The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective*

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March 8, 2007

Abstract

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the efficient pricing of an academic journal from a two-sided market perspective and the consequences of the open access policy on the journal’s quality standard. When the journal’s objective is to maximize social welfare, open access is optimal if and only if the positive externalities generated by its diffusion exceed the marginal cost of distribution. This condition is satisfied in particular for an electronic journal for which the marginal cost of distribution is zero. However, we show that if the journal is run by a not-for-profit association that has a different objective (such as maximizing the utility of its readers or the impact of the journal), the move from the traditional reader-pays model to the open-access model may result in a decrease in quality standard below the socially efficient level. In some cases, it may even lead to a reduction in readership size.

Keywords: Academic Journals, Open-Access, Reader-Pays, Two-Sided Market, Endogenous Quality.

JEL numbers: D42, L44, L82

*We benefited from the comments of Mark Armstrong, Paul Beaudry, Antoni Calvo, Jay Pil Choi, Helmut Cremer, Andreu Mas-Colell, Preston McAfee, Patrick Rey, Francisco Ruiz-Alameda, Klaus Schmidt, Yossi Spiegel and the participants in Workshop on Media Economics (IESE), Jornadas de Economia Industrial 2006, Korea Economic Association Meeting 2006, LACEA-LAMES 2006 (Mexico city) and the 4th Conference on the Economics of the Software and Internet Industries 2007 (Toulouse). We also thank seminar participants at National University of Singapore, University of British Columbia and Korea University. Jeon gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under BEC2003-00412 and the Ramon y Cajal grant.

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1 Introduction

The development of electronic publishing and the dissatisfaction with academic journal price escalations has led to an increasing support for the open-access model (also called the author-pays model), where authors pay for submitting and/or publishing their articles, while readers can access published articles at no charge through the Internet.\(^1\) According to the Directory of Open-Access Journals’ (DOAJ) website (www.doaj.org), there are already (as of February 1, 2007) 2550 open-access journals in all fields, of which 51 in Economics (such as Theoretical Economics, CES Ifo Forum, Economics Bulletin and IMF staff papers) and 33 in Business and Management. Open access publishing currently represents approximately 5% of the total market for academic journals.\(^2\)

After several private initiatives\(^3\) endorsed open access to academic journals, some public committees\(^4\) have reported on the issue, and recommended public support for experimentation of open access journals. The report of the Science and Technology Committee of the UK House of Commons (House of Commons henceforth, 2004) gives an overview of many issues related to author-pays publishing.\(^5\) In summary, the main argument in favor of open-access is greater dissemination of research findings\(^6\). By contrast, the report

\(^1\) According to the public library of science (PLoS), an open-access publication is one that meets the following two conditions:

- The authors and copyright holders grant to all users a free, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access, subject to proper attribution of authorship, and
- A complete version of the work is deposited immediately upon initial publication in at least one open-access on-line repository.

\(^2\) See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2004, p.73). Among major open-access publishing initiatives, one can mention the Public Library of Science (PLoS) and BioMed Central:

- The PLoS is a nonprofit organization of scientists and physicians committed to making the world’s scientific and medical literature a freely available public resource. The publication fee ranges from USD 1250 to 2500.
- BioMed Central is an independent publishing house committed to providing immediate open access to peer-reviewed biomedical research. Its portfolio of 172 journals includes general titles such as Journal of Biology, alongside specialist journals (e.g. BMC Bioinformatics, Malaria Journal) that focus on particular disciplines. Its average publication fee is USD 1470.

\(^3\) In addition to PLoS mentioned before, there were the Budapest open access initiative (2002), the Bethesda statement on open access publishing (2003) and the Berlin declaration on open access to knowledge in the sciences and humanities (2003). See Dewatripont et al. (2006, p.17) for more details.

\(^4\) For instance, House of Commons (2004), OECD (2005) and Dewatripont et al. (2006). The last report was commissioned by the European Commission.

\(^5\) A recent report by OECD (2005) makes similar points.

\(^6\) According to House of Commons (2004), “Author-pays publishing would bring the greatest potential
expresses concerns that an author-pays model may introduce an incentive for authors to publish less because of problems of affordability. A second type of concern, which is the focus of our paper, is that author fees may induce journal editors to accept a higher proportion of articles, which may have negative implications for quality.

This paper builds a model of an academic journal that fulfills a double role of certification and dissemination of knowledge and studies its pricing from a two-sided market perspective. Adopting first a normative viewpoint, we show that, for an electronic journal, open access is socially optimal because the marginal cost of providing access to a new reader is zero. If subsidizing readers (through a negative subscription price) were feasible, it would be even optimal to do so because each new reader exerts positive externalities on the rest of society. An example of these positive externalities is the development of innovations inspired by the ideas contained in the academic articles. This implies that open access can also be optimal for a printed journal (that has a positive cost of dissemination) if the positive externalities exerted by readers exceed the marginal cost of dissemination (reproduction and distribution). Even though authors also exert positive externalities by publishing their articles, there is no need to subsidize authors for submitting articles as long as they get substantial benefits from publication since the submission cost is negligible.

Then, adopting a positive perspective, we study a not-for profit journal run by an academic association and study how the change from the traditional reader-pays model to the open access model affects the journal’s quality standard and its number of readers. If the objective of the association were to maximize social welfare, this move would lead to the social optimum. However the association is likely to pursue its own objective. We consider two possibilities for the objective function of the association: the total utility of the readers or the impact of the journal. We find that the change may lead to a decrease in the quality standard and thereby (more surprisingly) a reduction in the readership size. Since a reader-pays model should recover its publication cost through a positive increase in access for groups of users that do not habitually subscribe to journals or belong to subscribing institutions.” (p. 76)

According to House of Commons (2004), “There is some concern that, ..., there are also those who would not be able to afford to publish in them”. (p. 78)

According to House of Commons (2004), “if author-pays publishing were to become the dominant model, there is a risk that some parts of the market would be able to produce journals quickly, at high volume and with reduced quality control and still succeed in terms of profit, if not reputation. Such journals would cater for those academics for whom reputation and impact were less important factors than publication itself.” (p. 81)

We focus here on the dissemination of academic output (i.e. research articles) and do not model the prior stage where these articles are produced. It is needless to say that subsidizing research (i.e. production of articles) is socially desirable.
subscription price, attracting the same number of readers requires a reader-pays journal to provide a higher quality than an open access journal. In this way, the reader-pays model imposes more discipline on quality than the open-access model.

Our paper builds on two strands of the literature. First, it builds on the recent literature on two-sided markets (see for examples Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2006, Caillaud and Jullien, 2003, Evans, 2003, Armstrong 2006 and Hagiu 2006). Two-sided markets can be roughly defined as industries where platforms provide interaction services between two (or several) kinds of users. Typical examples are payment cards, software, Internet and media. In such industries, it is vital for platforms to find a price structure that attracts sufficient numbers of users on each side of the market. Our paper has two novel aspects. First, in addition to choosing a price for each side, the platform (i.e. the academic journal) can choose a minimum quality standard. Second, the externality from authors to readers is not always positive: as the number of published articles increases (and hence as the quality standard decreases), the utility that a reader obtains from the platform increases up to a maximum and then decreases.

