



DemoSoc Working Paper

Paper Number 2012--44

A Reassessment of Family Reunification in Europe The Case of Senegalese Couples

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February 2012

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Abstract

Contemporary policy makers in most European destination countries express a great concern about reunification of migrants' families. New restrictions multiply in almost all countries, on the grounds that migrants would take advantage of a too lax system and that it would foster an influx of non-desirable migrants. So far, quantitative evidence is scarce on migrants' practices in matter of family reunification. Taking advantage of a unique longitudinal dataset that includes Senegalese individuals surveyed both at origin (in Senegal) and in Europe (France, Italy and Spain), we perform event-history analyses to show three things. First, couple separation is very often a long lasting situation. Second, when separated because of international migration, wives and husbands do not only reunify in Europe but quite commonly in Senegal. And third, those who reunify in Europe are those who are the most adapted or adaptable to the European culture and economy.

Keywords

Family reunification, transnational families, Senegal, couple separation, family migration, international migration

Introduction

Family-linked migration has become the major source of new immigration to most Western receiving countries and, thus, also one of the fundamental sticking points of the immigration debate in liberal democracies. In most countries, especially in Europe, restrictions multiply and family reunification becomes more and more difficult for migrants. From policy makers' viewpoint, family reunification in Europe appears as a logical and systematic outcome of all immigrants' trajectories, provided that they left behind spouses and children. This belief is grounded in the combination of two common perceptions. The first is related to the very concept of 'family': in the western family model being in a couple means living in the same place, altogether with the children. The second is related to international migration: immigrants are usually viewed as permanent settlers rather than circular migrants; return migration –albeit encouraged by some programmes– is perceived as negligible. Under those conditions, family reunification appears as an obvious option for migrants. However, this view is challenged by various strands of research that have never been brought together so far. The New economics of labor migration, for instance, suggest that migration is a family strategy consisting in scattering the members of the family in order to diversify the sources of risk and of income. On the other hand, transnational studies insist on new patterns of life consisting in comings and goings between different countries, allowing for the dispersal of the family members. This comes in line with socio-anthropological and demographic studies on sub-Saharan families showing that multi-residence is, for long, a quite common pattern of life, especially among the most “traditional” families (Findley, 1997). With the increase of international migration, there would be a process of internationalization of these multi-located families. However, in fact, we still know very little on the extent of this kind of transnational family arrangements and very little also on when, where and why immigrants choose to reunify rather than keep a transnational way of family life.

States undoubtedly play a major role in the selection of both those migrants who can reunify (the “reunifiers”) and those who join their relative(s) at destination (the “reunified” ones). But they are not sole actors in the game. Individuals, migrants or “left behind” persons, are also selection actors. On one hand, they may decide to ignore governmental restrictions and proceed to a de facto reunification, choosing to regroup without a legal authorization of the destination state. On the other hand, whatever their legal position, they are those who decide the timing and the place to regroup. Our objective is thus to study how migrants and their relatives select themselves to regroup or not. In contradiction with common wisdoms among European policy makers and public opinion, our contention is that not all migrants (and their relatives) wish to reunify in a short term; that reunification in Europe is not their only option, some of them preferring to regroup at home; and that reunification in Europe is -in fact- the choice of the most integrated. Following this idea, we test two hypotheses in this paper. (1) Couple separation is likely to work as a long lasting arrangement for many African migrants, especially if partners can visit each other

frequently. (2) Reunification at destination is more likely with men's economic and cultural integration and with woman's potential adaptability to the receiving context (more education, higher occupational skills, childless, etc.). These hypotheses will be tested using a new and unique dataset from the MAFE project¹ that presents two major advantages for this kind of study: it is both a longitudinal and transnational dataset that allows to have a double viewpoint, on the migrants in Europe on the one hand and on the left behinds in Africa on the other hand. Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly a major target of European policies, which makes this case especially interesting for the study of family reunification. In this paper, we will restrict our analyses to the Senegalese population², which is –by its size– one of the first groups of African immigrants in Europe.

Next section provides a literature review that presents the current policy context and helps to understand the logics of family reunification (or not) by bringing together three separate strands of research (economic theories, transnational and socio-anthropological studies, and empirical research in the socio-demographic field). The third section presents in details the MAFE survey, its advantages for this kind of study and the methodology used in this analysis. The fourth one presents the results, before a final discussion in section 5.

¹ The Senegalese part of the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project is coordinated by INED (C. Beauchemin), in association with the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho). The project also involves the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizán), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. González-Ferrer), and the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione (E. Castagnone). The survey was conducted with the financial support of INED, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, the Région Ile de France and the FSP programme 'International Migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the countries of the South'. The MAFE-Senegal project is now being enlarged to Ghanaian and Congolese migrations, thanks to a funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement 217206. For more information (including the questionnaires), see: <http://www.mafeproject.com/>

² In the future, comparative analyses will be done with other African migrant groups (from RD-Congo and Ghana), so that we will be able to identify the common traits of African migrants and the specificities of the Senegalese population.

Literature Review

Immigrant families constitute a growing share of the population living in developed countries. A special feature of them is that their members can be scattered across borders. The timing between migration and family formation is determinant. In some cases, the family is formed before migration, so that the departure of one of its members implies the family's separation, at least temporarily (movements of all members of a same family are rare). In other cases, the family is formed after migration: a migrant moves on his/her own and starts a relationship while being abroad either with a partner who lives in his/her country of residence, or with someone who still lives in his/her country of origin and who may or may not join him at destination. In both cases, international migration results in couples' separation that may last for short or relatively longer periods, and that would end –theoretically– either with reunification at destination or with the migrants' return to their home country. In this section, we firstly present the views of contemporary policy makers in Europe on family reunification. Their restrictive view appears to be grounded in the idea that all migrants intend to regroup in Europe and that reunified persons are not easy to integrate in the host societies. The rest of the literature review, on the contrary, suggests to some extent that transnational family arrangements can be long-lasting ones, that reunification can occur in the origin country (and not only at destination) and that immigrants who call their family in Europe are the most integrated, while the left behinds who come to Europe are –a priori– the easier to integrate.

Policy concern around family reunification

The issue of family reunification attracted considerable attention among policy makers and public opinion since the early eighties both in the US and in Europe. In the US, the number of annual admissions granted on the basis of family reunification and, especially, their potential multiplier effect was considered excessive by many at that time (Arnold, 1989; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986, 1989). In Europe, after the halt on the foreign workers recruitment programs in the mid-seventies, the struggle for reducing the size of the immigrant populations clearly resulted in tough restrictions for family reunification, the major legal door of entry along with asylum (OECD, 2001.). In more recent years, policy concern shifted, at least partially, from quantity to quality, from the size of the flows to their composition: a big question at stake in Europe is the ability of reunified immigrants to integrate into their host society. This concern relates both to the economic and cultural assimilation of immigrants.

