The donor problem

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Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew. The donor problem. 2004
To cite or link this document: Abbink, Klaus Ellman, Matthew
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2004-10-01
dc.description.abstract Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (e.g. by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor’s problem. In one treatment, the intermediary selects recipients. In the other, selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data, random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar, but intermediaries embezzle more when they have selection power and (correctly) expect fewer complaints.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 796
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title The donor problem
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2014-06-03T07:14:12Z
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
dc.subject.keyword development
dc.subject.keyword entitlement
dc.subject.keyword experiments
dc.subject.keyword fairness
dc.subject.keyword intermediaries
dc.subject.keyword monitoring
dc.subject.keyword targeting
dc.subject.keyword punishment.
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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