Second, our paper builds on the literature on the economics of academic journals, that has initially adopted a one-sided perspective, focusing on library subscriptions (McCabe, 2004, and Jeon and Menicucci, 2006). For instance, Jeon and Menicucci (2006) show that bundling electronic journals make it difficult for small publishers to sell their journals. To our knowledge, McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b, 2006, 2007) are the first papers to study the pricing of academic journals from a two-sided market perspective. McCabe and Snyder (2006, 2007) study pricing of academic journals industry under different structures (monopoly, duopoly, free entry) but in their model all articles have the same quality and hence journals do not provide any certification function. Our model is closer to McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b) in that they consider a monopoly journal providing certification services when articles are heterogenous in terms of quality. However, there are significant differences. McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b) take the quality standard of the journal as given (it is determined by the talent of its editors) and ask how the quality standard affects the subscription price and thereby the adoption of open access. By contrast, we endogenize the quality standard of the journal and study how the move from the reader-pays model to open access affects the quality standard and the readership size of

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10 Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) argue that bundling electronic journals can create strategic barriers to entry but they do not build a formal model.
11 An exception is section 5.4 in McCabe and Snyder (2007) where they consider free entry and quality certification. They obtain specialization result: articles of different qualities are published by different journals.
12 They find that open access is more likely to be chosen by a journal with poor editorial talent since the subscription price chosen by a for-profit journal increases with its editorial talent.
a not-for-profit journal.\footnote{There are two other differences. First, they consider binary support for an article’s quality while we consider continuous support. Second, author demand is inelastic in their model while it is elastic in our model. Since, in their model, every author has the same prior belief about the quality of her article, the author fee is always chosen to induce the submission of all articles. By contrast, in our paper, each author knows the quality of her article and hence submits her paper only if it meets the quality standard.}

The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 characterizes the first-best allocation. Section 4 characterizes the second best allocation, defined as the one that maximizes social welfare under the constraint that reading cannot be subsidized. Section 5 studies the policy chosen by a not-for-profit journal under open access and under the reader-pays model. Section 6 performs a comparison among four different outcomes. Section 6.6 considers, as a robustness check, an impact maximizing journal and performs comparative static. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 The model

We consider a single academic journal, modelled as a platform between a continuum of authors and a continuum of potential readers. The mass of authors is normalized to one. Each author has one article,\footnote{Since we focus on the certification/dissemination of academic research, we do not model the prior stage where articles are produced.} which embodies “ideas” that may be useful to readers, for example because they allow them to develop innovations. The benefit from each innovation is not fully appropriated by the reader/innovator but also spills over to the rest of society, including to the author herself, through peer recognition.

The only way in which authors and readers can interact is through the academic journal.\footnote{This is because we assume that the average quality of the unpublished articles that are directly accessible through Internet is so low that readers prefer to look only at published articles. The academic journal plays thus a fundamental certification role: it filters out “junk” articles.} Three conditions are required for this interaction to occur:

- authors must submit their articles to the journal;
- the journal should referee them and publish only those that meet its quality standard;
- readers must read the published articles.

Thus, in our model, the academic journal plays two crucial roles: it \textbf{disseminates} academic production (i.e. articles) and \textbf{certifies} the quality of these articles in order to
convince readers to read the journal. Since time is costly to readers, they will indeed read the journal only if they anticipate that the average quality of articles is good enough. Symmetrically, the benefit that an author obtains from publication increases with the readership size of the journal. Thus we are in a “chicken and egg” situation, characteristic of two-sided markets,\textsuperscript{16} where the platform (here the academic journal) has to attract both sides (here authors and readers) to be successful. However, by contrast with most of the literature on two-sided markets, the platform controls not only the number of interactions but also their quality, through its certification function.

We use $q$ to measure the quality of an article. The quality of each article is independently drawn from the same distribution, with support $[0, q_{\text{max}}]$. We assume that the quality of an article is privately observed by its author. The journal has a perfect refereing technology: by incurring a cost $\gamma_R$, it can perfectly observe the quality of a submitted article. Since our focus is on electronic journals, distributed through the Internet, we assume that the marginal cost of distribution is zero.\textsuperscript{17} The journal incurs a publication cost $\gamma_P$ per published article; it includes the cost of making the first (electronic) copy and any fixed cost of distribution per article (such as the cost of buying capacity to post an article). The journal commits to publish all submitted articles of quality $q \geq q_{\text{min}}$, where $q_{\text{min}}$ is the minimum quality standard chosen by the journal. In addition, the journal chooses its pricing policy. It charges $p_S$ to all submitted articles, an additional $p_P$ to all published articles and a subscription fee $p_R$ to each reader.

Readers cannot observe the quality of an article before reading it but observe its quality after reading it. We assume that an article’s quality cannot be verified ex post by a third party and therefore the journal’s pricing scheme cannot be conditioned on realized quality\textsuperscript{18}.

The mass of readers is normalized to one. All readers obtain the same expected benefit $q$ after reading an article of quality $q$ but differ in their “reading cost” $c$, which is independently drawn from a distribution with support included in $[0, \infty)$. Readers’ benefit includes not only the increase in their knowledge but also the utility that they obtain from its use (such as production of scientific articles, patents, commercial applications). As already mentioned, when an article is read, some utility from its potential applications also spills over to the rest of society, including to the author herself. More precisely, when an article of quality $q$ is published by the journal, the total (that is, monetary and

\textsuperscript{16}See for example Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006).

\textsuperscript{17}However our arguments can also be applied to a print journal, provided the marginal cost of printing and distributing copies is not too big.

\textsuperscript{18}McCabe and Snyder (2005a,b) assume it as well. It can be justified by the fact that a Court cannot perfectly verify the quality of scientific articles.
non-monetary) benefit that the author obtains is given by

\[ u + \alpha_A q n_R, \]

where \( u(>0) \) and \( \alpha_A(>0) \) are constants and \( n_R \) represents the number of readers. \( u \) is a fixed component: it corresponds to the utility from having one article published in the journal. For instance, if a tenure decision depends solely on the number of articles published in particular journals, a tenure-track professor derives some utility from publishing her article in those journals, this independently of the quality of the article.\(^{19}\) By contrast, \( \alpha_A q n_R \) is a variable component: it depends on the quality of the article. We interpret \( qn_R \) as the impact of the article, proportional to the number of subsequent citations or to the number of patents that are subsequently based on the article. The constant \( \alpha_A (>0) \) measures the strength of the relation between publication impact and authors’ utility. A similar term \( \alpha_S n_R \) with \( \alpha_S (>0) \) represents the benefit that spills over to the rest of society. We denote by \( \alpha = \alpha_A + \alpha_S \) the total externality term.

The timing of the game is as follows:

1. The journal announces its editorial policy \( (q_{\min}) \) and its prices \( (p_S, p_P, p_R) \).
2. Authors decide whether or not to submit their articles to the journal.
3. The journal referees all submitted articles and accepts or rejects each of them.
4. Readers decide whether or not to buy the journal and read the articles.

Since both the author and the journal perfectly observe the quality \( q \) of a submitted article, the author perfectly knows whether or not her article will be accepted. Therefore, if \( q < q_{\min} \) and \( p_S > 0 \), she will not submit the article. By contrast, if \( q > q_{\min} \), the article will be accepted and she will have to pay the author fee \( p_A(= p_S + p_P) \). This implies an indeterminacy between \( p_S \) and \( p_P \): only \( p_A \) matters. The fact that only articles of quality superior to \( q_{\min} \) are submitted in our model\(^{20}\) also implies that what matters for the journal is only the sum \( \gamma_P + \gamma_R \), not its composition. Let \( \gamma \equiv \gamma_P + \gamma_R \). We assume \( \gamma > u \), implying that even when the reading cost is zero, publishing the lowest quality article (i.e. the one with \( q = 0 \)) is not socially optimal. This assumption captures the certification role of the academic journal: by rejecting articles of low quality, the journal allows readers to concentrate on important articles and avoid proliferation of bad ones.