On the one hand, most of the increasingly restrictive policies on family reunification are based on the presumption that migrants that get admission through this visa category are mainly dependents, i.e. individuals who will remain out of the labor market and, thus, will increase the dependency ratio among the immigrant population.

However, this assumption has been rarely tested in a proper empirical way and, in some contexts, it has even proved wrong (González Ferrer 2006, 2011).

On the other hand, the increasing numbers of ‘imported partners’ in the flows of family reunification in Europe -especially among particular ethnic groups (i.e. Muslims like Turks, Moroccans or Pakistanis)- appears as another motivation for policy restrictions (Celikaksoy, 2003; Bonjour, 2006). Imported partners are individuals that move abroad to join someone with whom they started their relationship at a distance, once they were already living in different countries (as opposed to relationships that preceded both partners’ migration). This type of marriage practice has been mostly identified as a traditional feature (Lievens, 1999), sometimes even associated with forced marriages and, consequently, seen as a threat for the overall integration process at destination (Kraler et al. 2011). Accordingly, it is not surprising that some of the toughest immigration reforms in the latest years had precisely addressed this type of family-linked migration. The Danish immigration reform passed in 2002 and known as the ‘24-year reform’, for instance, intended to reduce this type of immigration jointly with a clear selection intention: by delaying their possibility to live together (in Denmark) as a married couple for migrants involved in marriage migration, the Danish government aimed at lengthening the period of secondary education of the young marriageable immigrants and so improving their employment prospects in the Danish labour market (see Nielsen, Smith and Celikaksoy 2007 for details).

Overall and beyond the particular experience of families formed through marriage migration, it has become a commonplace to blame family reunification as the responsible of increasing closure trends within immigrant communities and their failed integration into the host societies (Kraler et al. 2011). Those families who are not conformed to the nuclear European model are especially stigmatized. During the rioting in Paris’ suburbs in November of 2005, for instance, the French Minister of Employment fingered polygamy as the main reason for the racial discrimination which ethnic minorities faced in the job market; in his opinion, ‘overly large polygamous families sometimes led to anti-social behavior among youths who lacked a father figure, making employers wary of hiring ethnic minorities’ (Financial Times, 15th November 2005).

These examples serve us to illustrate the apparent shift in family reunification policy goals from only reducing the quantity to rather, or in addition, selecting the quality. However, as G. Borjas noted, states can only select from the available self-selected pool of applicants: those who already want to migrate abroad’ (1990). In other words, at least two types of selection processes overlap to produce family-linked international migration flows: on the one hand, the one derived from the costs and constraints that immigration policies imposes on individuals willing to migrate and, on the other, the one related to the own families’ decision-making process with regard to reunification. Family reunification is thus a double selection act (C. Bledsoe & P. Sow, 2008).

Unfortunately, we still know very little about these two processes and how they interact with each other. Although some studies have dealt with family migration decisions, they have mostly restricted to the experience of internal migrants and focused on family separation (Sandell 1977, Mincer 1978; Courgeau, 1990, Wagner and Mulder, 1993, Stark, 1988) rather than on the process leading to family reunification after a period of physical separation due to international migration. As Grasmuck and Pessar (1991) brilliantly illustrated in their analysis of Dominican international migration, negotiation concerning *who migrates first and who follows* -if someone does- among the household's members is far from being straightforward. The living arrangements that families involved in international migration adopt do not necessarily reflect each individual's preferences but also their bargaining position within the household or family, and hence the normative context that structures their roles, at least loosely, in generational and gendered ways (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992, 1994, 1999).

Family reunification in and out of economic theories of migration

While the process of family formation, partner choice and childbearing by immigrants in developed countries have received a lot of attention by demographers, sociologists and economists in the recent decades, a consistent theoretical model accounting for family-linked migration is poorly developed. Family reunification has not been explicitly addressed by either Neoclassical Economics (NE) or New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM). The NE approach conceived migrants as 'income maximizer' who will stay abroad as long as the expected income differentials between their country of origin and their country destination persisted (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976). Accordingly, they are expected to endure relatively long separations from their relatives left behind, until proper arrangements can be made for family reunification in the country of immigration (i.e. obtaining a stable job position, being able to pay a bigger apartment by their own, etc., which takes some time). Due to its strongly individualist approach, the reasoning provided by the NE model neglects the possibility that reunifying with the partner at destination may contribute to the couple's income maximization, if this second partner is willing to work as well. Similarly, the possibility that reunification takes place back in the origin country is not considered either, since the economic reasons that underlie the migration decision (international wage differentials) are difficult to remove and, consequently, return would not be a rational decision.

In contrast to this, the NELM clearly familized the international migration decision by placing individuals in the larger context of their households and considering the role that different household's members played in providing for the family. In addition, Stark and his colleagues (1985, 1991) conceived international migration as a household strategy oriented to minimize the economic risk deriving from a variety of market failures, instead of an individual strategy to maximize income. By allocating different household's members in different countries where employment conditions are

weakly or not correlated, families can diversify the sources of risk and better provide for their economic well-being. Thus, the international migrant that NELM envisages is a ‘target-earner’ migrant that will return to origin as soon as the macro-economic context and her own economic situation allow to successfully cope with the economic risks the household has to face. This is why Constant and Massey (2002), in their discussion of the implications of the NE and NELM tenets regarding return migration, concluded that spouses’ reunification at destination makes little sense in the context of NELM, unless the sponsored partner is also willing to work. In such a case, reunification is accomplished in order to reduce the number and duration of trips and to increase the probability to return (instead of settling permanently), by enhancing the household’s ability to meet a given earnings/savings target.

Following this reasoning, partner’s reunification at destination can be partially explained by both theoretical frameworks, although they would interpret reunification as an indication of opposing residential intentions: the couple’s reunification would suggest a clear movement towards permanent settlement at destination for NE’s income-maximizing migrants, whereas it would indicate an attempt to accelerate return to the home country for NELM’s target-earners. Moreover, conditional on her willing to work at destination and for the same reasons, the partner’s reunification is expected to be quicker among target-earner migrants than income-maximizing ones.

