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Sub-State Identities and Immigrant Integration Policies: The Cases of Andalusia and Catalonia

Luca Marano
maranoluca95@gmail.com
Abstract

Fitting in the line of research that brings together the politics of minority nationalism and that of immigrant multiculturalism, the present paper tries to answer the following research question: To what extent does the presence of a sub-state national identity affect regional immigrant integration policies? Based on the assumption that there is a qualitative difference between regional and minority national identities, the paper develops as a binary comparative study on the immigrant integration policies of a standard region (Andalusia) and a minority nation (Catalonia). The analysis shows that the major differences between their immigrant integration policies concern the discourse rather than the content. In addition, the paper takes Billig’s notion of ‘banal nationalism’ and questions the idea that Andalusian policies are less assimilationist than Catalan policies.

Keywords

Sub-State Identity, Integration Policy, Immigration, Andalusia, Catalonia

Author’s biographical note

Luca Marano recently completed his Master’s Degree in International Security Studies jointly offered by the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies and the University of Trento, after carrying out a research stay at the Instituto de Migraciones (University of Granada) and the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from the University of Trieste. He is particularly interested in the interaction between old and new minorities and in the securitization of immigration.

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Introduction

Over the past few decades, European states, including those that were historical countries of emigration, such as Spain and Italy, have been experiencing an increase in volume, composition, and nature of immigration flows – a higher number of individuals coming from different countries have started to arrive and settle in with the intention of staying and (re)establishing their own family, with all the consequences that this entails from a socio-cultural, economic, and political perspective.

Apart from being a central concern at the state and supra-state level, immigration has acquired salience for sub-units as well. The gradual decentralization of European states, which began in the 1960s and decelerated – or even regressed – with the economic crisis in 2008 and 2010, increased sub-units’ capability to act upon immigration (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Barker, 2015). Numerous devolved competences regard policy areas that overlap with immigration-related issues. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of immigration on population and territory explains why sub-units have great interest in acting upon it. This is especially the case for those sub-units where minority nations live.

Here the autonomy and the cultural distinctiveness of the sub-unit nourish one another to the point that immigration-induced diversity and potential newcomers’ integration in the dominant society of the state may interfere with the existing equilibrium. Defined as ‘legitimation paradox’ (Jeram et al., 2016: 1232), this punctual situation reminds that the receiving society at the sub-state level and the receiving state do not necessarily coincide. This, in turn, highlights the importance of immigrant integration policies as instruments to (re)conceptualize and (re)build collective identities (Zapata-Barrero, 2009: 16).

This paper is not limited to studying the issue in relation to minority nations, as does most of the existing literature. It makes a comparison between a standard region and a minority nation, assuming that immigration may be relevant in the former case, too, albeit with different implications. Identities, be them regional or (minority) national, matter in shaping immigrant integration policies. Still, in the former case, this is less visible because immigrants are included in the broader state national identity and there is no concern that they may alter the relations between sub-unit and central state. Therefore, the research question reads so: To what extent does the presence of a minority national identity affect regional immigrant integration policies?

The paper develops as a binary comparative study based on a qualitative methodological approach, and aims at gaining in-depth insight into the selected case
studies – the Spanish regions of Andalusia and Catalonia. The research focuses on what Czaika and De Haas call ‘policy on paper,’ that is regional policy plans in the present case (2011, quoted in Zuber, 2014: 8). Furthermore, insights from authoritative Spanish scholars and a spokesperson from the Andalusian administration are included.

The choice of the case studies is based on the most similar systems design. First, Andalusia and Catalonia are part of the same country, and they gained high levels of autonomy when the Estado de las autonomías was established, even if they did it for different reasons and, subsequently, through different legal channels. Second, Andalusia and Catalonia have experienced high levels of immigration since the late 1990s – in 2018, Catalonia was the first region per share of the total foreign residents in Spain (22.9%) while Andalusia was the fourth one (13.1%) (INE). Accordingly, immigration has become an important element in both societies. Third, Andalusia and Catalonia have been very proactive in tackling the issue of immigration – their governments have produced a certain number of policy documents specifically devoted to it –, and their reformed Statutes of Autonomy are the most advanced in this field. However, Andalusia and Catalonia are very different with regards to sub-state identities despite being both called ‘nacionalidades históricas.’ In the former case, one may better speak of a standard region while, in the latter, of a minority nation.

This paper consists of three parts apart from the introduction. Section 1 introduces the distinction between sub-state national and regional identities, which is the independent variable of this research. Sub-section 1.1. explores Andalusian and Catalan identities by looking at regional culture (a), level of politicization (b), and subjective sense of identity (c). Section 2 touches on the notions of citizenship and integration in order to deal with immigrant integration policies in multinational states. Sub-section 2.1. engages with the analysis of the case studies, and after a brief overview on the regional immigrant communities, it presents the regional institutional framework (a) and the policy plans (b) and (c) on immigrant integration. Section 3 draws some final remarks on how different types of sub-state identity lead to, more or less, different regional immigrant integration policies.

1 It is the 2nd Transitory Disposition of the Spanish Constitution that allowed Catalonia to go straight to the referendum for the approval of the Statute of Autonomy on the ground that it had already adopted one prior to 1936. By comparison, Andalusia used art. 151 of the Constitution, which allows for the achievement of high levels of autonomy if an initiative is proposed by three-fourths of the municipalities of all the provinces and approved by the absolute majority of the population of each province in a referendum.
1. Sub-state identities

Regionalisms and minority nationalisms are conceived as two forms of sub-state identity, that is more or less politicized cultural identities that coincide with a territorial unit within a greater polity – usually a state. This definition is based on two assumptions: 1. Nevola’s analytical distinction among cultural, territorial, and political or politicized identity (2011: 23-25); and 2. Núñez’s statement that ‘regionalism and minority nationalism could be considered as two parallel manifestations of a conflict or social mobilization on an ethno-territorial basis’ (1999: 122).

