries in ISSP: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Georgia, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, United States

Identification: (ESS): "How emotionally attached you are to Europe"; (WVS) "I see myself as part of [European Union/Asia/Latin America/North America]; (ISSP) "How close do you feel to [Europe/Middle East/Asia/America]"

The Contents of Education

I will now explore the role of the content of education in mediating the association between educational attainment and European identification. In particular, I aim to distinguish between the effect of greater exposure to the history, politics, geography, and culture of other European countries, from the effect of the valence attached to Europe or the European Union. That is, I evaluate whether the reason why highly educated individuals express greater emotional attachment to Europe results from greater awareness or because education promotes not only greater awareness about Europe but also positive images about Europe and the message that being cosmopolitan, in this case, European, is a good thing.

Direct adjudication between the two alternatives above is not feasible with the available data. Nonetheless, one can check whether the effect of education on supranational identification across countries is consistent with the second alternative. If the second mechanism is the main one, one would expect, for instance, the effect of education to be stronger in EU member states than in non-member states, if only because EU membership probably increases exposure to positive messages about European integration and about the importance of feeling European. In multiple regression, this can be modelled with interaction terms for the effect of education conditional on country of residence. Row 1 in Table 3 reports information concerning the statistical significance and strength of these interaction effects with the ESS data on emotional attachment to Europe. The comparison between the obtained F-Value for the test and the critical F value at the 95% significance level (two-tailed) in row 1, columns 7 and 8, shows that taken together the interactions are statistically significant. That is, it conveys that the effect of education on emotional attachment to Europe varies across countries. The comparison between the R-square in Row 1, Column 2 and the R-square in Row 1, Column 4, however, shows that the model fit improves only marginally when one models interactions between education and country of residence. In other words, considering these interactions instead of postulating a uniform effect of education hardly improves the explanation of emotional attachment to Europe. Furthermore, when I distinguish between European Union member states and non-member states (e.g., Norway, Russia), it turns out that the effect of education on emotional attachment to Europe is actually weaker, instead of stronger, in European Union member states than in non-member states. Another finding that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect of education on emotional attachment to Europe is mediated by the images of Europe and European identity that are transmitted at school and university is that when one compares the United Kingdom with the rest of EU member states, the effect of education on European identification is actually greater than the average education effect in the rest of the EU. The ESS data thus suggest that a common denominator

to all European educational systems underlies the positive association between education and emotional attachment to Europe.

Once one leaves the European context and focuses on the role of education in other countries, the inference above that representations and evaluations of supranational geographical and geopolitical regions at school or university are not what leads more educated people to identify more as Europeans than do less educated people becomes more plausible. Consistent with Roose's structural equation models, which show that the socio-demographic correlates of supranational identification are the same in and outside Europe, row 1 in Table 2 shows indeed a positive relationship between education and identification with geographical and geopolitical areas greater than the national state. Along with the fact that supranational identification does not greatly differ in and outside Europe, which reflects the paramount role that geographic location plays in explaining identifications, this suggests that some common element to educational systems is the major influence behind the relationship between the two. This common element is exposure to the world beyond the national state, which increases awareness of one's location not only in a particular country but also in a particular continent and then, the world. One can note at this point that the transmission of cosmopolitan values cannot be the common denominator across educational systems, for I showed above that neither values nor personality play a significant role in mediating the relationship between education and supranational forms of identification.

It is with this in mind that one can now interpret other statistical findings in Tables 3 and 4: First, the finding in rows 2 and 3 of Table 3 that the effect of education varies across countries (see columns 6 to 8), combined with the trivial contribution that these interactions play to the explanation of supranational identification (compare columns 2 and 4); then, the finding in row 2, Table 4, that the effect of education is stronger in European countries than in non-European countries. Since the effect of education on emotional attachment to Europe is stronger in non-EU countries and in Eurosceptic Great Britain than in EU member states, which casts doubt on the role of the images and evaluations of Europe and European identity that educational systems transmit to their students, one can venture that greater emphasis in the history, economy, geography, and politics of other countries in the continent in European curricula compared to the curricula of non-European countries is the key explanation for this contrast. It makes Europe more salient in people's minds than are other continents in the minds of people who live outside Europe. This interpretation, which needs empirical confirmation through systematic examination of school textbooks, would highlight perhaps one important contribution of European integration, which is to have made educational systems less parochial and more sensitive to the European context.

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Table 3. Goodness of Fit Indices for Interaction Effects between Education and Country of Residence on Supranational Identification

	RSS (baseline)	R-Square	RSS (with Interactions)	R-Square	Df baseline	Df full	Obtained F-Value	F-Test Critical Value P<0.05 two-tailed	Conclusion
ESS	179957.516	0.177	178930.586	0.182	31501	31480	8.60	1.69	Reject H0
ISSP	32024.875	0.155	31799.670	0.161	41726	41695	9.53	1.56	Reject H0
WVS	4644.992	0.136	4630.909	0.139	8686	8676	2.64	2.05	Reject H0

Note: For number of cases, see Table 2

Table 4. Interaction Effect of Education with Country of Residence on Supranational Identification

	Interaction Coefficient for combined effect of Education and World Region		
	ESS 2016	ISSP 2013	WVS 2011-2014
European Union/Other	**-0.06** **(0.01)**		
European/Non-European		**0.01** **(0.00)**	**0.14** **(0.00)**

Note: ( ) Standard Error
All models control for age
Bold: Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed.
For number of cases, see Table 2

Following the line of argument above, we can now explore the role of two channels through which greater awareness could be propitiated and re-enforced. The first channel would be a direct one. One spends many years in school and during these years, especially in high-school, one reads and hears about other countries in one's geographical region. The second channel would be more indirect. The education system teaches and accustoms students to read and be informed about the world. The longer one stays in school and then university, the more this habit is internalized as a disposition, which leads highly educated individuals to read and listen to news more frequently, thereby being reminded of one's broader geographical and geopolitical affiliations (e.g. France, Europe, the West, the Francophonie, the European Union, the world).

