Immigration policy with partisan parties

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Journal of Public Economics, 95(1-2), 134-142, 2011
To cite or link this document: Llavador, Humberto Solano-García, Angel
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2009-08-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Public Economics, 95(1-2), 134-142, 2011
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfare through economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1169
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Immigration policy with partisan parties
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:51:07Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword immigration
dc.subject.keyword ideological parties
dc.subject.keyword unskilled and skilled labor
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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