According to Nevola, a cultural identity exists when a group of people identifies as a collectivity on the basis of elements that are generally recognized as cultural, including language, religion, or traditions. A territorial identity appears if this culturally-defined group is concentrated within a delimited territory – in this case, the territorial element, which bears specific socio-economic interests, becomes another defining feature of the group. This collective identity is then politicized if it is channeled through specific institutions and becomes a source of political claims. This analytical distinction makes it possible to overcome the ethnic-civic dichotomy, by acknowledging that the cultural and voluntaristic elements at the basis of a collective identity coexist and mutually reinforce each other.

Núñez suggests that regional and sub-state national identities are both a manifestation of the internal heterogeneity of modern nation-states and the center-periphery cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). The concomitant emergence of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organization led to the pursuit of nation-building projects on the part of central states with the objective of removing internal differences and ensuring social cohesion. Moreover, the expansion of capitalism as the dominant form of economic production led to an unequal division of labor and redistribution of the resources, which generated material discrepancies amongst the various sub-units and a subsequent sense of frustration among their populations (Hechter, 1975: 30-34). Although the existence of a particular cultural identity is a necessary condition to mobilize a collectivity, what can trigger political claims is the discontent deriving from a difference in the level of economic development and performance between a peripheral territory and the state center (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983). So one question arises spontaneously: What is the difference between regional and minority national identities if they are both a reaction to the same phenomena?
Assuming that there is no collective identity without a process of self-recognition, it is the very members of the territorially-bound collectivity that ‘decide’ whether they constitute a region or a (sub-state) nation and ‘desire’ to be treated accordingly. However, together with this subjective feeling of identity, another element contributes to the distinction between regional and national identity: The objective that the collectivity wants to achieve within the multilevel state and the subsequent relationship with the central state.

Therefore, the distinction between regionalism and minority nationalism is political, too. The former is a form of collective identity that may claim decision-making powers but usually accepts the existence of a ‘superior’ state national community. The latter either totally rejects state national identity or demands to be recognized as enjoying the same dignity as state national identity. Neither regional nor sub-state national identities prevent in-group members from holding multiple identities, that is from identifying with more than one collectivity at a time. Still, in the latter case, this is less likely, especially if the central state does not recognize its multinational character and, subsequently, the ‘national dignity’ of the minority. Due to their political character and their constructed nature, the distinction between regionalism and minority nationalism is actually fuzzy. However, this de facto ambiguity does not preclude the utility of using the two concepts for analytical purposes.

Even if contemporary liberal states have rejected their mono-national character and promote their internal heterogeneity through the granting of collective rights, they cannot be considered as culturally neutral (Kymlicka, 1995; Kuzio, 2001; Zapata-Barrero, 2009: 14-17). They still carry out the nation-building process of their dominant society, but this fact usually goes unnoticed because identity reproduction mechanisms are applied on a daily basis and the dominant society is accustomed to them. It is because of this general ‘sociological forgetting’ regarding mainstream nationalism on the part of the state dominant society that Billig (1995) coined the phrase ‘banal nationalism,’ where ‘banal’ should be interpreted as ‘taken for granted.’

On the one hand, state nationalism is rationalized into a form of patriotism by emphasizing its civic component. On the other hand, the irrational character (i.e. emotional psychology) intrinsic to any nationalism is pinned on peripheral societies and problematized by overplaying their ethnic-cultural component. In this way, what the state does is delegitimizing and further disempowering the sub-state identities that are perceived to challenge its nation-building project.
To use the words of Triandafyllidou (2001: 32-54), minority nations constitute a ‘significant other’ that threatens the state nation and vice versa, because they both carry out competing nation-building processes. The case of regional identities is relatively different – even if they prevent the state nation-building process from achieving the objective of societal uniformity, they do not deny the exclusive character of this process within the state territory and the subsequent objective of societal unity (Barker, 2015: 10-12). This does not preclude the possibility of regionalist parties holding radical positions or, in the words of Massetti and Schakel, having a high ‘threatening intention’ (2013: 2).

1.1. Andalusian and Catalan identities

Both Andalusia and Catalonia have always been labeled as ‘nacionalidades históricas’ since they both acceded a high level of autonomy during the democratic transition. The definition of the region as a ‘nationality’ is even included in the reformed Andalusian Statute; and in the Catalan case, besides being restated, it is explicitly associated with the notion of ‘nation.’ Nonetheless, this nominal affinity actually conceals very different sub-state realities.

The concept of sub-state identity is blurred because of its psychosocial connotation. For this reason, the nature of Andalusian and Catalan identities is analyzed by looking at (a) regional culture, (b) level of politicization of the identity; and (c) subjective sense of identity.

a) Regional culture

In both cases, the sub-state identity is characterized by a distinctive regional culture, yet their identity makers are substantially different. First, while Catalonia is bilingual and tenaciously promotes its regional language, Andalusia does not have its own language – the habla andaluza is a mere variation of Castilian. Dialects have an identitarian connotation, but they are hardly ever mobilized politically, even because they are subordinated to the standard language and they are likely to be associated with stereotypes and low literacy (Edwards, 2009: 65). By contrast, languages are traditionally considered to be an emblem of groupness and to favor participation in civic life (Chhim & Bélanger, 2017: 930). Moreover, they are usually promoted through specific policies.

In Catalonia, the llengua pròpia is the major identity marker and tends to ‘officially’ permeate all aspects of cultural and societal distinctiveness, even if not all Catalans speak the minority language or deem it as their mother tongue (Interview 3; Interview 5). The
restauration of self-governing institutions coincided with the linguistic normalization process (Soler Costa, 2009; Fontana, 2014: 418-427). The overall objective was to correct the ‘abnormal’ situation created by previous discrimination and redressing the unbalance with the Castilian language. Although one cannot deny its crucial role in the advancement of the Catalan nation-building project, the promotion of Catalan and even the attempt to make its ‘preferential use’ official respond to the need to protect a minority language within an environment which is inevitably Castilian-speaking (Interview 6).

