Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening

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Shapiro, Joel. Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening. 2001
To cite or link this document: Shapiro, Joel
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2001-04-01
dc.description.abstract This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenance framework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability and the disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare the resulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the United States since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closely resemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that depends on the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare (unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor is unobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be used in that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and the presence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability and relative importance of the population's characteristics.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 544
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:34Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword welfare programs
dc.subject.keyword optimal taxation
dc.subject.keyword multidimensional screening
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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