Long-run selection and the work ethic

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Josephson, Jens; Wärneryd, Karl. Long-run selection and the work ethic. 2004
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/745
dc.contributor.author Josephson, Jens
dc.contributor.author Wärneryd, Karl
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2004-09-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/745
dc.description.abstract That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 774
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Long-run selection and the work ethic
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2016-06-04T02:50:46Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword work ethic
dc.subject.keyword evolution
dc.subject.keyword group selection
dc.subject.keyword public goods
dc.subject.keyword stochastic dynamics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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