Second, cultural plurality is a sign of distinctiveness and inclusiveness in both contexts (see the Preambles of the Statutes of Autonomy). Connected to regional history and territory, this element is praised as the major identity maker vis-à-vis the central state in Andalusia. The Andalusian identity-building process has coincided with a constant attempt to decolonize local culture from Madrid and to emphasize the region’s geographical position at the European borders (Dietz, 2004: 1093-1096; Castaño et al., 2017: 82-84).

The efforts of cultural re-appropriation involve three major legacies – popular Catholicism, flamenco music and dance, and the convivencia among Christians, Jews and Muslims under al-Andalus. The passage and the presence of numerous cultures on Andalusian soil made them part of Andalusian cultural heterogeneity (Moreno, 1993). Furthermore, the proximity to Africa and the long coastline explain the history of Andalusia and support the positive image of the region as a crossroads of peoples and civilizations (Dietz, 2004: 1088-1089; Castaño et al., 2017: 82-84). All this translated into a discourse of inclusiveness, which is coupled with the remembrance of Andalusian emigration and recognizes cultural plurality as the major Andalusian identity marker.

By comparison, in Catalonia, cultural plurality is an additional identity marker, which immigrants ‘brought with them.’ Catalan prosperous economy turned the region into an attraction pole for cheap labor force (Domingo, 2014; Joutet, 2018). This first occurred at the beginning of the 20th century with an immigration wave mostly coming from Catalan-speaking French territories, Valencia, Aragón and, to a lesser extent, Castilian-speaking Murcia. Then, after the Civil War, Franco’s development policies contributed to a new wave coming from other regions of Spain and especially Andalusia. Finally, the economic expansion of the 1990s and early 2000s favored a third immigration wave from abroad.

Internal immigration under Franco triggered a debate on the issue of immigrant integration, which contributed to redefining Catalan identity in civic terms and to
emphasizing the Catalan language as the main instrument to include immigrants into local society. Consequently, immigration is recognized to be one of the founding elements of Catalan contemporary society, turning the region into a ‘terra d’acollida’ (Domingo, 2014; Franco-Guillén & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Joutet, 2018).

b) Level of politicization

Andalusian and Catalan regional cultures are not backed up by the same level of politicization. The two regional party systems are very different as far as their structural and ideological composition is concerned. Just like most other Spanish regions, Andalusia has no strong nationalist or regionalist party – the historical Partido Andalucista (PA) always played a marginal role in regional politics and no longer exists. The protagonists of the sub-state political system have always been the regional appendices of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP) (Acosta Sánchez, 2002). The latter had always been at government till the elections in December 2018, when the three rights – PP, Ciudadanos (C’s), and Vox – got into office. As a result, one can barely tell the difference between the regional and the central state party systems, which means that in Seville, too, parliamentary confrontation works along the left-right axis.

On the contrary, the Catalan party system is characterized by a multiplicity of nationalist parties – the historical ones being Convergència i Unió (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) – that hold different positions across the left-right spectrum as well as different aspirations in relation to Catalans’ self-determination (Wilson, 2009). These parties counted for a majority of the vote share on three occasions (i.e. 1984, 1992, 1995) and have always led the regional government or been part of governing coalitions. Furthermore, some of them have even been elected at statewide elections, thus seating in the Spanish Congress and playing a crucial role whenever minority governments needed their support (Field, 2015). The dynamics of the Catalan party system subsequently have both a left-right and a territorial dimension, but the latter usually has prominence over the former.

Hence, intergovernmental interaction between regional and central level is different in Andalusia and Catalonia (Wilson, 2009). In the former case, territorially-bound demands have been relegated to those periods in which the political color of regional and central governments did not match (Acosta Sánchez, 2002; Lacomba, 2004). When the same party is in power both in Seville and in Madrid, no regionalist request is made; when the two governments have different colors, left-right confrontation acquires a territorial
connotation, yet regionalist claims are usually not fulfilled owing to the opposition in Madrid. This has resulted in low levels of demands of autonomy (déficit autonómico).

Conversely, in Catalonia, regional governments have never ceased to claim a higher degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, one can distinguish between pre- and post-2012 politics (Colomé García, 2017). The first phase is characterized by a centripetal trend – despite the confrontation with the central government on competence devolution, CiU and the leftist tripartite government did not put into question state structure (Orte & Wilson, 2009; Zardoya Iglesias, 2015; Interview 5). However, the harsh Ruling 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy and the austerity policies following the economic crisis deteriorated the political situation. The 2014 popular consultations, the 2017 independence referendum, and the mobilization following Ruling 459/2019 of the Constitutional Court on the ‘presos polítics’ express a new centrifugal phase in Catalan politics.

c) Subjective sense of identity

As confirmed by surveys on the subjective sense of identity, Andalusians and Catalans hold qualitatively different identities. Andalusians conceive their identity as regional: In 2005, the overwhelming majority of enquired population (85.8%) opted for the term ‘region’ to describe their territory. Moreover, the answer to the Linz-Moreno question shows that most respondents hold a dual identity, thus suggesting that Andalusian sub-state identity is compatible with Spanish national identity. In 2018, 74.2% of the people answered that they feel as Spanish as Andalusian, 10% that they feel more Andalusian than Spanish, and 1.1% that they feel only Andalusian.