\(^{19}\) \( u \) can also represent recognition from non-peers who do not read the journal. For instance, if a scientist publishes an article in Science or Nature, even those who are not able to understand the article will think that she made an important discovery and accordingly will give her their recognition.

\(^{20}\) We assume however that the journal commits to effectively referee all submitted articles.
In summary, when an article is published in the journal, its author gets a fixed utility $u$ while the journal incurs a fixed cost $\gamma (> u)$. When an article of quality $q$ is read by a reader of cost $c$, the reader gets net utility $(q - c)$, and the rest of society (including the author) gets utility $\alpha q$.

Each potential reader decides whether to read the journal, based on his expectation of the quality of published articles and on his (unit) cost of reading $c$. If the $n_A$ best articles are published, the net utility of a reader of cost $c$ is:

$$U_R = n_A[Q^a(n_A) - c] - p_R,$$

where $Q^a(n_A)$ is the (anticipated) average quality of the articles published in the journal. This average quality can be inferred perfectly from the minimum quality standard $q_{\text{min}}$ announced by the journal. Indeed, let us denote by $q(n_A)$ the $n_A$-th quantile of the distribution of articles’ qualities (ranked by decreasing quality: $q(\cdot)$ is thus decreasing). This distribution is supposed to be common knowledge. We have by definition:

$$\Pr(q \geq q(n_A)) = n_A,$$

$$Q^a(n_A) = \frac{\int_0^{n_A} q(x) dx}{n_A},$$

while

$$q_{\text{min}} = q(n_A).$$

Similarly the number $n_R$ of readers can be perfectly anticipated by authors, since the distribution of readers’ costs is also supposed to be common knowledge. Let $c(n_R)$ denote the $n_R$-th quantile of the cost distribution (ranked by increasing cost: $c(\cdot)$ is thus increasing). We have by definition:

$$\Pr(c \leq c(n_R)) = n_R.$$

Moreover the utility of the marginal reader is zero, and thus:

$$n_A[Q^a(n_A) - c(n_R)] = p_R.$$

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21 This formula presumes that the readers who subscribe to the journal read all the articles it contains. It is indeed optimal for them to do so. This comes from two of our assumptions: the cost of reading article is proportional to the number of articles read and articles qualities are indistinguishable a priori. The reading decision is thus all or nothing. Our analysis could be easily extended to the case where partial reading can be optimal (interior solution) either because reading cost is strictly convex in the number of articles or because the journal signals the quality of the articles by ranking them in decreasing order of quality.

22 In practice, journals are often subscribed by libraries. Our model is compatible with this situation, provided that the library decides its subscription policy in accord with the interests of the community it represents. Parameter $c$ is then the average cost of readers belonging to the community.
Thus knowing $q_{\min}$ and $p_R$ (and the distributions of costs and qualities) each author can infer the number $n_A$ of published articles, the average quality $Q^a(n_A)$ of these published articles, and thus by (5) the number of readers. Figure 1 describes the journal as a platform mediating authors and readers.

![Figure 1: The journal as a platform.](image)

### 3 The first-best allocation

In this section, we derive the first-best outcome, that would be implemented by a social planner who could choose who reads the journal and which articles are published. Obviously, if there are $n_A$ articles published and $n_R$ readers, efficiency requires that these are the articles with the highest qualities ($q \geq q(n_A)$) and the readers with the lowest costs ($c \leq c(n_R)$). Social welfare, denoted by $W(n_A, n_R)$ is then given by:

$$ W(n_A, n_R) \equiv (1 + \alpha)n_R \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx - n_A(\gamma - u) - n_A\int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy. \quad (6) $$

In formula (6), the first term represents social benefit (readers + authors + the rest of society) when the $n_A$ best articles are published and read by the $n_R$ most efficient readers, the second term represents the total cost of publishing the journal, minus the total fixed benefit of authors and the last term represents the aggregate cost of reading the journal.

We assume that the parameters are such that the maximum of $W$ is interior: the proportion of published articles is strictly between 0 and 1. Then, from the first order condition with respect to $n_A$, we have:

$$ (1 + \alpha)n_Rq(n_A) = (\gamma - u) + \int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy. \quad (7) $$
Given that the $n_R$ readers with $c \leq c(n_R)$ read the journal, condition (7) means that the optimal number of articles published, $n_A$, is determined by equalizing the social marginal benefit from publishing an article of quality $q(n_A)$ to its social marginal cost. The social marginal benefit is equal to $(1 + \alpha)q(n_A)$ since when an article of quality $q(n_A)$ is read by a reader, the reader derives utility $q(n_A)$, while the rest of society (including the author) derives utility $\alpha q(n_A)$. The social marginal cost is equal to the sum of the net cost of publishing an article ($\gamma - u$) and the aggregate cost of reading an article $\int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy$. (7) can be rewritten as:

$$(1 + \alpha)q(n_A) = \frac{\gamma - u}{n_R} + C^a(n_R),\quad (8)$$

where

$$C^a(n_R) = \frac{\int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy}{n_R}$$

denotes the average cost of readers.

From the first order condition with respect to $n_R$, we have:

$$(1 + \alpha) \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx = n_A c(n_R).\quad (9)$$

Given that the $n_A$ articles with quality $q \geq q(n_A)$ are published by the journal, condition (9) means that the optimal number of readers is determined by equalizing the social benefit $(1 + \alpha) \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx$ from having one additional reader to the total cost of reading $n_A c(n_R)$ incurred by this marginal reader. (9) is equivalent to

$$(1 + \alpha)Q^a(n_A) = c(n_R).\quad (10)$$

Since the externality term $\alpha$ is positive, condition (10) implies that for the marginal reader, the average utility from reading an article of the journal is lower than her cost of reading it (i.e. $Q^a(n_A) < c(n_R)$). Thus, as we shall see below, the marginal reader should be subsidized. This is because she generates positive externalities on the rest of society by increasing the impact of articles and/or the number of innovations derived from them. Let $(n_A^{FB}, n_R^{FB})$ denote the first-best allocation, characterized by (8) and (10).

We now study the minimum quality standard $q_{min}^{FB}$ and the prices $(p^{FB}_A, p^{FB}_R)$ that implement the first-best outcome $(n_A^{FB}, n_R^{FB})$ when the social planner cannot fully control readers and authors, and has to satisfy the participation constraints for both of them. Obviously, $q_{min}^{FB}$ must be equal to $q(n_A^{FB})$. Given $n_R$, let $U_A(n_A : n_R)$ denote the utility that the $n_A$th author derives from publishing her article in the journal. We have:

$$U_A(n_A : n_R) = \alpha_A q(n_A)n_R + u - p_A.\quad (11)$$
In order to induce the submission of all articles of quality superior to \(q(n^{FB}_A)\), the following constraint should be satisfied:

\[
(PC_A) \ U_A(n^{FB}_A : n^{FB}_R) = \alpha_A q(n^{FB}_A) n^{FB}_R + u - p_R \geq 0;
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
p_R = \alpha_A q(n^{FB}_A) n^{FB}_R + u - p^\text{max}_A.
\]

Note that when \((PC_A)\) is satisfied, the participation constraint is also satisfied for all inframarginal authors, for which \(q \geq q(n^{FB}_A)\).