It is, thus, possible to derive some theoretical implications to explain the decisions leading to couple’s reunification from these two economic dominant theories, in spite of the fact that they originally neglected this phenomenon. However, they both suffer from two main limitations that new approaches on transnationalism have repeatedly emphasized (Bryceson & Vorela 2002). On the one hand, they both remain largely constrained by ‘methodological nationalism’(Winner and Glick Schiller 2003) and, consequently, focus on either the place of origin or the place of destination, but disregarding the possibility of repeated movements back and forth by different family members as a strategy that might allow to sustain cross-border livelihoods (Sorensen and Olwig 2002). This limitation has become more and more visible as the cost of international moves has lowered in comparison to past decades and, probably, encouraged repeated migration and greater diversity and fluidity of the working and living arrangements of the members of families involved in international migration (Bledsoe, 2008; C. H. Bledsoe & P. Sow, 2008; Riccio, 2001a, 2001b; Rodríguez-García, 2006), for examples with African migrants). In this context of easier mobility, visits along with remittances have been said to “(...) help to oil the functioning of the splitted families” (Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008).

In effect, the idea of transnationalism as a long-lasting and stable family arrangement does not seem compatible with the main predictions that one may derive from the NE model concerning the process of migrants’ family reunification (see above). However, this is not that clear in the case of NELM. Stark and his colleagues never explicitly stated that migration needed to be temporary in order to fit into their theoretical model

(only empirical applications of their theoretical model said so); thus, long-lasting separations as a way of diversifying risk cannot be discarded. However, they did not explicitly develop the possibility of recurrent circulation or repeated migration. In addition, they also seemed to view reunification in destination as the sign of permanent settlement that would explain, among others, the decay of remittances (Lucas and Stark, 1985).

On the other hand, studies inspired by transnationalism have been particularly successful in highlighting that both the NE and NELM models remain largely gender and culture-blind explanations approaches.

Insights of transnational and socio-anthropological studies

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The main contribution of the growing number of socio-anthropological studies recently developed in the area of transnational families precisely consists of explaining the logic that renders living apart-together across countries a rational and even functional strategy in many African contexts (see (C. H. Bledsoe & P. Sow, 2008), (Bledsoe, 2008), (Riccio, 2001b), (Rodríguez-García, 2006), instead of just a dramatic situation that migrants accept with resignation due to their vulnerable economic and legal position in Europe, but always anxiously waiting for the opportunity to bring as many of their relatives as possible to join them in Europe.

In Senegal, like in almost all sub-Saharan societies, the basic social unit is some form of extended family. According to the latest Census (2002), the average size of Senegalese households was 9.1 persons, which is not surprising if one takes into account, among other things, that polygamy is permitted and relatively extended (25 percent of all marriages are polygamous, Senegal Census 2002 (Vázquez Silva, 2010). In addition, after marriage, it is not rare, especially in rural areas, that the wife moves to the house of her husband's family, where she will take care of the house chores and caring tasks in collaboration with other women of the family –maybe other co-spouses if the husband is polygamous, or her new sisters' in law (Poiret, 1996).

Marrying and moving to the husband's parental home does not necessarily imply a great deal of intimacy between the spouses, at least not in the Western way. According to Findley, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, men and women take their meals separately, rarely socialize together, and have marriages where the level of conjugal interaction is quite low (Findley, 1997): 121). Indeed, in the Senegalese traditional family model, being in a couple does not necessarily imply to live together in the same place. In Africa there is quite a high proportion of spouses living in distant places for relatively long periods (from 3 to 7 years), frequently as a result of intense internal migration aimed at diversify sources of income and risk across several places (Stark, 1991). Findley estimated between 43 and 68 the percentage of couples being in this situation at some point during their lives in Senegal (Findley, 1997: 125). In the urban context and where polygamy is frequent, living in different dwellings even when both spouses reside in the same locality is not rare.

In any case, and regardless of migration, in the most extended traditional family system, once the newly-wed wife moves in 'her' new household, she becomes under the authority not only of her husband and other old men in his family but also under the authority of the older women, especially her mother in law, for whom she becomes a care-giver (see more details in Vazquez-Silva 2010). This role of daughters-in-law towards their mothers-in-law, as well as the risk that remittances sent by young male migrants in Europe to their parental household in Senegal will decline if their wife (and children) joins them abroad, renders absolutely rational for the elders in the family to oppose to any form of "family reunification" in Europe. In addition, the European dominant way of living, as well as the increasingly restrictive immigration policies that have stigmatized large African polygamous families and their living

arrangements have also probably reinforced this view of reunification in Europe as a sub-optimal choice.

Thus, transnational couples as a relatively stable living arrangement for Senegalese individuals involved in international migration to Europe may appear as a completely rational and wished outcome for many of the male migrants currently 'living alone' in Italy, France or Spain. However, we should not incur in the same mistake that socio-anthropological studies inspired by the transnational approach have repeatedly highlighted as the second major limitation of both the NE and NELM models to explain immigrants' living arrangements in contemporary times: that they remain culture and gender-blind explanations and, consequently, fail to explain the multiplicity of forms that family life may take in the context of international migration.

In Senegal, like in most countries, the dominant type of family organization that we have just described, as well as the family values associated to it, are subjected to continuous challenges by groups and individuals that either belong to minority ethnic or religious groups different from the largest one, or possess larger resources that allow them to (at least partially) deviate from the social norm. In our case, as we said, the previous description corresponds to the most traditional family model among the Wolof, the largest ethnic group in the region of Dakar and the most numerous one among Senegalese migrants in Europe. Yet, the Serer and the Diola groups, for instance, are known to have traditionally followed a more matrilineal lineage system, which would probably imply a stronger women's bargaining position within their couple and families at large, and will then alter some of the behaviors described above. For the same reason, men with higher economic stability and women with higher levels of education are clear candidates to deviate from the dominant behavior regarding family reunification, because resources in general will provide individuals with additional opportunities to successfully circumvent social pressures coming from their pairs and, in addition, will make them more integrable candidates from the point of view of Western countries.

Gender, education & family reunification: some empirical evidence

The empirical evidence dealing with the practice of importation of partners of marriage migration has bluntly illustrated the deeply gendered nature of this phenomenon. The idea that immigrant men in European countries chose partners in their country of origin over those co-national immigrants already living at destination motivated by a wish for wish for 'unspoiled' traditional wives, especially among Turks, seems compatible with the negative relationship between the men's educational level and his probability to import a partner instead of marrying a native or a co-national immigrant already at destination (Lievens, 1999; Celikaksoy et al., 2003, González-Ferrer, 2006). However, the practice of importing a partner by single female immigrants does not fit this logic so easily. Indeed, most studies developed so far have

found positive, although generally no significant relationship, between the educational level of immigrant women and their propensity to import a partner from their country of origin (Hooghiemstra, 2001; González-Ferrer, 2006; Kalter & Schroedter, 2010). Moreover, the existing literature has typically referred to ‘the influence of the social group of reference’ (Kaljmin, 1998) but also to the potential benefits for the woman that may derive from this marital strategy in terms of bargaining power within the couple because she is the one who already knows the country where the couple will settle, as the two main potential mechanisms that may explain importation of partners by female immigrants in Europe. In his analysis of the marital choices of Turk and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, Lievens (1999) emphasized this aspect of marriage migration involving female importers and concluded that ‘women may marry an imported partner in order to satisfy modern goals’ (717). However, similar studies carried out for Turkish and other Muslim immigrant communities in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany could not support or reject such a hypothesis (Hooghiemstra, 2001; Celikaksoy et al., 2003; González-Ferrer 2006).

