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This paper presents the experience of 6 months of work (January to June 2022) with educators and young people aged 16-18 years from a socio-educational organisation in Raval, a vulnerable neighbourhood of Barcelona. It explores how peer governance practices could help young people to acquire conflict resolution skills. It also analyses the role of adults in the application of these practices, thus furthering the understanding of peer governance as a practice that enables people to co-decide, set limits by establishing specific rules and co-manage conflicts [Kostakis, V. (2010). Peer governance and Wikipedia: Identifying and understanding the problems of Wikipedia's governance. First Monday, 15(3)]. An action research methodology was developed for this purpose, based on the application and analysis of participatory workshops and ethnographic work. The results show how the process helps adolescents acquire conflict resolution skills in areas such as negotiation of interests, reaching consensus and distribution of roles. It also identifies how educators overestimate the need for an adult mediator. This article is part of a case study that was conducted in the framework of the Horizon 2020 project SMOOTH that explores educational commons as a catalyst for reversing social inequalities among young people in vulnerable contexts.
(2025) Palacios Esparza, María José
; Arciniega Cáceres, Mittzy; Figueras Maz, Mònica
According to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are transparent to all parties, a form of semantic descriptivism. This, at least, is the way in which Dworkin and his followers have interpreted Hart's positivist stance. The problem is that disagreements often arise on how to interpret the words of the law, and this fact seems to conflict with the emphasis of positivism on the idea of agreement, or so it is argued. If the meaning of legal terms depends on shared criteria, why do individuals disagree? And if they disagree, what does their disagreement consist in?
The discussion about how to account for interpretive disagreement can be seen as a discussion about how to account for the meaning of terms, and hence as a discussion about what kind of theory of meaning explains the existence of disagreement and the grounds for its resolution. In some cases a descriptivist approach to semantics seems to be correct, whereas other cases seem to speak in favor of non-descriptivist theories of reference.
In this work we will examine critically how two competing approaches to meaning account for disagreements. We will argue that Hart's conventionalist stance does not commit him to descriptivism. That non-descriptivist theories of reference, properly understood, can account for a vast array of cases of interpretive disagreement; that an account of different kinds of disagreement can be provided from a conventionalist perspective within the framework of non-descriptivist theories of reference, and hence that the dispute between Dworkinians and Hartians does not depend on Hart's commitment to one or another semantic theory. We argue that both in and out of the legal context, a host of non-semantic considerations have to be taken into account in the adjudication of disputes.
(2016) Ramírez-Ludeña, LorenaAn intuitive view of language is frequently assumed: words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. Such a view is generally understood as convention-based in the sense that it emphasises the existence of conventions that determine what descriptions are relevant. However, this descriptivist approach has been shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, the Causal Theory of Reference (CTR) provides a plausible account of our use of words. CTR has been understood to be a theory that provides a non-conventionalist approach to language and one that is committed to an implausible version of essentialism. In this chapter, Ramírez-Ludeña presents a version of CTR that addresses the criticisms it has normally received. She also shows the advantages of this version of CTR when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, CTR has been associated with non-positivistic conceptions about law. However, since CTR is not committed to essentialism but rather takes account of the way in which the community uses words, Ramírez-Ludeña also shows how the proposed model is compatible with conceptions in legal philosophy such as that of Hart, which emphasises the conventional character of law.
(2019) Ramírez-Ludeña, LorenaIn this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin's challenge.
(2016) Ramírez-Ludeña, LorenaWe discuss the 1818 case in which the jury sided with inspector J. Maurice, who had demanded payment for inspecting casks of whale oil. The verdict is arguably incorrect: as several experts argued, whales are not fish. However, a well-established use of "fish" at the time included whales. The jury relied on that meaning. Arguably, the verdict was also correct. Both responses are intrinsically plausible, albeit contradictory. It is often argued that the issue in this case is not about semantics, but about how content is determined by features of legal communication. Some authors try to elucidate how the content of legal texts is determined by pragmatic features. Others consider that there is always a gap between the content communicated by an act of legislation and its legal impact. Both positions try to assess whether the verdict of the jury was right. Here we will not adjudicate, nor will we try to provide an answer by determining the correct meaning of "fish". Our purpose is to understand the tension raised by the case. We claim that semantic and meta-semantic considerations are essential, and we propose two models that clarify the nature of the tension.
(2020) Martí G, Ramírez-Ludeña L