Given \(n_A\), let \(U_R(n_R : n_A)\) denote the utility that the \(n_R\)th reader derives from subscribing to (and reading) the journal. We have:

\[
U_R(n_R : n_A) = [Q^a(n_A) - c(n_R)] n_A - p_R. \tag{12}
\]

In order to align each reader’s incentive to subscribe to the journal (and to read it) with the social incentive (i.e. in order to induce only those with \(c \leq c(n^{FB}_R)\) to subscribe to the journal), the following incentive constraint\(^\text{23}\) has to be satisfied for the marginal reader:

\[
(IC_R) \ U_R(n^{FB}_R : n^{FB}_A) = [Q^a(n^{FB}_A) - c(n^{FB}_R)] n^{FB}_A - p_R = 0,
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
p_R = [Q^a(n^{FB}_A) - c(n^{FB}_R)] n^{FB}_A \equiv p^{FB}_R.
\]

From (10), we have

\[
p^{FB}_R = -\alpha Q^a(n^{FB}_A) n^{FB}_A < 0. \tag{13}
\]

Therefore \(p^{FB}_R\) must be strictly negative. By contrast, \(p^{FB}_A\) can be strictly positive: this is because an author derives a strictly positive utility from publishing her article in the journal but incurs no submission cost. This implies that charging a small (but positive) price is compatible with the submission of all articles of quality higher than \(q(n^{FB}_A)\). In fact, any \(p_A \leq p^\text{max}_A\) achieves it. By contrast, each reader must incur a cost of reading the journal. Since reading generates positive externalities to the rest of society, it is optimal to subsidize readers by charging a subscription price that is lower than the marginal distribution cost. For an electronic journal, this distribution cost is zero, so that the subscription price must be negative. Summarizing, we have:

\(^{23}\)We call it an incentive constraint instead of calling it a participation constraint since a participation constraint is usually defined by an inequality.
Proposition 1 (First-best) (i) The first-best allocation \((n_A^{FB}, n_R^{FB})\) is characterized by:

\[
(1 + \alpha)q(n_A) = \frac{\gamma - u}{n_R} + C^a(n_R),
\]

\[
(1 + \alpha)Q^a(n_A) = c(n_R).
\]

(ii) To implement the first-best allocation, the social planner has to choose a minimum quality standard equal to \(q^{FB}_{\text{min}} \equiv q(n_A^{FB})\) and prices \((p_A^{FB}, p_R^{FB})\) satisfying

\[
p_A^{FB} \leq \alpha q(n_A^{FB})n_R^{FB} + u \equiv p_A^{\text{max}}; p_R^{FB} = -\alpha Q^a(n_A^{FB})n_A^{FB}.
\]

Therefore, the subscription price must be strictly negative.

4 The second-best allocation

In the previous analysis of the first-best allocation we have made the somewhat implausible assumption that the social planner could induce a marginal reader of type \(c(n_R^{FB})\) to read the journal by subsidizing it, i.e. by charging a negative subscription price. However, charging a negative subscription price would not, in practice, necessarily induce the marginal reader to read the journal. This is because it is hard to monitor whether or not someone effectively reads the journal. Consequently, a negative subscription price would induce fake readers who have no or very weak interest in reading the journal to subscribe to it only to obtain the subsidy.\(^{24}\) Therefore, we consider here the second-best outcome in which the social planner is constrained to charge a non negative subscription price \((p_R \geq 0)\).

Given \(p_R\), the marginal reader is determined by

\[
U_R(n_R : n_A) = \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx - c(n_R)n_A - p_R = 0.
\]

Therefore, requiring \(p_R \geq 0\) is equivalent to requiring

\[
c(n_R)n_A \leq \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx. \tag{14}
\]

Hence, in the second best outcome, the social planner maximizes \(W(n_A, n_R)\) subject to (14). Again we assume that the parameters are such that the (second-best) optimum is interior: the proportion of published articles is strictly between 0 and 1. Define

\(^{24}\)By contrast, charging a negative author fee could be feasible since it would be paid upon acceptance of an article and the number of articles of quality superior to a given quality standard is limited.
Let $L^{SB} = W - \lambda_1 [c(n_R)n_A - \int_0^{n_R} q(x)dx]$ where $\lambda_1 (\geq 0)$ represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with (14). The first-order conditions with respect to $n_A$ and $n_R$ are:

$$(1 + \alpha)n_Rq(n_A) = (\gamma - u) + \int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy + \lambda_1 [c(n_R) - q(n_A)]; \quad (15)$$

$$(1 + \alpha)\int_0^{n_R} q(x)dx = n_Ac(n_R) + \lambda_1 c'(n_R)n_A. \quad (16)$$

When condition (14) binds, we find from (16) that

$$(1 + \alpha)c(n_R)n_A = n_A[c(n_R) + \lambda_1 c'(n_R)]$$

and thus that

$$\lambda_1 = \frac{\alpha c(n_R)}{c'(n_R)} > 0.$$  

$\lambda_1$ represents the marginal increase in social welfare that would occur if the social planner could subsidize readers by a small amount. Inserting $\lambda_1 = \frac{\alpha c(n_R)}{c'(n_R)}$ into (15) gives

$$(1 + \alpha)n_Rq(n_A) = (\gamma - u) + \int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy + \frac{\alpha c(n_R)}{c'(n_R)} [c(n_R) - q(n_A)] \quad (17)$$

The fact that (14) binds implies that

$$c(n_R) = Q^a(n_A). \quad (18)$$

In other words, the marginal reader’s reading cost is equal to the average quality of the articles published in the journal. This, together with $Q^a(n_A) > q(n_A)$ implies that when we compare (7) with (15), the social marginal cost of publishing one more article is larger in the second-best allocation than in the first-best (this is because the additional term $\lambda_1 [c(n_R) - q(n_A)]$ is positive). Similarly, comparing (9) with (16) shows that the social marginal cost of having one more reader is larger in the second-best than in the first-best. Let $(n^{SB}_A, n^{SB}_R)$ denote the second-best allocation, characterized by (17) and (18). The previous arguments imply that $n^{FB}_A > n^{SB}_A$ and $n^{FB}_R > n^{SB}_R$, at least if $W$ is quasi concave. These inequalities will be established formerly in Section 6, in the case of iso-elastic distribution functions.

Let $(p^{SB}_A, p^{SB}_R)$ denote a price vector implementing $(n^{SB}_A, n^{SB}_R)$ when the social planner chooses the quality standard $q^{SB}_0 \equiv q(n^{SB}_A)$. Since (14) binds, we have $p^{SB}_R = 0$. Therefore, open-access is second-best optimal. $p^{SB}_A$ has to satisfy the participation constraint of the marginal author, implying :

$$p^{SB}_A \leq \alpha_Aq(n^{SB}_A)n^{SB}_R + u.$$
Proposition 2 (Second-best) When a negative subscription price is not feasible:

(i) Open-access is socially optimal.

(ii) In this case, the second-best allocation \((n_A^{SB}, n_R^{SB})\) is characterized by (17) and (18). In particular, the marginal reader’s cost is equal to the average quality of published articles.

(iii) If \(W\) is quasi-concave in \((n_A, n_R)\) then the second-best allocation involves less publications and less readers than the first-best: \(n_A^{SB} < n_A^{FB}\) and \(n_R^{SB} < n_R^{FB}\).

Proposition 2 characterizes the situations where open-access is optimal: when the positive externalities generated by readers (in particular through the innovations derived from academic articles) exceed the cost of distributing articles (which is zero for an Internet journal) and when subsidizing reading is not feasible (so that the first-best is not attainable), it is optimal to charge a zero subscription price. This reduces the number of readers with respect to the first-best allocation, which in turn reduces the net social benefit from publishing an article. Therefore the minimum quality standard is higher in the second-best allocation than in the first-best. Note that the second-best allocation coincides with the Ramsey optimum as long as the marginal author’s benefit from publication is large enough. Figure 2 describes the first-best and the second-best allocations.