In the case of family reunification of spouses when the couple pre-existed migration of both partners, some studies have also found a different effect of education by gender in explaining the likelihood and length of spouses’ separation due to international migration. Gupta (2003) found that more educated Mexican women are also more likely to migrate with their husbands to the US than being left behind. In addition, for couples who have experienced at least one spell of separation, separation tends to be longer the older the wife is at the time of the husband’s migration, and shorter the more educated the husband is³. The conjectured that education improves women’s status overall and results in more equalitarian partners’ relationship, which in turn might make wives more likely to insist in migrating with their husbands or, alternatively, to succeed in persuading them of not migrating at all (61). Explaining the process of reunification of wives by foreign recruited male workers in Germany, González-Ferrer (2007) also found that more educated women are likely to join their husbands more quickly than less educated ones, whereas having a husband with more years of education substantially increase the odds of joint couple migration but does not significantly affect the pace of the spouses’ reunification at destination.

³ However, she framed the study within the context of circular or repeated migration, focused on visits to the family in the country of origin that interrupt spouses separation and, therefore, excluded from the analysis couples who were separated for all twelve months in the year.

Data & Methods

Data Requirements

The objective of this paper is to study the timing and the determinants of couple reunification among Senegalese migrants either at destination (i.e. in Europe) or at origin (i.e. in Senegal). What are the data requirements to perform such analyses? Basically, we need to compare couples who reunified, in Europe or Senegal, with couples who did not regroup. We thus need a sample that includes three types of partnerships: (a) couples in which the partners do not live in the same country; (b) couples who used to live in separated countries and finally regrouped in Europe; and (c) couples who were separated and reunified in Senegal.

In the rest of the paper, we call “transnational couples” the couples in which partners do not live in the same country because at least one of the partners moved (possibly temporarily) out of Senegal. In other terms, transnational couples are “living apart together” across borders. They are “separated” in a geographical sense but they may maintain other varied relationships, such as emotional or legal ties (marriage), economic exchanges, frequent visits, family obligations, common children, etc. In this paper, the transnational nature of a couple rests only on the fact that partners do not live in the same country regardless of their nationality. In our analyses, at least one of the partners was born Senegalese in Senegal, the other one may have or not the same citizenship. “Reunification” occurs when partners start living in the same country (not necessarily in the same dwelling) after a period of transnational partnership. In our analyses, reunification does not refer to a legal procedure. We rather analyse a “de facto” reunification that includes all sorts of reunification (in Senegal or in Europe, following the legal procedure specifically establish to that goal or any other available channel including irregular migration).

A proper analysis of reunification requires information on individuals who are both at origin (in Senegal) and destination (in Europe). There is thus a need for a transnational sample that includes current and former pioneers as well as current and former left behinds. Furthermore, a proper analysis of reunification also requires a multi-level data source that provides information for couples, but also –at a lower level– for their constituting partners and at –at a higher level– for the context (e.g. in matter of migration policies). Finally, it requires time-varying information in order to allow a measure of reunification timing and an analysis of the determinants of reunion among couples. Indeed, to assess in a seemly way the factors of reunification, we need to characterize the couples –and their members– at the time of reunification (or just before ; in any case, not only at the time of the survey); and the same information is needed –at the same time– for those couples who did not regroup.

The MAFE-Senegal Survey

Few datasets present the features that are needed to study the determinants of family reunification. The MAFE-Senegal survey is, for two reasons, one of the rare quantitative sources that allow such analyses. First, it consists in a transnational dataset resulting from the collection of identical data both in European countries and in Senegal: 603 Senegalese migrants were surveyed in Europe (about 200 in each of the following countries: France, Italy and Spain⁴) and 1,067 persons were interviewed in the region of Dakar (including 197 returnees and 101 migrant's partners at the time of the survey, i.e. 2008)⁵. Second, the data are time-varying by nature since they result from individual life-histories collected in biographical questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed to collect longitudinal retrospective information on a yearly basis from birth until the time of survey (2008), for each sampled individual, whatever his/her country of residence at the time of the survey. The data collected include a large range of information on migration and occupation histories of the interviewed persons, as well as on their family history (children, partnerships). Interestingly, the questionnaire includes a whole module on the international migrations of the interviewee relatives (including his/her current and past partners), international migration being defined as a stay of at least 12 months outside Senegal. This 12-month threshold also applies to couple's separation and reunification: a separation or a reunion lasting less than 12 month is not considered in our analyses.

⁴ For the sake of simplicity in writing and reading, we'll refer in the rest of the text to "Europe" instead of mentioning these three different destination countries.

⁵ A perfect survey on Senegalese migration would have covered the whole Senegal and all countries in the world where Senegalese migrants are present. For practical reasons, it was obviously impossible. However the places covered by the MAFE Senegal survey offer a good coverage of Senegalese people. On one hand, in Europe, France, Spain and Italy accounted for 45 percent of the international Senegalese migrants declared in the 2002 Senegal Census. On the other hand, the region of Dakar is home to about a quarter of the national population in the 2002 Senegal Census and is the region of origin of 31% of the international migrants declared in 2001-2002 by Senegalese households in the ESAM-II survey. In all countries, the eligibility criteria for selection into the sample established that individuals had to be between 25 and 75 years of age (to have long enough life histories), born in Senegal (to exclude second generation in Europe) and of present or past Senegalese nationality (to exclude immigrants in Senegal). Varied sampling methods were used to select the individuals. In Senegal, a stratified probabilistic sample was drawn. The municipal register in Spain (*padrón*) offered a national sampling frame from which documented and undocumented migrants could be randomly sampled. Respondents in France and Italy were sampled through varied non-probabilistic methods (e.g. snowballing, intercept points, contacts obtained from migrant associations) in order to fill pre-established quotas by sex and age. More information can be found in González-Ferrer and Beauchemin (2011) or on the website of the MAFE project: <http://www.mafeproject.com/>

