A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Econometrica, 68, 5, (2000), pp. 1127-1150,
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/525
dc.contributor.author Hart, Sergiu
dc.contributor.author Mas-Colell, Andreu
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1996-03-01
dc.identifier.citation Econometrica, 68, 5, (2000), pp. 1127-1150,
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/525
dc.description.abstract We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive procedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 200
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2016-06-04T02:50:18Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword correlated equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword nash equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword adaptive prodedure
dc.subject.keyword regret
dc.subject.keyword blackwell approachability
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

See full text
This document is licensed under a Creative Commons license:


Advanced Search


My Account