![Graph showing the first-best (FB) and the second-best (SB) allocations.](image)

**Figure 2:** The first-best (FB) and the second-best (SB) allocations.

The shaded area corresponds to the region \(p_R \geq 0\) (non negative reader price).

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25In the case of iso-elastic distribution functions that we consider in section 6, this condition is satisfied if the average quality of potential articles is large enough.
5 Positive analysis

In this section, we adopt a positive viewpoint and analyze the consequences of the move from reader-pays to open access for a not-for-profit journal run by an academic association. If the objective of the association were to maximize social welfare, this move would lead to the (second best) social optimum (see Proposition 2(i)). However, the association is likely to pursue its own objective. We consider two possibilities for the objective function of the association: the total utility of the readers (in this section) or the impact of the journal (in Section 6.6). Our main result, that open-access is likely to lead to a decrease in the quality of academic journals, holds for both objective functions. We start (in Section 5.1) by explaining the basic intuition behind this result, and then characterize formally the outcomes under reader-pays (RP) and open access (OA).

5.1 The basic intuition

Recall that the readership of the journal is determined by the indifference of the marginal reader:

\[ U(n_R : n_A) \equiv [Q^a(n_A) - c(n_R)] n_A - p_R = 0. \]

In the reader-pays model, the author fee is zero, and the budget breaking condition of the journal is

\[ p_R n_R \geq \gamma n_A. \]

Eliminating \( p_R \) between these two conditions, we obtain the inequality characterizing the feasible set of the journal in the reader-pays model:

\[ Q^a(n_A) \geq c(n_R) + \frac{\gamma}{n_R}. \]  

(19)

Note that the feasible set under open access (where \( p_R = 0 \)) corresponds to the same condition where \( \gamma \) is set equal to 0 (since \( \gamma \) is recovered by author fees) and the inequality is replaced by equality:

\[ Q^a(n_A) = c(n_R). \]  

(20)

\[ ^{26} \text{We here have in mind a situation in which the association maximizes its members' utilities and one becomes a member by subscribing to its journal. In a more general framework, the association would internalize some fraction of authors' utilities as well, since some members (possibly the most influential ones) are also authors. Our formulation here captures in a simple way the bias in the objective of the association toward the readers, as compared with that of the social planner.} \]
Since \( \gamma > 0 \), we see that in order to attract the same number of readers, a \( RP \) journal has to offer a higher quality than an \( OA \) journal. This is the basic intuition behind our main result: the \( RP \) model imposes more discipline on quality choice.

Figure 3 below represents the two feasible sets and the indifference curves of the association. Under fairly general conditions the optimal choice of the association will entail higher quality (and possibly larger readership) under reader-pays than under open access.

\[
TUR = \int_0^{n_R} \{ [Q^a(n_A) - c(y)] n_A - p_R \} dy, \tag{21}
\]

where \( TUR \) means total utility of readers. Since \( n_R \) and \( p_R \) have to satisfy the indifference condition of the marginal reader, i.e.

\[
U_R(n_R : n_A) = [Q^a(n_A) - c(n_R)] n_A - p_R = 0,
\]

we can replace \( p_R \) by \( [Q^a(n_A) - c(n_R)] n_A \) in (21). We find:

\[
TUR(n_A, n_R) \equiv n_A \int_0^{n_R} [c(n_R) - c(y)] dy.
\]
5.2 Open-access

We first consider open-access \((p_R = 0)\). This, together with \(U_R(n_r : n_A) = 0\) implies:

\[
c(n_R)n_A = \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx. \tag{OA}
\]

The association maximizes \(TUR(n_A, n_R)\) with respect to \((n_A, n_R, p_A)\) subject to \((OA)\), the budget breaking \((BB)\) constraint:

\[
(p_A - \gamma)n_A \geq 0, \tag{BB}
\]

and the authors’ participation constraint:

\[
U_A(n_A : n_R) = \alpha_A q(n_A)n_R + u - p_A \geq 0. \tag{PCA}
\]

Note that \(p_A\) does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of generality, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compatible with \((BB)\), namely \(p_A = \gamma\). In what follows, we study the association’s choice of \((n_A, n_R)\) assuming that \((PCA)\) is slack at \(p_A = \gamma\).\(^{27}\)

Define \(L^{OA} = TUR - \lambda_2 \left[ c(n_R)n_A - \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx \right]\) where \(\lambda_2\) represents the Lagrangian multiplier associated with \((OA)\). Then, the first-order conditions with respect to \(n_A\) and \(n_R\) are given by:

\[
\int_0^{n_R} [c(n_R) - c(y)] dy = \lambda_2 [c(n_R) - q(n_A)]; \tag{22}
\]

\[
n_A n_Rc'(n_R) = \lambda_2 n_A c'(n_R). \tag{23}
\]

(23) is equivalent to

\[
\lambda_2 = n_R > 0. \tag{24}
\]

\(\lambda_2\) represents the marginal increase in \(TUR\) that would be achieved if the association could subsidize readers. Replacing \(\lambda_2\) with \(n_R\) in (22) gives:

\[
q(n_A) = \frac{\int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy}{n_R} (\equiv C^a(n_R)). \tag{25}
\]

\(^{27}\)In the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions we consider in section 6, \((PCA)\) is slack at \(p_A = \gamma\) if the following condition holds:

\[
\frac{\alpha_A}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \left[ \frac{\varepsilon_q}{\varepsilon_c + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}} q_{\text{max}} \right]^{\frac{1 + \varepsilon_c}{\varepsilon_c}} > \gamma - u.
\]

Note that this condition holds if \(q_{\text{max}}\) or \(\alpha_A\) is large enough.
Let \((n_{OA}^A, n_{OA}^R)\) denote the association’s optimal choice under open-access. It is characterized by \((OA)\) and (25). \((OA)\) means that the average quality is equal to the reading cost of the marginal reader. In a somewhat symmetric fashion, condition (25) means that the average reading cost \(C^a(n_R)\) is equal to the quality of the marginal author’s article.

**Proposition 3** (not-for-profit and open-access) Consider a not-for-profit journal run by an academic association maximizing the total utility of its readers. Under open-access the allocation \((n_{OA}^A, n_{OA}^R)\) optimally chosen by the association is characterized by two conditions:

- the average quality of published articles is equal to the reading cost of the marginal reader, and
- the average reading cost is equal to the quality of the marginal article.

### 5.3 Reader-pays

As we already saw, the feasible set of a reader-pays journal is characterized by:

\[
c(n_R) + \frac{\gamma}{n_R} \leq Q^a(n_A). \tag{26}
\]

The left-hand side of (26) is \(U\)-shaped in \(n_R\). If its minimum is higher than the maximum quality \(q_{\text{max}}\), the feasible set is empty. We have therefore to assume that \(q_{\text{max}}\) is large enough to avoid this problem. In this case, for a given \(n_A\), there may be two values of \(n_R\) that satisfy (26) with an equality: it is always optimal to choose the highest.