Analyses Sample

Even though the MAFE methodology offers a unique opportunity to study family reunification, it was not specifically designed for this purpose. For this reason, the analyses carried out in this paper rely on a sub-sample of the survey. Out of the 1,679 individuals included in the whole survey, only 459 individuals were kept for this study. They form (or have formed) a total of 546 transnational couples that are our units of analysis. The number of transnational couples (546) is higher than the number of interviewed individuals (459) because some interviewees (64) appear in several transnational couples either successively (when they had several partners, each time living apart together across borders) or simultaneously (when individuals are engaged in polygamous unions)⁶. How were these individuals and transnational couples selected? The first criterion of selection was that the individuals (male or female interviewees) had to be engaged in a transnational couple for a period of at least one year, being married or not⁷, at some point in time (i.e. at the time of the survey and/or in the past). The second criterion was that the couple had to be made of a woman living in Senegal and a man living in France, Spain or Italy (see Table 1, especially cells with bold characters). This last restriction unfortunately prevents us from analyzing emerging couple arrangements in which the female is the pioneer partner (42 cases, see Table 1) and the male the one left behind in Senegal (25 cases). But numbers are too small to allow for specific analyses and priority was given to the constitution of a homogeneous sample, in order to facilitate interpretation of results. For the same reason, cases that involve varied destination countries out of France, Italy and Spain were also eliminated from the analysis sample (Table 1).

⁶ 395 interviewees experienced one spell of separation (period of transnational couple). 42 individuals had two spells of separation, 21 had three spells, and only one had four spells. Note that we analyze only the first spell of transnational life of every couple, having in mind that only 5 % of our analytical sample of individuals experienced several periods of transnational life with the same partner. However, a particular individual may be engaged in several couples (successively or at the same time). This is why we have more spells of separation than individuals.

⁷ Among all years of partnership registered in the survey, 89% correspond to periods of marriage vs. 11% to periods of consensual union. Note that homosexual couples are not considered in our analyses: no interviewee declared this kind of partnership in the MAFE survey.

Table 1. Number of transnational couples in the MAFE-Senegal survey according to the sex and country of residence of the interviewee (non-weighted)

Sex of the interviewee	Country of residence of the interviewee when the period of separation started (whatever the place of the survey)		
	Europe (France, Spain, Italy)	Senegal	Other country
Male	347	25	85
Female	42	199	77

Notes:

- **Bold numbers** signal the couples kept in our analysis sample (347+199=546). Other figures indicate the types and numbers of cases excluded from our analyses for the sake of homogeneity.
- A same individual can appear in several transnational couples, hence a total number of 546 transnational couples for only 459 interviewees in our analysis sample. When several periods of transnational life occurred within a same couple, only the first spell of transnational was taken into account in the analyses (this is the case for only 5% of the analysis sample).
- Couples may be married or not. In fact, in the analysis sample, only 11% of the couple-years are in consensual union.

Finally, we use a sample of 546 transnational couples (restricted to their first spell of separation), for which the data were obtained either from males interviewed in Europe (347 cases) or females surveyed in Senegal (199 cases). Note that the information obtained on the partners of a same couple is asymmetric: the MAFE data related to the interviewee are richer than the data related to his/her partner. They are both more numerous and also more precise in terms of time specification (see Table 3 for detailed information).

Table 3. Description of the sample at the beginning of the first period of transnational life of each couple (weighted data)

	Availability of the variable*		Total Sample		Males in Europe		Females in Senegal	
	Interviewee	Partner	Proportion	S.E.	Proportion	S.E.	Proportion	S.E.
<i>Socio-demographics variables</i>								
<i>Age (mean)</i>	TV	TV	29.59	0.42	31.32	0.63	25.19	0.67
<i>Sex (% of men)</i>	TC	TC	0.72	0.04	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>Socio-economic variables</i>								
<i>Educational level</i>	TV	TC: available only at the beginning of partnership						
No schooling			0.13	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.20	0.04
Primary			0.47	0.05	0.45	0.06	0.54	0.07
Secondary			0.33	0.05	0.37	0.06	0.24	0.08
Tertiary			0.06	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.01
<i>Socio-economic status</i>	TV	TC: available only at the beginning of partnership						
Unskilled occupations			0.34	0.05	0.40	0.06	0.21	0.06
Self-employed (w/o employees)			0.25	0.03	0.30	0.03	0.13	0.04
Skilled workers			0.15	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.11	0.08
Non manual jobs			0.03	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02
Not employed			0.23	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.54	0.07
<i>Migration experience / Left behind experience</i>								
<i>Father decided migration</i>	TV (beginning of each migration periods)	NA	-	-	0.04	0.01	-	-
<i>Residence/work permit (yes)</i>	TV	NA	-	-	0.62	0.06	-	
<i>Lives with mother/father in law</i>	Partially TV (beginning of each housing period)	NA	-	-	-	-	0.10	0.03
<i>Couple variables</i>								
<i>Duration of union:</i>	TV		0.22	0.03	0.20	0.03	0.26	0.07

>5 years								
<i>Duration of union: 1-5 years</i>			0.28	0.04	0.31	0.05	0.20	0.06
<i>Duration of union: 0 years</i>			0.50	0.04	0.48	0.04	0.54	0.09
<i>Polygamous or co-spouse (yes)</i>	TV (only partially for women: for each union, women are asked whether they had/have co-wives)		0.24	0.04	0.30	0.05	0.11	0.03
<i>Children (yes)</i>	TV		0.54	0.05	0.59	0.04	0.43	0.08
<i>Visited partner</i>	TV	NA	0.20	0.03	0.27	0.03	0.02	0.01
<i>Persons interviewed (unweighted N)</i>	-	-	546	-	347	-	199	-
<i>Persons years (unweighted)</i>	-	-	3742	-	2535	-	1207	-
* Precise whether the information is available for the interviewee and his/her partner or not available (NA) and also whether the information is time varying (TV) or time-constant (TC). For time-varying variables, note that the figures in this table refer to the beginning of the period of transnational life of the couples.								

To take into account the changing characteristics of the couples (and of the partners themselves), the data was arranged as a couple-year dataset in which each couple appears when it becomes transnational for the first time (i.e. when the male migrates out of Senegal, leaving behind his wife) and disappears when it stops to be transnational, either because the couple reunifies (in Europe or Senegal) or because it breaks off (separation, divorce, widowhood), or –by default (censoring)– at the time of the survey (see Table 2 for a detailed account of these outcomes).

Table 2. Outputs of the 1st period of separation of transnational couples (analysis sample, weighted data)

	Total Sample	Males' in Europe	Females' in Senegal
End of partnership (widowhood, divorce)	12.8	12.4	13.2
Reunification in Europe	19.4	12.7	33.2
Reunify in Senegal	14.9	11.8	21.5
Still transnational at the time of the survey	52.9	63.1	32.1
Weighted %	100%	100%	100%
N (non weighted)	546	347	199


Each year of life of a transnational couple is thus a line in the dataset and is considered as an observation in the analyses. The analytical sample is thus extended from 546 couples to 3,742 couple-years.

