How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

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Arruñada, Benito; González, Manuel. How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms. 1997
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/894
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/894
dc.contributor.author Arruñada, Benito
dc.contributor.author González, Manuel
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1997-11-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/894
dc.description.abstract Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity are usually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies with the performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shown by the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams and when specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeated team production induces all team members to take disciplinary action against underperformers through switching and separation decisions, however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when the markets for team members are competitive, even for large teams using specialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firms shows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentives the costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must be bellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational design defined by the use of a share system. It does not account for its existence, however.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 261
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:13:55Z
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.subject.keyword theory of the firm
dc.subject.keyword team production
dc.subject.keyword share contracts
dc.subject.keyword profit sharing
dc.subject.keyword remuneration systems
dc.subject.keyword self-enforcement
dc.subject.keyword fishing firms
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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