Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

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The American Economic Review, 94 (3), 785-795, June 2004
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/931
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/931
dc.contributor.author Ciccone, Antonio
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1998-03-01
dc.identifier.citation The American Economic Review, 94 (3), 785-795, June 2004
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/931
dc.description.abstract Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform being enacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because a majority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minority gaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, but it may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believe that they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to be sustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase the incentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit. Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform in future elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty. These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER, 1991).
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 537
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty
dc.title.alternative Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty: Comment
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-07-31T02:50:45Z
dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
dc.subject.keyword status-quo bias
dc.subject.keyword bias against reform
dc.subject.keyword individual-specific uncertainty
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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