Thanks to the longitudinal nature of the MAFE data, the variables describing the partners in the dataset can change every year. However, a major constraint of our analysis sample is that it contains asymmetrical information on the partners: the dataset contains a wealth of variables describing the interviewee at any point in time (his/her whole history in matter of family formation, education and occupation, migration experience, etc.), but much less information describing his/her partner (only six variables: age, country of birth, nationality, couple status, education level and socio-economic status; and only at the time when the couple started). Additional variables are available to describe the couple itself: whether it started as a transnational partnership (i.e. whether the partners started their relationship while living in different countries, which is the case for 50% of the total sample, see Table 3); whether the couple is part of a polygamous family at any moment (i.e. whether the male has several partners or whether the female has co-wives); and the number of children at each point in time.

Methods


Using the longitudinal nature of the MAFE data, we first computed discrete-time survival functions of the time between the start of the couples' transnational life until their reunification (Figure 1).

Figure 1



Couples still living separated at the time of answering the survey, divorcing or becoming widow were treated as censored when the first of these events takes place. Pseudo-survival functions (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995) were computed to account for two possible outcomes (Figure 2): couple reunification takes place in Senegal (when the male partner returns to Senegal) or couple reunification takes place in Europe (when the female partner migrates to join her husband in Europe).

Figure 2



Second, we performed multivariate discrete-time event history analyses to study the determinants of couple reunification. Since our objective is to analyze the factors of couple reunion either in Europe or in Senegal, we applied multinomial logistic regressions in a competing risk analysis that distinguish among both destinations, including a set of multi-level explanatory variables describing both the individuals and the couples in which they are engaged (in cases of polygamy or subsequent partnerships). Models are specified as follows (Yamaguchi 1991; Lillard, L. A., Brien, M. J., & Waite, L. J. 1995; Barber et al. 2000; Wu 2003):

$$\log[P_{ricy} / (P_{sicy})] = \alpha_r + \beta' X_{ricy} + \varepsilon_i$$

where P_{ricy} is the conditional probability that individual i experiences a first reunification either in Europe or in Senegal (the place being denoted by the subscript r) versus remaining separated (denoted by the subscript s) for transnational couple number c at the year y , given that reunification has not already occurred. α is a constant term, and X_{ricy} a vector of individual, couple and contextual covariates (including the baseline hazard function), with β denoting the value of the estimated coefficients of the model for each variable. ε_i is a residual term specific to each individual interviewed, assumed to follow the normal distribution, and constant across all outcomes for the same individual. This residual term is included to account for the fact that there are a few repeated observations in the dataset since 64 individuals were engaged in several distinct transnational couples. This situation occurs in cases of polygamy or second or higher order unions, having in mind that only the first spell of

transnational life was kept for analysis in cases of repeated separations within a same couple. Multiple outcomes for a given individual may be correlated, and therefore we apply a multi-level model in which the individual respondents are a higher level unit and each of the partnerships in which this individual is engaged are at a lower level (Barber et al. 2000; Lillard and Panis, 2003).

As can be seen in Table 4 reporting the results of our analyses, the standard deviation of ε is always significantly different from zero with a value of 1.4, 1.5 and 1.5 in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In other words, there are respondent-specific unmeasured characteristics which affect all partnerships (and separation spells) in which respondents engage. Failure to account for these would have as a consequence that standard errors of parameter estimates would be underestimated, and several estimates could be biased.

Table 4. Models' results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Reunification in Senegal			
years separated>3	0.939	0.912	0.606
union started separated	2.637		
children	10.289 **		
visited partner	0.034 **		
polygam	0.799		
Educational level (ref. Primary)	Women	Women	Men
no schooling	1.809	2.137	1.415
secondary	11.018 ***	6.555 **	0.923
tertiary	4.074	1.631	4.870 *
Economic status (ref. Unskilled occupations)	Men	Women	

self employed (no employees)	1.890	2.079	
skilled worker	2.662	4.485	
higher occupations, employer	11.691 **	0.000	
not employed	2.151	0.576	
interviewee's bad financial situation			0.105 **
woman living with inlaw	0.017		
Ethnic group (ref. patrilinear)			
matrilinear		0.907	
other ethnic		2.350	
Religion (ref. Other muslim)			
cristian			0.000
mouride			0.365 *
Constant	0.001 ***	0.010 ***	0.037 ***
Reunification in Europe			
years separated>3	1.867	1.618	1.483
union started separated	3.171 **		
children	1.058		
visited partner	0.528		
polygam	0.239 **		

Educational level (ref. Primary)	Women	Women	Men
no schooling	1.224	0.887	0.859
secondary	4.014 **	4.597 **	1.063
tertiary	3.719	4.697	6.076 **
Economic status (ref. Unskilled occupations)	Men	Women	
self employed (no employees)	1.555	1.027	
skilled worker	3.188 **	0.985	
higher occupations, employer	5.569	0.225	
not employed	1.448	0.531	
interviewee's bad financial situation			0.559
woman living with inlaw	0.048 *		
Ethnic group (ref. patrilinear)			
matrilinear		2.207 *	
other ethnic		6.778 **	
Religion (ref. Other muslim)			
cristian			4.826
mouride			0.388 *
Constant	0.005 ***	0.014 ***	0.025 ***
standard deviation of ε	1.450 ***	1.531 ***	1.531 ***

ln-L	-307.140	-331.440	-334.720
Notes: Odds ratios. Standard errors suppressed, available upon request.			
Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.			

All results presented are weighted and account for survey stratification according to country, sex and age in Europe, and in Dakar according to being a returned migrant, migrant partner, or other. The analyses also account for the clustering according to region in Europe, or in Dakar, according to census district (60 units). Details on the sampling strategy can be found in Beauchemin (2011).

Following the same technical specifications, three different multinomial models were run to test the effects of various characteristics of the couples and of each of their members. In all models, couple reunification is the dependant variable. Table 3 presents some descriptive information on the explanatory variables included in the analyses and specifies whether they are time-varying or time-constant and for whom they are available (the interviewee and/or his/her partner). Although preferable in principle, a unique model containing all variables of interest could not be elaborated for two reasons. First, some variables are not compatible (for instance Christian religion and polygamy, or economic status and household financial situation), leading to collinear results. Second, the small sample size implies to be parsimonious: results become insignificant when a too large number of explanatory variables are introduced in the models.