As for Catalonia, in 2005, about half of the enquired population (44.7%) called their land a ‘nation.’ It would be interesting to see the current opinions on the matter due to the procés, but the region-or-nation question has not been asked since 2005. One can close this loophole by looking at the opinion survey run by Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) in 2019. This shows that only 33.9% of the respondents consider Catalonia to be ‘a region of Spain’ and ‘an autonomous community of Spain.’ If one interprets the answers ‘a State within a federal Spain’ and ‘an independent State’ in accordance to the traditional association between state and nation, one may infer that 58.4% of the interviewees consider Catalonia as a nation.

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2 All figures are taken from Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). When they are complemented with information from other sources, the latter are specified.
Despite suggesting that Catalonia is seen as a minority nation that claims to be equal in dignity with respect to the Spanish nation, all this does not mean that the two identities are necessarily perceived as incompatible. Even if there has been a gradual increase in the percentage of those who feel exclusively Catalan as the procés advanced (22.7% of respondents in 2017), the relative majority (43.8%) continues to feel as Spanish as Catalan. Finally, 24.3% of the people answered that they feel more Catalan than Spanish.

2. Immigrant integration at the sub-state level

Immigration is a diversity multiplier that, just like regionalisms and minority nationalisms, triggers the ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy, thus calling into question the equation between state and national community and bringing about the issue of integration (Triandafyllidou, 2001: 55-76). Immigrant communities represent a ‘significant other’ which is qualitatively different from regions and sub-state nations because they are not part of the state national narrative (Crepaz, 2016). In order to understand this difference and its implications, the connection between the status of citizenship and the degree of integration comes in handy – while the former draws the (legal) distinction between who is a member of the state and who is a foreigner, the latter refers to the reduction of the (social) distinction.

There is general agreement that citizenship concerns the relationship between the individual (citizen) and a polity (source of citizenship) (Faist & Kivisto, 2014: 23; Medda-Windischer & Kössler, 2014: 61). Traditionally, citizenship is interpreted in legal terms as referring to a particular set of rights that citizens enjoy as full members of the state. Nevertheless, social and political scientists have coupled the legal understanding with a socio-political one. On the one side, citizenship implies participation – initially understood as taking part to political life (within the state), this dimension has expanded to include public life as a whole (within society) (Holesch, 2016: 109-112).

On the other side, citizenship means membership – it deals with citizens’ affiliation to the political community which allegedly coincides with the source of citizenship (Joppke, 2008: 532-533; Hepburn, 2011). The traditional 19th-century association between state and nation explains why there continues to be confusion about the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality,’ although they are conceptually untied. Citizenship identity refers to the political community and is fixed by state laws whereas national identity depends on whether the single individual feels part of the nation (Habermas, 1994: 21-
Owing to the internal heterogeneity of the state, in most cases, one cannot use the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably as the two memberships do not actually coincide, even if they partially overlap – all citizens are members of the state, but not all citizens feel that they belong to the same nation.

Members of sub-state nations and those of the state nation share the same citizenship, which, in liberal democracies, means that they are – formally and substantially – equal members of the same polity. By comparison, newcomers are foreigners – they usually hold a different national identity, and their status of non-citizens prevents them from participating in the receiving society on equal terms. Citizenship is therefore a potential instrument to integrate. Just like it has been transformed to accommodate minority national diversity, citizenship can be further stretched either by simplifying the naturalization process or by extending citizenship rights to non-citizens (Faist & Kivisto, 2014: 26-37). Hammar speaks of denizenship – long-term resident foreigners are bestowed an intermediary status between full citizenship and the condition of alien because of their de facto participation in the host society (Medda-Windischer & Kössler, 2014: 73). This status implies the enjoyment of a set of rights almost equivalent to that of citizens. Political rights are usually entirely excluded, yet certain states confer voting rights for local elections.

The link between citizenship and integration becomes manifest when one looks at the multidimensionality of integration. Scholars agree that one can differentiate among the political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural dimensions of integration, which mirror Marshall’s concentric circles of citizenship (Hamberger, 2009: 5-6; Zuber, 2014: 8-10). Integration depends on the level of equal rights vis-à-vis the native population, contributes to the de facto participation of immigrants in state and societal matters, and boosts a sense of membership.

Assuming that assimilation is an illiberal form of diversity management which requires immigrants to ‘self-remove’ their differences, socio-cultural integration is rather described as a bidirectional process that engages both sides under the state umbrella and reshapes the public domain (Garreta Bochaca, 2003: 48-62). Accordingly, integration has been generally associated to multiculturalism as this embraces diversity by recognizing the coexistence of autochthonous and new cultures as well as by calling for equality of treatment and opportunities.

However, facts, such as the actual ghettoization of immigrants, the lack of social mobility, or acts of terrorism, have been interpreted as evidence of the ‘failure of
multiculturalism’ in old immigration countries (Goodman, 2010: 754-755). On the one hand, this disillusionment triggered the intercultural turn, which has invested especially new immigration countries. Willing to learn from others’ ‘mistakes,’ these countries emphasize the need for dialogue between immigrant and local cultures to give form to a new common public culture (Arribas Lozano & García-González, 2013: 4-6).

On the other hand, the model of civic integration has emerged as an alternative, which was first introduced in the Netherlands with the 1998 Newcomers Law (Goodman, 2010: 754-755). Based on the idea that the receiving state has its own historical-cultural tradition, civic integration requires that immigrants commit to learning the local language, acquiring some notions of history, and interiorizing the basic liberal social values so as to achieve ‘functional individual autonomy’ (Goodman, 2010: 754).

As the object of the paper is Andalusian and Catalan immigrant integration policies, it is necessary to introduce the theoretical framework that Zapata-Barrero and Baker developed to explain policy variations across government levels and state territory in immigration governance in multilevel and/or multinational states (2014: 19-40). Devolution is generally dictated by efficiency, which translates into the principle of subsidiarity. However, when a state is characterized by internal heterogeneity, the principle of identity, too, pushes for decentralization, based on the need to accommodate diversity and ensure self-government. Devolution can be symmetrical in the sense of extended to all sub-units, yet, in most cases, only sub-units with a distinct identity enjoy a higher degree of autonomy.

