Credit cycles in theory and experiment

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Games and Economic Behavior, 36, (2001), pp. 105-137
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/548
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/548
dc.contributor.author Bosch-Domènech, Antoni
dc.contributor.author Sáez, María
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1999-01-01
dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior, 36, (2001), pp. 105-137
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/548
dc.description.abstract We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model provides conditions for the existence of credit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seem to be good approximations of the experimental results.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 351
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Credit cycles in theory and experiment
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:13:58Z
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.subject.keyword cycles
dc.subject.keyword evolutionary dynamics
dc.subject.keyword games
dc.subject.keyword experiments
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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