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dc.contributor.author
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Ueda, Masako |
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dc.contributor.other
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
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dc.date.accessioned
|
2012-07-11T02:07:45Z |
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dc.date.available
|
2012-07-11T02:07:45Z |
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dc.date.issued
|
2005-09-15T23:21:40Z |
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dc.identifier.uri
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http://hdl.handle.net/10230/845 |
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dc.description.abstract
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Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To answer this question, I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectual property rights are not well protected. The upside of VC financing is that the VC understands the business better than a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC may steal the idea and use it himself. The results of the model are consistent with empirical regularities on start-up financing. The model implies that the characteristics of the firms financing from venture capitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that the tighter protection of intellectual property rights contributes to the recent dramatic growth of the US venture capital industry. |
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dc.language.iso
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eng |
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dc.rights.uri
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Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
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dc.subject.other
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Collateral, intellectual-property, venture-capital |
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dc.title
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Bank versus Venture Capital |
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dc.type
|
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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dc.date.modified
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2012-07-10T07:27:20Z |
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