Therefore, the association maximizes \(TUR(n_A, n_R)\) with respect to \((n_A, n_R)\) subject to (26). Define \(L^{RP} = TUR - \lambda_3 \left[ n_{AC}(n_R)n_R + \gamma n_A - n_R \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx \right]\) where \(\lambda_3\) represents the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (26). Then, the first-order conditions with respect to \(n_A\) and \(n_R\) are given by:

\[
\int_0^{n_R} [c(n_R) - c(y)] dy = \lambda_3 \left[ c(n_R)n_R + \gamma - n_Rq(n_A) \right]; \tag{27}
\]

\[
n_A n_R c'(n_R) = \lambda_3 \left[ n_A c(n_R) + n_A c'(n_R)n_R - \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx \right]. \tag{28}
\]

Since (26) is binding at the optimum, we have

\[
c(n_R)n_R + \gamma = n_R Q^a(n_A). \tag{RP}\]
Inserting \((RP)\) into (27) gives:

\[
\lambda_3 = \frac{c(n_R) - C^a(n_R)}{Q^a(n_A) - q(n_A)} > 0. \tag{29}
\]

\(\lambda_3\) represents the marginal increase in \(TUR\) if the association’s budget constraint is relaxed. When its budget constraint is relaxed, the association can charge a lower subscription price and thereby increase \(TUR\). Inserting (29) into (28) and dividing by \(n_A\) gives

\[
n_{RC}'(n_R) = \frac{c(n_R) - C^a(n_R)}{Q^a(n_A) - q(n_A)} [c(n_R) + n_{RC}'(n_R) - Q^a(n_A)].
\]

Using (RP) and rearranging terms, we finally obtain:

\[
C^a(n_R) = q(n_A) + \frac{\gamma}{n_R} \left[ \frac{C^a(n_R) - c(n_R)}{n_{RC}'(n_R)} - 1 \right]. \tag{30}
\]

Let \((n_A^{RP}, n_R^{RP})\) denote the association’s optimal choice under reader-pays model. It is characterized by \((RP)\) and (30). Since \(c'(n_R) > 0\) and \(C^a(n_R) < c(n_R)\), (30) implies that \(C^a(n_R) < q(n_A)\). Similarly, \((RP)\) implies that \(Q^a(n_A) > c(n_R)\).

**Proposition 4** (not-for-profit and reader-pays) Consider a not-for-profit journal run by an association maximizing the total utility of its readers. Under reader-pays, the allocation chosen by the association \((n_A^{RP}, n_R^{RP})\) is characterized by \((RP)\) and (30). In particular:

- the average quality of published articles is higher than the reading cost of the marginal reader, and
- the average reading cost is lower than the quality of the marginal article.

### 6 Comparative statics analysis

In this section, we compare four scenarios (first-best, second-best, not-for-profit journal with open-access, not-for-profit journal with reader-pays) in terms of average quality of the articles published in the journal and number of readers. To facilitate the comparison, we choose a particular specification, that we call “iso-elastic”:\(^{28}\)

\[
q(n_A) = q_{\text{max}} \left[ 1 - (n_A)^{\varepsilon_q} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad c(n_R) = (n_R)^{\varepsilon_c}.
\]

\(^{28}\)The specification \(q(n_A) = Kn_A^{-\varepsilon_q}\) would not work, since it would imply \(q(0) = +\infty\), and hence unbounded article qualities.
In our iso-elastic specification we have:

\[ Q^a(n_A) = \frac{\varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} + q(n_A)}{1 + \varepsilon_q} \]

or equivalently:

\[ q(n_A) = (1 + \varepsilon_q)Q^a(n_A) - \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}, \]

and

\[ C^a(n_R) = \frac{c(n_R)}{1 + \varepsilon_c}. \]

### 6.1 The first-best allocation

The first-best allocation is characterized by two conditions:

\[ (1 + \alpha)q(n_A) = \frac{\gamma - u}{n_R} + C^a(n_R), \quad (8) \]

and

\[ (1 + \alpha) \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx = n_A c(n_R). \quad (9) \]

Condition (8), expressed in terms of \((q, c)\) leads to:

\[ (1 + \alpha)q = \frac{\gamma - u}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} + \frac{c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}. \quad (31) \]

Condition (9), expressed in terms of the same variables leads to:

\[ (1 + \alpha) [\varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} + q] = (1 + \varepsilon_q)c. \quad (32) \]

Subtracting (31) from (32) leads to:

\[ \left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) c - \frac{\gamma - u}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = (1 + \alpha)\varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}. \quad (33) \]

Let \( \Phi^{FB}(c) \equiv \left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) c - \frac{\gamma - u}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}}. \) Since \( \Phi^{FB}(c) \) increases from \( \Phi^{FB}(0) = -\infty \) to \( \Phi^{FB}(+\infty) = +\infty \), there is a unique solution to (33), denoted \( c^{FB} \equiv c(n_A^{FB}) \). Replacing \( c \) by \((1 + \alpha)Q^a\) (this results from (9)) into (33) and dividing (33) by \( (1 + \alpha) \) gives:

\[ \left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma - u}{(1 + \alpha)^{1+1/\varepsilon_c}(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}. \quad (34) \]

\( Q^{aFB} \equiv Q^a(n_A^{FB}) \) is the unique solution of (34).

From (33) and (34), both \( Q^{aFB} \) and \( c^{FB} \) increase when \( \gamma - u \) increases. In other words, as the net publication cost \((\gamma - u)\) increases, it is optimal to increase the quality standard, and to expand readership. From (33) and (34), we also find that as \( \alpha \) increases, \( Q^{aFB} \) decreases and \( c^{FB} \) increases. In other words, as the externality generated by published articles increases, it is optimal to publish more articles, and to increase readership size.
6.2 The second-best allocation

It is characterized by two conditions:

\[(1 + \alpha)q(n_A) = \frac{(\gamma - u)}{n_R} + \frac{\int_0^{n_R} c(y)dy}{n_R} + \frac{\alpha c(n_R)}{n_R c'(n_R)} [c(n_R) - q(n_A)] \quad (17)\]

and

\[c(n_R) = Q^a(n_A). \quad (18)\]

After replacing \(n_R c'(n_R) = \varepsilon c(n_R)\) into (17) and expressing everything in terms of \((q, c)\), we obtain:

\[(1 + \alpha + \frac{\alpha}{\varepsilon_c})q = \frac{\gamma - u}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} + \frac{c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \quad \frac{\alpha}{\varepsilon_c}, \]

from which we get:

\[q = \frac{\gamma - u}{(1 + \alpha + \frac{\alpha}{\varepsilon_c})c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} + \frac{c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \quad (35)\]

Since \(q = (1 + \varepsilon_q)Q^a - \varepsilon q_{q_{\text{max}}} = (1 + \varepsilon_q)c - \varepsilon q_{q_{\text{max}}}\) (the latter equality results from (18)), condition (35) becomes:

\[\left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) c - \frac{\gamma - u}{(1 + \alpha + \frac{\alpha}{\varepsilon_c})c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon q_{q_{\text{max}}}. \quad (36)\]

c_{SB} (\equiv c(n_{SB}^R)) is the unique solution of (36). Furthermore, we have \(c_{SB} = Q^a_{SB} \equiv Q^a(n_{SB}^A)\). When we replace \(c\) with \(Q^a\) in (36), compare it with (34), and use the fact that \((1 + \alpha)^{1+1/\varepsilon_c} > (1 + \alpha + \frac{\alpha}{\varepsilon_c})\), we find

\[Q^a_{SB} > Q^a_{FB}. \]

Comparing (36) with (33), we also find:

\[c_{SB} < c_{FB}. \]

The two inequalities are equivalent to

\[n_{FB}^A > n_{SB}^A \quad \text{and} \quad n_{FB}^R > n_{SB}^R. \]

