dc.contributor.author Ueda, Masako
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-11T02:07:45Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-11T02:07:45Z
dc.date.issued 2005-09-15T23:21:40Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/845
dc.description.abstract Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To answer this question, I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectual property rights are not well protected. The upside of VC financing is that the VC understands the business better than a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC may steal the idea and use it himself. The results of the model are consistent with empirical regularities on start-up financing. The model implies that the characteristics of the firms financing from venture capitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that the tighter protection of intellectual property rights contributes to the recent dramatic growth of the US venture capital industry.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights.uri Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.subject.other Collateral, intellectual-property, venture-capital
dc.title Bank versus Venture Capital
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2012-07-10T07:27:20Z

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