In the field of immigration policies, power-sharing is limited to reception and integration policies as they pertain to immigrants’ participation in the local society and overlap with other devolved competences, such as education, housing, and healthcare. States jealously guard their competences in admission and citizenship matters because they concern the physical (borders and territory) and emotional (national community) components of the state.

Due to its transformative potential at the societal and cultural level, regions and especially sub-state nations usually have great interest in having a saying on immigration. The latter may be perceived as a challenge – newcomers are usually expected to undermine local cultural distinctiveness and, therefore, the legitimacy for local autonomy because they are likelier to choose to integrate in the dominant society (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001: 66-69). This would result in exclusionary attitudes on the part of the sub-state community.
Otherwise, immigration may be deemed as a resource if immigrants are seen as allies against a common ‘significant other’ – the central state. In this case, the issue may be depoliticized along the left-right axis and politicized along the center-periphery axis. Immigrant integration policies may therefore be used to favor the enjoyment of certain – usually social – rights as well as equal participation in daily life on the part of newcomers. This inclusive attitude may be coupled with the notion of regional citizenship, which refers to the relationship between individuals (non-citizens but residents) and the region (Medda-Windischer & Kössler, 2014). Because citizenship policy is a prerogative of the state, regional citizenship lacks any legal effect, yet it has a symbolic value – it makes the sub-unit a point of reference for immigrant residents, thus encouraging their loyalty to sub-state society.

2.1. Andalusian and Catalan integration policies

In accordance with statewide trends, both Andalusia and Catalonia have experienced an immigration boom since the 1990s (Kleiner-Liebau, 2009: 79-85), yet the inflow volume has decreased with the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 and 2010.³

While 99,781 individuals, that is 1.38% of the 7.2 million inhabitants of Andalusia, were of foreign origin in 1998, twenty years later foreign residents represented 7.41% of the 8.4 million population. Half of these 621,396 immigrants came from other European countries, 28.2% from Africa, 15.6% from America, and 6.3% from Asia and Oceania; and over half of this population was located in the provinces of Malaga (38.3%) and Almeria (22.5%). By comparison, in 1998, 121,361 individuals, that is 1.97% of the 6.1 million Catalan population, were of foreign origin. In 2018, foreign residents were 14.2% of the total 7.6 million inhabitants of the region. One fourth of these 1,082,099 foreigners came from European countries, 27.3% from America, 21.8% from Africa, and 13% from Asia and Oceania; and two thirds of this population resided in the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Both Andalusia and Catalonia have adopted a pragmatic approach towards what was either a completely or a partially new phenomenon, developing their own institutional framework (a) and immigrant integration policies (b and c).

³ All figures are taken from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). The data on the foreign resident population in Spain refer to individuals who hold a nationality different from the Spanish one.
a) Institutional framework

The Spanish Constitution confers the exclusive competence on ‘nationality, immigration, emigration, foreign status and asylum’ to the central government (art. 149(1)(2)). Only with the adoption of the new Ley(es) de Extranjería of 2000, Spain started issuing a ‘complete and comprehensive immigration policy’ (Monar 1997, quoted in Ortega Pérez, 2011: 1383). Apart from the security dimension, the new law(s) included those of integration and cooperation with major countries of origin.

The central state has focused on the external dimension of immigration (i.e. flows management and admissions), thus relegating integration-related issues to a secondary role. Although this implied wide participation of private actors in reception and integration in the 1990s, then it led to a de facto division of labor between central state and sub-units (Interview 3). This was the case because immigrant integration necessarily passes through the access to and enjoyment of regionally provided public services.

Although the original Andalusian and Catalan Statutes did not refer to immigration at all, the Junta and the Generalitat took actions in the exercise of their competences. The Junta was already active through the Labor and Social Affairs Department, and in 1992, it established the Immigration Service with a focus on foreign workers (Interview 5). In the same years, the Generalitat set up the Commission for the Monitoring and Coordination of Immigration Measures to produce the guidelines for regional integration policies: the 1993-2000 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan (Climent-Ferrando, 2012: 31-34).

From an administrative perspective, both Andalusia and Catalonia mimicked the four-pillared architecture of the central state (Ortega Pérez, 2011: 1390). The first body (the Interdepartmental Committee) is in charge of coordinating the immigration-related activities of the various departments of regional governments. The second body is the Directorate-General (Andalusia) or Secretariat (Catalonia) – it impulses and directs regional integration policies. The third body (the Immigration Forum) enables the contact between public administration and civil society as well as between receiving society and immigrant communities, by giving the latter the chance to make proposals and recommendations. The Observatory is the fourth body, which is responsible for data collection and research.4

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4 Despite its inclusion in the 2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan and in the 2010 Reception Law, Catalonia still lacks a research center specifically dealing with immigration.
There are some variations in the regional administrative structures. Both Andalusia and Catalonia acknowledge their territorial heterogeneity and the unequal distribution of the newcomer population. Consequently, they foment local initiatives while establishing some sort of control over and/or cooperation with the local level (Interview 3). This is done mostly through provincial/local fora as well as through budgeting and agreements between regional government and municipalities.\(^5\)

Moreover, Catalonia has set the objective of creating an executive body implementing regional policies, the Agency for Migrations, and a Joint Commission gathering Generalitat and local authorities to coordinate their actions.