Results

As Figure 1 clearly illustrates, couples' reunification appears as relatively uncommon among Senegalese migrants, regardless of whether we consider reunification taking place at destination, i.e. in Europe, or in the country of origin, i.e. Senegal. Approximately 60 percent of migrants had not reunified with their partners after 10 years since their separation (due to migration). The probability of reunification seems to be somewhat higher in the 3 initial years of separation, to decline afterwards, according to our multivariate models; nevertheless in most models the variable "years separated" did not provide statistically significant results⁸. Although for a small group

⁸ Similarly, the variables "duration of residence in France/Italy/Spain" and "duration of union" (not shown in the specifications presented) did not provide significant results.

of migrants couple's reunification occurs relatively quickly, most couples seem to endure rather long separations. This result is not only consistent with theoretical perspectives that emphasize family dispersion in order to diversify the sources of income and risk (see above), but also with the anthropological literature that highlights the importance of complex family structures in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in the Senegalese culture. Furthermore, this pattern –long separations as an apparently stable family arrangement– contrasts with the behavior of other migrant groups in Europe that joined their partners at destination much faster (González-Ferrer 2007, 2010). Figure 2 reveals a second important finding: couple's reunification in Senegal is almost as likely as reunification in Spain, Italy or France (these “pseudo survival functions” for each destination are not significantly different). This result challenges the extended belief that family reunification is very intense and only possible at destination, and highlights the importance of return migration. We will see below, however, that the determinants of reunification differ from a place to another. Overall, these data show that couple's reunification is an important factor in the explanation of migration dynamics between Senegal and Europe, i.e. not only of migration from Senegal to Europe, but also for return migration. It is therefore crucial to understand the choices of couple's members, including whether and where to re-unify.

Long duration of separation may be related to the role of visits that partners make to each other. These visits seem to be quite frequent, as they involve 20 percent of the sample's person-years. In fact, it is the partner living in Europe who is almost always the visitor: 27% of the males in Europe visited their partner at home at least once the first year of separation while only 3% of the females left behind in Senegal visited their partner in Europe (Table 3). Obviously, visits are facilitated by a residence permit in the relevant European country, which is held by two thirds of the men living in France, Italy or Spain only, according to our data. Even though frequent visits might indicate a stronger wish to be together, our results indicate that having visited the partner during the previous year substantially reduces the odds of reunification. Reunification in Senegal seems to be particularly negatively related to visits, since the odds is reduced to 0.034**, according to Model 1 (Table 4). These results are consistent with transnational arrangements as a stable one, in which the visits, together with remittances, “(...) help to oil the functioning of the splitted families” (Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008).

Another striking finding is that as many as half of the couples started their union while living in different countries (duration of union at separation of 0 years; see Table 3). This is related to the fact that most of our sample involves young adult years, in which migration as well as partnership formation takes place. Furthermore, many Senegalese migrants living abroad seek for their partners in Senegal, not in their country of residence. Partner “import” may be connected to the strong gender imbalance among Senegalese single migrants to Europe. It also suggests that having migrated facilitates union formation with someone living in Senegal as already mentioned in qualitative studies (Mondain, 2009). Our multivariate results show that if a union started

separated it has more chances to reunify quickly with respect to those couples that have previously lived together. Thus, the variable “union started separated” yields an odds ratio of 2.6 for reunification in Senegal and 3.2** for reunification in the studied European countries (Model 1). This result can be put in relation with the literature on ‘imported spouses’, which is mainly based on the experiences of Turks, Moroccans and Pakistanis (Lievens 1999; Celikaksoy 2008; González-Ferrer 2006). Lievens formulated the ‘modernization hypothesis’ suggesting that more integrated Turkish and Moroccan women in Belgium were the ones more likely to import a husband from their countries of origin because this would give them more bargaining power in the couple and will free them of the potential control of their in-laws, who remained in Turkey/Morocco. However, ‘imported brides’ in these ethnic groups were expected to be very traditional because the men who import women from their countries of origin used to be the most “traditional” ones (the most “modern” ones would opt either for a native woman or a co-national immigrant who is already in the country of destination). In the context of the Senegalese-European migration, unions that started while the partners were not living in the same country could be thought to be of weak consistency. However, the migrant man is probably in a good position to choose a partner, being less closely influenced by his family and because he has more economic power, than non-migrant men. Also, these transnational unions may be more attractive for women, as the partners may have a relatively good economic position. This kind of partnership may be a way to be more autonomous with respect from family of origin. Thus, one can speculate that for a woman who wants to attain these goals, it makes sense to marry a man who lives in Europe, making her own migration to Europe more likely⁹.

In all the models that were computed, the educational level provided strong and statistically significant coefficients. Thus, the odds of reunification strongly increase with the women educational level (Models 1 and 2 in Table 4): women with a secondary level of education show an odds ratio between 4 and 11 times higher than women with no formal schooling, depending on the place of reunification. Results for women with tertiary education do not provide significant results, most likely because few women attain tertiary level (about 3 percents in our sample, Table 3). The results for men in Model 3 also show strong effects of education with odds ratio for tertiary educated of 4.9* and 6.1***, respectively for reunification in Senegal and in France, Italy and Spain. This result is highly consistent with our general hypothesis that individuals more economically or culturally integrated to European society will show higher probabilities to start living together, in particular in a European country. Education is an indicator of availability of personal resources as well as a sign of cultural assimilation to European culture and languages. In fact, individuals with no or little formal education (many of whom may be illiterate) are very likely to have strong

⁹ This is consistent with some qualitative evidence (Randall and Mondain, 2009; Riccio, 2001).

difficulties to integrate in European labour markets, and have little chances to get a standard employment, many of them being actually working in the underground economy (Reyneri, 2006; Baizán and González-Ferrer, 2011). The jobs available to them may be not only very restricted to particular occupations (such as agricultural labourers or street vendors), but also very precarious, thus not allowing them to successfully integrate in the labour market and have access to a residence or work permit. For women, formal education may even imply more gender equality in the couple, and perhaps more importantly, greater chances of finding an employment in Europe that may help to bear the cost of living in Europe. For instance, at the time of the survey, nearly two thirds of interviewed women living in Italy, Spain, or France in a partnership held a job; about one fourth declared to be housewives as main occupation; and 4 percent declared to be unemployed. By contrast, 95 percent of partnered men living in these countries declared to be employed and 5 percent unemployed.

