|
|
| dc.contributor.author | Garoupa, Nuno |
| dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-07-11T02:07:34Z |
| dc.date.available | 2012-07-11T02:07:34Z |
| dc.date.issued | 2005-09-15T23:17:08Z |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/691 |
| dc.description.abstract | The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them. |
| dc.language.iso | eng |
| dc.rights.uri | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
| dc.subject.other | Crime, probability and severity of sanctions, law enforcement |
| dc.title | Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.date.modified | 2012-07-10T07:27:31Z |
| See full text | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Files | Size | Format | View |
| 454.pdf | 123.3Kb | application/pdf |
View/ |