From a legal perspective, one has to wait for the reform of the Andalusian (2007) and the Catalan (2006) Statutes to see the formalization of the \textit{de facto} division of labor with the central state. Art. 62 (Andalusia) and art. 138 (Catalonia) explicitly recognize already consolidated competences: Favoring immigrant integration and participation, and fixing yearly foreign workers’ quotas. Furthermore, these articles introduce the new executive competence on the granting of work permits to foreigners whose working performance shall take place on regional soil. As most of the articles of the reformed Catalan Statute, art. 138 was included in PP’s claim of unconstitutionality. Ruling 31/2010 of the Constitutional Court confirmed the validity of the article as a whole, but it provided a strict interpretation of the latter. As immigration remains an exclusive competence of the state, the regional competences on this matter are to be interpreted as mere application of already existing regional competences on social assistance and employment to immigration (Aguado i Cudolà, 2010).

Both Statutes are very advanced when it comes to immigrant integration, yet there is a remarkable difference between the two cases. Assuming that Andalusia has taken Catalonia as a point of reference, the inclusion of the new executive competence should not be read in terms of center-periphery confrontation, but rather in terms of interregional imitation deriving from autonomy asymmetries and the aspiration not to be less than other Spanish regions. In fact, the handover process has never been completed, and the competence has remained on paper.

Conversely, Catalonia is much more active and assertive. On the one hand, it has started releasing and renewing work permits valid on its territory in coordination with the central state. The constitutionality of this provision was confirmed not only by Ruling

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\(^5\) Albeit being promoted in policy documents, the Andalusian Immigration Provincial Fora are not so operative (Interview 4).
31/2010, as already stated, but also by the Ley de Extranjería of 2009, which extends this possibility to the other regions.

On the other hand, Catalonia is the only Spanish region with a specific law devoted to immigration and, more precisely, reception. Apart from taking up the inclusive discourse of Catalonia as a terra d’acollida, Law 10/2010 establishes the regional reception system and promotes immigrants’ autonomy through actions aimed at improving their language competences, occupational skills, and knowledge about Catalan society and laws.

b) The policy documents

Both Andalusia and Catalonia have produced a certain number of policy documents that are innovative for their inclusive language and for the quantity and quality of the proposed measures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Andalusia</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 1st Comprehensive Plan for Immigration in Andalusia 2001-2004 (1st PIPIA);</td>
<td>• Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration 1993-2000;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2nd Comprehensive Plan for Immigration in Andalusia 2006-2009 (2nd PIPIA);</td>
<td>• Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration 2001-2004;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 3rd Comprehensive Plan for Immigration in Andalusia. Horizon 2016 (3rd PIPIA);</td>
<td>• Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 4th Comprehensive Plan for Immigration in Andalusia 2018-2022: “Migrated Citizenship” (4th PIPIA)</td>
<td>• National Agreement on Immigration (PNI);</td>
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<td>• Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009-2012;</td>
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<td>• Citizenship and Migrations Plan: Horizon 2016;</td>
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<td>• Citizenship and Migrations Plan 2017-2020;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• National Agreement on Interculturality.</td>
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Catalonia is more active than Andalusia in issuing policy plans, which is indicative of a more continuist and confrontational policy vis-à-vis the central state. Except for the first Catalan Intergovernmental Plan that covered a seven-year period, all the others have a four-year duration. The last three plans are part of the strategic frame set by the 2008 PNI, which they develop(ed) in accordance with the political agenda of the various governments. In 2020 the PNI comes to an end, so at the time of writing this paper, the
Generalitat is drafting the National Agreement on Interculturality through a highly participatory process.

On the contrary, Andalusia issues policy documents less constantly. The actual period that the plans cover(ed) does not correspond to the one in the title due to delays in their adoption and prolongations in their implementations (Interview 3; Interview 4) – the 3rd Plan is still ongoing. In this respect, owing to the economic crisis and internal disagreements within the Directorate-General and the overall Junta, the 4th Plan is awaiting approval.

Although the principle of efficiency is there in both cases, the principle of identity informs Catalan more than Andalusian policies. Accordingly, both Andalusian and Catalan documents are original, yet for different reasons and to varying degrees. The most groundbreaking PIPIA is the first (2001) – the PSOE-led Junta wanted to send a clear dissenting message to Prime Minister Aznar (PP) (Interview 1; Interview 3). While the statewide GRECO Programme (2001) focused on migratory flow management and intergovernmental cooperation with countries of origin, the 1st PIPIA asserted the need for a comprehensive and socially-oriented vision of immigration. Accordingly, its element of originality is comprehensiveness – the Plan intervened in all those public policy fields that have some impact on immigrant integration.

The 2nd (2006) and the 3rd PIPIAs (2014) followed the same line, but their distance from central state plans diminished. On the one side, the Junta postponed issuing and implementing the 2nd PIPIA as it waited for the newly-formed Zapatero government (PSOE) to define its position on immigration and launch the Fund to Support the Reception and Integration of Immigrants (FAIREA) (Ortega Pérez, 2011: 1390). On the other side, the 1st (2007) and the 2nd (2011) statewide Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECIs) resembled Andalusian plans in structure and content, pushing for a more comprehensive and socially-oriented approach and explicitly referring to interculturalism (Fernández-Suárez, 2017: 119-120).

Although the innovative character of the PIPIAs decreased, some scholars maintain that the left-right axis may assume a territorial connotation again as the Junta is currently led by a rightwing coalition while the central government by the PSOE (Interview 2). However, the politicization of immigration along the left-right axis in Andalusia reflects
that at the central level, so it is likely that the rightwing government may also interrupt policy continuity.6

By comparison, Catalan plans have always maintained an assertive character. The territorial dimension emerges in the first Interdepartmental Plan (1993), yet it acquires greater significance in the following Interdepartmental Plan (2001) and in the first Citizenship Plan (2005). Inspired by the Québécois model of integration, the former document introduces the notion of ‘via catalana d’integració’ and announces that Catalonia will follow its own model by balancing new diversity and old identity. The latter document makes a qualitative leap by recalling the Pujolian discourse on who is Catalan and introducing the EU language of citizenship: Catalan citizenship is untied from Spanish nationality as it is based on actual residency in Catalonia and participation in Catalan society.

