Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

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Aragonés, Enriqueta. Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition. 1994
To cite or link this document: Aragonés, Enriqueta
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 1994-08-01
dc.description.abstract We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economic performance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies, and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation of political parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 273
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2014-06-03T07:13:55Z
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword negativity effect
dc.subject.keyword ideology
dc.subject.keyword party formation
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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