I test for the second possibility above with WVS data, for the survey includes a battery of items that measure how frequently people get information from various sources. Through factor analysis, I combined these items into two dimensions, information through traditional media and information through interpersonal communication, be it face-to-face or other channels (e.g. email).

Then, I included the resulting variables in a multiple regression model for the explanation of feelings of membership in a continent or the European Union, depending on the country. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. These results show that the greater one's reliance on both interpersonal communication sources and traditional media to get information, the stronger one's feelings of being part of the continent in which one lives or, when referred to European Union member states, the European Union (column 2). Furthermore, a comparison between the coefficients for education in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 reveals that half of the education effect is mediated by how frequently individuals rely on both interpersonal sources and traditional media for information. Again, this finding is consistent with an interpretation of the education effect on supranational identification that highlights the mediating role of greater awareness of one's location in geographical and geopolitical spaces beyond the national state.

Table 5. The Mediating Effect of Exposure to Information on the Relationship between Education and Supranational Identification

	WVS (2011-2014) Feeling of being Part of Continent/European Union	
Age of completion of full-time education	**0.012** **(2.0E-03)**	**0.006** **(1.0E-03)**
Use frequency of interpersonal communication sources and internet		**0.075** **(1.0E-03)**
Use frequency of traditional media		**0.075** **(1.0E-03)**
R-Square	0.142	0.154
N	7735	7735

Note: ( ) Standard Error
Bold: Statistically significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed
All models control of age and for country of residence.
Universe: Population 23 and older; Age at end of education coded so that 24=24 and over.
WVS countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, USA.

> Question on Use frequency: "People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never (read out and code one answer for each): [Daily Newspapers, Printed Magazines, TV news, Radio news, Mobile Phone, Email, Internet, Talk with Friends and Colleagues"]

Conclusion

This paper provides persuasive evidence that geographical awareness underlies European identification and the relationship between education and European identification. At the same time, it shows that openness and extraversion and representations of Europe and the European Union play a relatively trivial role, if any. Through internal comparisons within Europe and comparisons with continental identifications outside Europe, I? interpret statistical findings as evidence that what education does is to increase familiarity and rapport with the broader geographical and geopolitical spaces in which individuals are located, both directly, through the subjects studied in school and university, and indirectly, by promoting greater interest in what goes on in the world. This is also the interpretation that I have reached through previous work on the role of fluency in foreign languages and of being in a binational marriage or cohabitation arrangement with another European. My analytical strategy of course is one based on privileging those explanations that are most consistent with observed regularities and in discarding explanations for which I have relatively good measures. One can criticize that this strategy does not control for other causal variables that can be treated as exogenous to European identification and that also mediate the effect of education. It is important, however, to differentiate between two potential shortcomings of my approach. The first one is that it does not prove that awareness and not emotions or rational calculus, to name two alternatives, are the main intervening factor. The criticism is all the more pertinent given that the ESS item asks respondents about their emotional attachment to Europe, a qualifier that I recommended as part of the team lead by Theresa Kuhn that drafted the proposal for inclusion of this item. Although this criticism would be appropriate, I feel that emotion is probably secondary and follows from greater awareness and familiarity. We would need an imaginative research design to get a more precise understanding of the precise causal process. In the meantime, I still prefer to place the accent on awareness for two reasons: first, because it is less demanding on individuals' investment in an object of identification that, objectively speaking is less salient than the national state; second, because it provides a better account of structurally equivalent associations between education and supranational identification outside Europe. The second shortcoming of my approach in this paper is that, even if we accept that awareness is the main psychological mechanism, I do not map systematically enough the causal process between education and European identification, so as to distinguish between the effect of the school and university curricula and secondary causal process like the one I have sketched for the role of news information. What would happen if in addition to items on information, I had items of fluency in foreign languages, frequency of travel abroad, having friends abroad, studying abroad? Well, from previous research we know what happens. The effect of education becomes smaller but does not disappear entirely. For a complete picture of the causal process we would ideally need a questionnaire

that is similar in content to some Eurobarometers conducted in the past and that has the geographical scope of surveys like the WVS or the ISSP. In the meantime, if we pool results from the literature, the argument that familiarity with other European countries, resulting from the curricular content at school and university, plays a non-trivial role in mediating the relationship between education and European identification.

From a policy perspective, the empirical findings, like many preceding them, are sobering. Since geographical location already predisposes citizens to identify as Europeans, the key challenge is how to turn awareness into emotions commensurate with those inspired by the national state. In the discussion above, I have mentioned that there is a two-point difference in average emotional attachment to one's country and emotional attachment to Europe. Given the small effect of education on European identification, European policy-makers cannot expect much change from gradual increases in levels of education across Europe, especially if Europe's population keeps aging, so that life-cycle effects cancel cohort ones.

Based on the findings above, it is also unlikely that a better communication policy will achieve much, for inclusion of exposure to information in the statistical models (see Table 5) only leads to a marginal increase in the explanation of European identification. The fact of the matter is that communication from Europe is filtered through national media systems. Unless national governments give up their hold over the population and control over the media agenda it is thus unlikely that a better communication policy would change things much. A more politically integrated European Union will not result from voluntarist approaches to the construction of identifications. More likely, both a more politically integrated European Union AND European identification will result from a gradual change in power relations between the more federalist Commission and European Parliament on the one hand and the more national-oriented European Council on the other.

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