The Interdepartmental Plans and the first Citizenship Plan reflect the ideological differences between CiU and the leftwing coalition that respectively produced them. The former still have a very technical approach whilst the latter is more socially-oriented. Nevertheless, the primacy of the vertical confrontation vis-à-vis the central state downplays the left-right confrontation, thus resulting in a general consensus on immigration management (see the PNI). The territorial dimension is likely to remain prominent in the future also due to the deterioration of the relations between Barcelona and Madrid, and the regional approach is likely to remain on this path as proved by the current formulation of a National Agreement on Interculturality.

c) Policy discourse and policy content

The policy discourse that Andalusian and Catalan plans have been developing is inclusive and welcoming. In both cases, the first documents present immigration as a challenge which should be valued as an enriching element, rather than problematized as a threat. Traditionally a land of emigration, Andalusia is now facing a new phenomenon, which allows for redefining the region as the ‘puerta directa de entrada de la población extranjera hacia Europa’ (2nd PPIA: 6). The inclusivity of regional integration policies is explained through the remembrance of past emigration and historical-cultural plurality. By contrast, Catalonia is traditionally a land of immigration – despite the qualitative

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6 While some scholars doubt that the 4th PPIA will be adopted under the rightwing Junta (Interview 1; Interview 3), spokespersons from public administration maintain that it will. However, the new plan will have different structure, contents, and ambitions (Interview 4).
difference between contemporary immigration from abroad and the previous waves, the regional long experience with immigration and the inclusive definition of Catalan citizenship inform its integration policies.

Both Andalusian and Catalan policy plans start referring to immigrants as citizens. In Andalusia, the initial dichotomy between foreigners and citizens (1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} PIPIAs) gives way to the idea that ‘la ciudadanía no puede vincularse a una identidad determinada’ (3\textsuperscript{rd} PIPIA: 82). However, the 4\textsuperscript{th} PIPIA speaks of ‘ciudadanía migrada,’ thus alluding that immigrants are still a different category of citizens. As for Catalan plans, they go from distinguishing between immigrated and Catalan population to calling immigrants ‘nouvinguts’ (second Interdepartmental Plan) and ‘nous catalans/ciutadans’ (Citizenship Plans).

Nevertheless, the language of inclusiveness of Andalusia and Catalonia has different insights and implications because of the center-periphery dimension. Both regions address the immigrant ‘audience,’ but only Catalonia also turns to the central state. What the first Citizenship Plan proposes is ‘un concept de ciutadania deslligat de la nacionalitat estatal’ (p. 34), thus conveying a double message: To immigrants – they are included in the Catalan community of belonging; and to the state – Catalonia needs more competences to effectively tackle immigration according to its national specificity (Interview 7).

Thus, Catalonia understands integration policies as linguistic and community-building policies challenging the nation-building project of the state. The citizenship language is introduced to verbally reduce the distance between autochthonous and immigrant population in terms of rights and participation, just like in Andalusia. Still, it is also associated with the objective of favoring immigrants’ identification with the Catalan national community.

Assuming that the integration process is defined as bidirectional in both contexts, the inclusive discourse of Andalusia and Catalonia translates into similar measures. The political and socio-economic dimensions of integration are conceived in terms of equality and normalization. The exclusive competence of the state in citizenship matters and the subsequent impossibility of extending voting rights entail that both regions mainly promote political integration through associationism. The most effective tool in this respect is the Andalusian Immigration Forum and the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Board. Still, Catalonia went as far as encouraging newcomers to participate in popular consultations and the overall social mobilization within the ‘national
transition’ framework (third Citizenship Plan) on the ground that, being actual citizens of Catalonia, they should be given the opportunity to decide its future (Interview 5).

Incorporation to the labor market is key to socio-economic integration, but great attention is also paid to education and healthcare. Not only should they be accessible on an equal footing with Spanish/Catalan citizens based on empadronamiento, but they should also be complemented with additional services addressing immigrants’ specific needs. Education is open to all underage individuals and centers on local language learning (e.g. Aulas Temporales de Adaptación Lingüística in Andalusia, and Aules d’Acollida in Catalonia) albeit the emphasis on intercultural dialogue and the promotion of foreign cultures. This is the case because Castilian and/or Catalan are seen as fundamental to participation and social mobility.

As for healthcare, it is open to everyone, and during the economic crisis, both regions opposed PP central government’s Royal Decree-Law 16/2012 aimed at excluding irregular immigrants. However, unlike Andalusia, Catalonia partially levelled the access in accordance with the time elapsed since patients’ empadronamiento. This difference may be explained both in political terms – in Seville there was a leftist government (PSOE-A) whereas in Barcelona a rightwing government (CiU) – and in social terms – both regions have a strong tradition of civil society engagement in immigration, but in Andalusia primary reception is mainly delivered by NGOs whilst in Catalonia it is centralized (Piccoli, 2016; Reception Law).

The socio-cultural dimension of integration is based on the recognition of and respect for immigration-related diversity – interculturalism is recognized to prevent societal fragmentation and favor the participatory construction of a cultura pública común. Not only do Andalusian and Catalan plans introduce the professional figure of the mediator and trainings for public employees, but they also promote languages and cultures of origin in the public sphere. Although the area of education contemplates the latter measures, most implementation efforts consist in teaching Castilian/Catalan, thus confirming the limitedness of intercultural interaction (Interview 1; Interview 5).