6.3 Open-access versus reader-pays

The allocation chosen by a not-for-profit journal under open-access is characterized by two conditions:

\[(OA) \quad c(n_R)n_A = \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx. \]
and
\[ q(n_A) = \frac{\int_0^n c(y)dy}{R} (\equiv C^a(n_R)). \] (25)

From \( q = (1 + \varepsilon_q)Q^a - \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} \), (25) becomes
\[ (1 + \varepsilon_q)Q^a - \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} = \frac{c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \] (37)
Replacing \( c \) with \( Q^a \) in (37) gives \( Q^{aOA} \)
\[ \left( \frac{\varepsilon_q}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) Q^{aOA} = \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}. \] (38)

Similarly the reader-pays allocation is characterized by two conditions:
\[ c(n_R) + \frac{\gamma}{n_R} - Q^a(n_A), \quad (RP) \]
and
\[ C^a(n_R) = q(n_A) + \frac{\gamma}{n_R} \left[ \frac{C^a(n_R) - c(n_R)}{n_R c'(n_R)} - 1 \right]. \] (30)

Since \( c = n_R^{\varepsilon_c} \), (RP) is equivalent to
\[ Q^a = c + \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}}. \] (39)
If we express (30) as a function of \( c \), using \( C^a = \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c} c \), \( q = (1 + \varepsilon_q)Q^a - \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} \) and (39), we get
\[ \frac{c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} = (1 + \varepsilon_q) \left[ c + \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \right] - \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}} + \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \left[ \frac{\varepsilon_c - c}{\varepsilon_c c} - 1 \right], \]
and after simplifications:
\[ \left( \frac{\varepsilon_q}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) c - \frac{\gamma \left( \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c} - \varepsilon_q \right)}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}. \] (40)

6.4 Average quality

**Proposition 5** (average quality): In the iso-elastic specification, we have:
\[ Q^a(n_A^{RP}) > Q^a(n_A^{SB}) > Q^a(n_A^{FB}) > Q^a(n_A^{OA}). \]

The association chooses too high a quality standard under the reader-pays model and too low a quality standard under open-access.
Note that $Q^{aOA}$ and $Q^{aRP}$ do not depend either on the externality parameter $\alpha$ or on authors’ fixed benefit $u$. Furthermore, under open-access, $\gamma$ has no impact on the quality choice of the association since there are (by assumption) sufficiently many authors who are willing to pay $p_A = \gamma$ to publish their articles: the participation constraint of authors is not binding. Therefore, as long as the net cost of publication $\gamma - u$ is positive, the association publishes too many articles under open-access: $Q^{aOA} < Q^{aSB}$. Under the reader-pays model, the association has to recover $\gamma n_A$ by charging readers. Hence, an increase in $\gamma$ increases its quality standard. By contrast, what matters for the social planner is the net cost $\gamma - u$. This, together with the fact that the association does not internalize the authors’ benefit, makes the reader-pays association publish too few articles.

**Proof of Proposition 5:** It is easy to compare the first-best allocation with the allocation chosen by an open-access association in terms of average quality. Indeed, comparing (34) with (38) tells us immediately that

$$Q^{aFB} > Q^{aOA}.$$

We now compare the first-best allocation with the reader-pays outcome, again in terms of average quality. Replacing $c$ with $Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}}$ into the first term of (40) gives

$$
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) \left( Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \right) - \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c} - \varepsilon_q \right) = \left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{\tilde{c}(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}}
$$

$$= \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}, \quad (41)$$

where $\tilde{c}(Q^a)$ is the largest $c$ that satisfies (39). This function is defined for

$$Q^a > \min_c \left[ c + \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \right].$$

As already mentioned, we assume that $q_{\text{max}}$ is large enough for this set to be non-empty. In this case, $Q^{aRP}$ is determined by (41). $Q^a > \tilde{c}(Q^a)$ implies

$$
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}} > \left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{\tilde{c}(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}}. \quad (42)
$$

Let $\tilde{Q}^a$ denote the solution of

$$
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}. \quad (43)
$$

Note that the left hand side of (42) increases with $Q^a$, while the right hand side equals $\varepsilon_q q_{\text{max}}$ when $Q^a = Q^{aRP}$, by condition (41). Then, (41) and (42) imply that $\tilde{Q}^a < Q^{aRP}$.
Comparing (43) with (36) (and in the latter condition, we replace \( c \) with \( Q_a \)) leads to \( \tilde{Q}^a > Q_a^{SB} \), which in turn implies \( Q_a^{RP} > Q_a^{SB} \). Since we know that \( Q_a^{SB} > Q_a^{FB} \), we have finally:

\[
Q_a^{RP} > Q_a^{SB} > Q_a^{FB} > Q_a^{OA}.
\]

The following table compares the determinants of average quality of published articles in the four regimes. It is easy to see that since, in all four equations of table 1, the left hand side of each equation increases with \( Q^a \), the unique solution exists as long as \( q_{\max} \) is large enough.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Equation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| First-Best   | \[
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1+\varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma - u}{(1 + \alpha)(1+1/\varepsilon_c)(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\max}
\]  |
| Second-Best  | \[
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1+\varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma - u}{(1 + \alpha + \alpha/\varepsilon_c)(Q^a)^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\max}
\]  |
| Open-Access  | \[
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1+\varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a = \varepsilon_q q_{\max}
\]  |
| Reader-Pays  | \[
\left( \varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1+\varepsilon_c} \right) Q^a - \frac{\gamma}{[\tilde{c}(Q^a)]^{1/\varepsilon_c}} = \varepsilon_q q_{\max},
\] where \( \tilde{c}(Q^a) \) is the largest solution of \( Q^a = c + \frac{\gamma}{c^{1/\varepsilon_c}} \).

**Table 1:** Average Qualities.

### 6.5 Readership size

We know that \( n_{FB}^R > n_{SB}^R \). Furthermore, under open-access the marginal reader is determined by the average quality of articles (i.e. \( Q^a = c(n_R^A) \)). Since, by Proposition 5, the average quality is higher under the second-best than with an open-access association (i.e. \( Q^a(n_{SB}^A) > Q^a(n_{OA}^A) \)) readership size is larger in the former than in the latter (i.e. \( c(n_{SB}^R) > c(n_{OA}^R) \)). Therefore, we have:

\[
n_{FB}^R > n_{SB}^R > n_{OA}^R.
\]
We now compare the policy of an open-access association with that of a reader-pays association in terms of readership size. For this purpose we need to compare (38) (in which we replace $Q^a$ with $c$) with (40). The comparison gives

$$c(n_{OA}^R) \geq c(n_{RP}^R) \text{ if and only if } \varepsilon_q \geq \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}.$$ 

If $\varepsilon_q > \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}$, the change from the reader-pays model to the open-access increases the readership size of the journal run by the association, as could have been expected. But a rather surprising result holds if $\varepsilon_q < \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}$: in this case open-access reduces, instead of increasing, readership size. This is because even though readers do not pay for subscription, the average quality of the journal is so low under open-access, that their benefit net of subscription price is higher under the reader-pays model than under open-access.

Summarizing, we have:

**Proposition 6 (readership size):** In the iso-elastic specification, we have:

$$n_{FB}^R > n_{SB}^R > n_{OA}^R.$$  

The journal attracts too few readers under the open-access model. Moreover:

$$n_{OA}^R \geq n_{RP}^R \text{ if and only if } \varepsilon_q \geq \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}.$$ 

The change from the reader-pays model to the open-access model increases the readership of the journal if $\varepsilon_q > \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}$ and reduces it if $\varepsilon_q < \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}$.