The results concerning the educational level are consistent and complementary to those of the variable “socio-economic status”. In particular for men, the higher is the occupational status, the higher are the probabilities of reunification. This result holds both for reunification in Senegal and in Europe. Men holding jobs in skilled occupations and in professional/employers occupations show reunification odds between 2 and 12 times higher than men in unskilled occupations or self-employed without employees (Models 1 and 2, Table 4). This variable indicates a higher ability to afford the costs of the partners’ migration and expenses while in Europe, as well as better economic prospects and economic integration. It is interesting to see that men living in France, Italy or Spain that are unemployed or inactive show an odds of reunifying 2.2 times higher than men in unskilled jobs (not significant); however, these higher odds are entirely due to the much higher probabilities of returning to Senegal and reunify there with their partner (Model 1). The lack of resources for men living in Europe leads to shorten their stay in Europe, and indirectly foster reunification in Senegal. Taken together, these results clearly demonstrate that men’s availability of economic resources is crucial for couple’s reunification, both in Senegal and particularly in Europe. In contrast, the results of the socio-economic status variable for women are ambivalent and not significant, and even point to a negative effect of the occupational status (Model 2). These results can be related, in the one hand, to the generally subordinate economic position of women in the couples; and in the other hand, women with an employment or a business in Senegal do have higher opportunity costs of migration to joint their partner. The smallness of the sample and the fact that only 54 percent of women are employed are also behind these, mostly insignificant, results.

The importance of the economic resources is underlined by the results of the variable “bad financial situation” that yields strongly negative and significant results for reunification in Senegal (odds of 0.1** with respect to individuals with good financial

situation; Model 3), while also negative but insignificant results for reunification in France, Italy and Spain¹⁰.

As we have seen above, economic diversification practices that delay couple's reunification are supported by cultural arrangements. Moreover, policies in the European countries have an ambivalent effect on family reunification in Europe. At least in the short term, an important number of migrants do have difficulties in getting work and residence permits. In particular in Italy and Spain, a large proportion has to work in the underground economy (Reyneri, 2006). However, once the individuals get a residence permit, for instance by means of one of the periodic regularizations, family reunification is granted by the European laws. As noted above, about two thirds of our persons-years sample hold a permit, including nationality of the country of residence, that would allow them to reunify their family living abroad. Nevertheless, the result of the variable "permit" does not provide a significant result, although it does show a positive sign (results not shown). Alternatively, this insignificant result could indicate that many reunifications are achieved bypassing the legal framework.

Consistently with the cultural and legal restrictions existing in European societies to polygamous couples, the odds of reunification of this type of family arrangement are especially low in Europe (odds ratio: 0.2**). They are also low in Senegal (odds ratio: 0.8), a result suggesting that this type of family arrangement tends to facilitate long periods of couple separation. Also the presence of children, usually left behind in Senegal with their mother, greatly speeds reunification in Senegal (10.3***), but not in Europe (1.0). In both instances, the presence of a large family in Europe would be at odds with traditional family arrangements and would increase the costs of stay, in contradiction with a "target earner" type of migration. Women living with in-laws in Senegal have a much lower probability of reunification (odds of 0.05* for reunification in Europe, with respect to women who do not live with in-laws), which again provides evidence that an arrangement that fits the traditional structure and organization of family roles delays family reunification. Living with in-laws is a feature of extended families characterized by patrilocality, that implies a strong hierarchy in which elders and men hold the power and where the roles of women are bounded to the domestic sphere. According to qualitative studies, this involves in particular the care of the in-

¹⁰ In some of the models we also included a variable concerning the housing conditions: when the dwelling in which the men lives is shared (room) or precarious (shanty town, etc.), this significantly delays couple reunification with respect to standard dwelling (an apartment or a house). Of course, this last result may not only indicate a bad economic situation, but also it can be interrelated to a prospective reunification with the partner, therefore we dropped it from the final specifications presented here.

laws, restricting migration and more generally freedom to pursue individual goals by women (Vázquez-Silva, 2010). We included a variable on the ethnic group, that shows that, where matrilineal practices predominate, e.g. among the Serer and Diola, the probability of reunification in Europe increases significantly (odds ratio: 2.2*) with respect to the predominantly patrilineal groups, such as the Wolof. Finally, we included the variable “religion” that shows that members of the Murid brotherhood have lower probabilities of reunification than other Muslims, irrespective of place of reunification. Christians show odds of reunification in Europe nearly five times higher than “other Muslims”, although this result is not statistically significant (Model 3)¹¹. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that individuals displaying behavior more distant to European culture will favor transnational living apart-together arrangements.

Conclusion

The MAFE data offered us a unique opportunity to bring new evidence on the process of family reunification among African migrants in Europe. Thanks to its transnational nature, this dataset allowed us to overcome the usual “methodological nationalism” often criticized in the recent literature of migrants’ families. Furthermore, its longitudinal nature allowed us to study the determinants of couple reunification in a life course approach.

As expected, couples’ reunification appears as relatively uncommon among Senegalese migrants, regardless of whether we consider reunification taking place at destination, i.e. in Europe, or in the country of origin, i.e. Senegal. Approximately 70 percent of migrants had not reunified with their spouses after 10 years since their separation (due to migration). Although for a small group of migrants couple’s reunification occurs relatively quickly, most couples seem to endure rather long separations. This result is not only consistent with theoretical perspectives that emphasize family dispersion in order to diversify the sources of income and risk (see above), but also with the anthropological literature that highlight the importance of complex family structures in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in the Senegalese culture. Furthermore, this pattern –long separations as an apparently stable family arrangement– contrasts with the behaviour of other migrant groups in Europe that joined their partners at destination much faster (González-Ferrer 2007, 2010). Finally, our results also reveal a second important finding: couple’s reunification in Senegal is almost as likely as reunification in Spain, Italy or France. This result challenges the

¹¹ None of the Christians in our sample reunified in Senegal.

extended belief that family reunification is very intense and only possible at destination, and highlights the importance of return migration.

In addition, the models' results generally support the hypothesis of increasing likelihood of reunification in destination countries with increasing economic and cultural integration and/or potential adaptability of both partners in Europe. For instance, men with tertiary education, i.e. those with a closer affinity to the western culture, have more chances to reunify in Europe than in Senegal. On the contrary, the less educated women (which may mean illiterate and with a lesser command of European languages) are more likely to reunify in Senegal, with the return of their partner, than in Europe through their own migration. In line with our integration hypothesis is the result that individuals holding a residence permit are also more likely to reunify in Europe, even though this result is not statistically significant. The variables indicating the "traditional" character of the couple also tend to confirm our hypothesis. On one hand, odds of reunification of polygamous couples are much lower in Europe than in Senegal, which is consistent with the cultural and legal restrictions on this type of family arrangement in European societies. On the other hand, couples who are enmeshed in strong "traditional" networks at origin (with the woman left behind living with her in-laws) have a much lower probability of reunifying at destination.

In short, in contradiction with common wisdoms, family reunification is generally more likely to occur in Europe among people easy to integrate in the host society. Having in mind that family reunification is a double selection act, further research is however needed to identify precisely whether this result is due to policy orientations or to a self-selection of the families. More research is also needed to identify how decisions are taken within families and to understand the bargaining process that lead to the choice of reunification here or there or the choice to keep a transnational way of life.

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