Moreover, in Catalonia, the principle of interculturality is coupled with the need to preserve Catalan national identity. This may explain why the Catalan model of integration actually moved closer to the civic integration model – Decree 150/2014 introduced the certificat d’acollida. Immigrants are encouraged – yet not obliged – to attend courses on the basics of Catalan and Castilian, occupational skills, and Catalan society and laws. Upon completion, they receive this certificate as further documentation to be submitted
when applying for temporary residence permits based on social rootedness. By contrast, Andalusia did not feel the urgency to fix a standard model for evaluating ‘integration efforts’ (Order of 16 December 2012). Immigrants can prove their social rootedness through a number of activities that are not limited to learning Castilian or European, constitutional, and regional values – also other training courses and conferences organized by both public and private entities are contemplated.

3. Conclusion

By analyzing the cases of Andalusia and Catalonia, this paper has tried to understand to what extent their regional immigrant integration policies differ and whether this is related to the nature of their sub-state identities. The comparative analysis shows that Andalusian and Catalan approaches to immigrant integration are not so dissimilar as far as their content is concerned, but the different nature of the two sub-state identities deeply affects the discourse:

1. The immigrant integration policies of standard regions and minority nations tend to be similar when it comes to the content because, albeit the different levels of autonomy that different sub-units may have, in both cases powers are very limited and do not equal those of the state. Both Andalusia and Catalonia aim at equalizing immigrants’ with locals’ rights, by establishing equal access to public services and by attending their specific needs. Accordingly, the measures proposed and implemented in the field of political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural integration are alike.

However, it is necessary to make two observations related to the nature of Andalusian and Catalan sub-state identities. First, the presence of a regional language in Catalonia introduces an important element connected to some of the areas of intervention of immigrant integration policies. Second, the political dynamics that brought to this inclusive approach are different – in Andalusia, what informs policy content is the left-right cleavage and, more precisely, the fact that the PSOE-A was always in power till the last regional elections; in Catalonia, instead, it is the center-periphery cleavage and the overall agreement that immigration is a constitutive element of Catalan distinctiveness. This may explain why the Catalan model of socio-cultural integration took a ‘civic turn.’

2. The recipients for whom the message is intended determine the policy discourse, and this is where the biggest difference between the policies of standard regions and minority nations can be found. Minority nations are more interested in using immigration-
related policies as a further policy field to challenge the state. The lack of a territorial cleavage fueled by Andalusian cultural identity implies that the policy discourse only addresses the immigrant population. Consequently, the message of inclusiveness does not have an assertive connotation. In fact, Andalusian demands vis-à-vis the central state have been very timid – if not minimal –, and the new executive competence has remained on paper. Likewise, the introduction of the citizenship language is merely rhetorical – neither is it used consistently, nor is it backed by the idea of developing an ‘alternative’ sense of belonging.

By contrast, the territorial cleavage has always been present in the Catalan discourse – the via catalana d’integració implies the double language of identity and competency (Zapata-Barrero, 2012). Catalonia needs to develop its own immigrant integration policy because of its national specificity, which translates into a balancing act between Catalan identity and cultural diversity as well as into demands for greater autonomy. This confrontational discourse is even strengthened by the introduction of the citizenship language – Catalonia is presented as an ‘alternative locus of […] loyalty’ as newcomers are called citizens irrespective of their legal status and of the Spanish naturalization process (Barker, 2015: 21).

3. One may well question whether one of the two immigrant integration policies is more ‘assimilationist’ than the other. Several authors and interviewees maintain that this is the case with Catalonia for two major reasons (Interview 1; Interview 3; Jeram, 2014) – the attempt to prioritize the Catalan language over Castilian (see, for instance, art. 9 of the Reception Law, invalidated by the Constitutional Court) and the attempt to standardize (non-compulsory) courses that immigrants may decide to attend as a way to prove their social rootedness (see the certificat d’acollida introduced by Decree 150/2014). However, mutatis mutandis, both aspects can be found in Andalusian policies as well – the vehicular language has a central role in immigrant integration, and attendance certificates of various (non-standardized) training courses are recognized as additional documentation for immigrants to prove their social rootedness. In both cases, newcomers are encouraged to make their contribution to the local identity (intercultural integration model), yet they should also acquire practical tools, including language and basic knowledge of the context, in order to participate in regional society and economy (civic integration model).

Despite these similarities, Catalan socio-cultural integration measures appear ‘rigid’ or ‘purposeful’ while the Andalusians do not because there is no idea of a separate
Andalusian society outside of the Spanish one. This perception seems to be biased by what Billig (1995) calls ‘banal nationalism.’ The nation-building project behind Catalan policies is ‘more visible,’ for there is the idea of a separate Catalan society that speaks a different language. The nation-building project behind Andalusian policies is, instead, ‘taken for granted,’ for Andalusian society is conceived as part of Spanish society and the nation-building project in question is that of the Spanish nation (Interview 1).

All in all, whether a sub-state unit is inhabited by a population that shares a regional or a national identity has an impact on its immigrant integration policies. All this depends on the regional culture (identity markers), but mainly on the level of politicization of the identity (presence of nationalist or regionalist parties) – the former element fuels the territorial dimension and may influence policy content, yet the latter defines the policy discourse and translates the territorial dimension into claims vis-à-vis the central state and a more active engagement with the immigrant population.

Therefore, in the case of a minority nation, immigrant integration policies are not just aimed at tackling a social issue that may be more or less politicized; they are the extension of the nation-building and the linguistic preservation projects. Accordingly, these policies may promote a regional citizenship which shifts the traditional link between (state) citizenship and (majority) nationality (Medda-Windischer & Kössler, 2014).

In the words of Triandafyllidou (2001), while the ‘significant other’ of a standard region is the immigrant, in the case of a minority nation, the otherness of the immigrant is restrained by the ‘significant other’ par excellence: The central state. As sub-units only have a limited range of tools at their disposal to achieve their policy objectives, it is understandable that the policy differences between standard region and minority nation are mainly discursive. Still, this does not downplay the importance of the discourse in legitimizing the policies and producing tangible impact.
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