The comparison of readership sizes for open-access and reader-pays journals is illustrated in Table 2. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the allocations chosen by the association under open access and under reader-pays together with the second-best allocation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open-Access</th>
<th>$\left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) c(n_R) = \varepsilon_q q_{\max}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reader-Pays</td>
<td>$\left(\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) c(n_R) + \gamma \frac{n_R}{n_R} \left(\varepsilon_q - \frac{1}{1 + \varepsilon_c}\right) = \varepsilon_q q_{\max}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** Readership Sizes.

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Figure 4: The allocations chosen by a not-for-profit journal when $\varepsilon_q < \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_c}$ (OA: open-access, RP: reader-pays).

Figure 5: The allocations chosen by a not-for-profit journal when $\varepsilon_q > \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon_c}$ (OA: open-access, RP: reader-pays).
6.6 Robustness: Impact-maximizing journal

Maximizing the utility of readers is a reasonable objective for a reader-pays (not-for-profit) journal, since readers are also the members of the association that controls the journal. However this objective seems less natural for an open-access journal. Thus the move from reader-pays to open-access may be accompanied by a change in objective. To account for this possibility, and as a robustness check, we consider now an alternative objective for the journal. We assume that it endeavors to maximize its impact, measured by the sum of all readers’ benefit from reading the journal:

\[ IM(n_A, n_R) \equiv n_R \int_0^{n_A} q(y)dy. \]

*IM* is also proportional to the number of citations of the article, or to the number of patents derived from it.

The association maximizes *IM*(n_A, n_R) with respect to (n_A, n_R, p_A) subject to (OA), the budget breaking constraint (BB) and the authors’ participation constraint (PC_A):

\[ c(n_R)n_A = \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx; \quad (OA) \]

\[(p_A - \gamma)n_A \geq 0 \quad (BB)\]

\[ U_A(n_A : n_R) = \alpha_A q(n_A)n_R + u - p_A \geq 0. \quad (PC_A) \]

As before, p_A does not appear in the objective of the association. Without loss of generality, we assume that the association selects the lowest price that is compatible with (BB), namely p_A = γ. In what follows, we study the association’s choice of (n_A, n_R) assuming that (PC_A) is slack at p_A = γ.\(^{29}\)

Define \( L^{IM,OA} = IM(n_A, n_R) - \lambda_4 \left[ c(n_R)n_A - \int_0^{n_A} q(x)dx \right] \) where \( \lambda_4 \) represents the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (OA). Then, the first-order conditions with respect to n_A and n_R are given by:

\[ n_Rq(n_A) = \lambda_4 [c(n_R) - q(n_A)]; \quad (44) \]

\[ \int_0^{n_A} q(y)dy = \lambda_4 n_A c'(n_R). \quad (45) \]

\(^{29}\)In the case of the iso-elastic distribution functions, (PC_A) is slack at p_A = γ if the following condition holds:

\[ \frac{\alpha_A}{1 + \varepsilon_c} \left[ \frac{\varepsilon_q}{\varepsilon_q + \frac{\varepsilon_c}{1+\varepsilon_c}} q_{\text{max}} \right]^{\frac{1+\varepsilon_c}{\varepsilon_c}} > \gamma - u. \]

Note that this condition holds if q_{max} or \( \alpha_A \) is large enough.
(45) is equivalent to
\[ \lambda_4 = \frac{\int_0^{n_A} q(y) dy}{n_A c'(n_R)} > 0. \] (46)

\( \lambda_4 \) represents the marginal increase in the impact of the journal that would occur if the association could subsidize readers. Replacing \( \lambda_4 \) in (44) with the expression in (46) gives:
\[ n_R q(n_A) c'(n_R) = Q^e(n_A) [c(n_R) - q(n_A)]. \] (47)

Since \((OA)\) is binding, we have that \( Q^e(n_A) = c(n_R) \). Rearranging (47) gives:
\[ q(n_A) = \frac{c(n_R)}{1 + \frac{n_R c'(n_R)}{c(n_R)}}. \] (48)

Therefore, the allocation chosen by the impact-maximizing organization under open access, denoted by \((n_A^{IM,OA}, n_R^{IM,OA})\), is characterized by (48) and \((OA)\).

In the iso-elastic case, it coincides with the allocation chosen by an open-access journal maximizing the utility of its readers. Indeed condition (25) (marginal quality equals average readers cost) coincides in this case with condition (48), since:
\[ C^a(n_R) = \frac{1}{n_R} \int_0^{n_R} c(y) dy = \frac{c(n_R)}{1 + \varepsilon_c} = \frac{c(n_R)}{1 + \frac{n_R c'(n_R)}{c(n_R)}}. \]

**Proposition 7**

(i) Under open access, the allocation chosen by an impact-maximizing journal \((n_A^{IM,OA}, n_R^{IM,OA})\) is characterized by \((OA)\) and (48).

(ii) In the iso-elastic case, it coincides with the allocation chosen by a journal who maximizes the utility of its readers.

Proposition 7 shows the robustness of our main conclusion, at least in the iso-elastic case. Independently of whether the journal maximizes its impact or the utility of its readers, it chooses the same quality standard, which is below the socially efficient level. Therefore, the move to open-access is likely to result in the publication of too many articles from a social welfare viewpoint.

### 7 Concluding remarks

We showed that in the case of an electronic journal, social welfare maximization implies open access in the second best world in which the subscription price cannot be negative.
This is because the marginal cost of distribution is zero, while readers exert positive externalities on the rest of society. We also examined the consequences of a move from the reader-pays model to the open-access model by considering academic journals run by not-for-profit associations. We considered both a reader-controlled association and an impact-maximizing association and found in both cases that this move is likely to lead to a decrease in journals’ quality below the socially optimal level. Although we were not able to prove this result in full generality, we have established it for a reasonably large class of distribution functions. The basic intuition behind it is simple: under open access, the association does not internalize the cost of publication (which is covered by authors) while under the reader-pays model, the association internalizes it. As long as those authors are not budget constrained, the association will choose to publish too many articles under open access. Our framework could be used to conduct similar analysis for other objectives of the journal: we could consider a profit-maximizing journal or a not-for-profit journal controlled by authors.

Even though we did not model library subscriptions under reader-pays model, our main results on the move from reader-pays and open access seem to be robust as long as we maintain the assumption that the journal charges a single subscription price. Note first that library subscription plays no role under open access. Under reader-pays model, as a first approximation, we can reinterpret a reader in our model as a group of readers for which a library makes the subscription decision. Then, a library will subscribe only if the total benefit of its group is larger than the sum of the subscription price and the total reading cost of its group. Hence, library subscription decisions would impose some discipline on the quality standard of the reader-pays model.

It would be interesting to extend our analysis to the case in which the journal can give an accepted article one among several ratings according to its quality. For instance, some B.E. journals in economics give one among three quality ratings (Advances, Contributions, Topics).

There are other interesting issues to study regarding open access journals. One of them is to know how the change in the pricing model affects competition among journals. There is a “bottleneck argument” according to which the change from reader-pays to open access would promote competition. Indeed, once articles are published in journals, each journal is a bottleneck and has a monopoly power on its content; however, at the submission stage (i.e. prior to publication) journals are substitutes and compete for attracting authors. We plan to examine this argument by considering competition between

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30For instance, see “there are two (non conflicting) theoretical possibilities for increasing price competition in the market: shift price competition to a level where journals are viewed as substitute rather than complement or make researchers and users more price sensitive” (Dewatripont et al., 2006, p.67).
for-profit journals within our framework and focusing on how the change of the pricing model affects quality standards of journals.
References


