Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

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International Review of Economcis and Finance, vol.11, 2002
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/517
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/517
dc.contributor.author Di Giorgio, Giorgio
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1999-09-01
dc.identifier.citation International Review of Economcis and Finance, vol.11, 2002
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/517
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 410
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:00Z
dc.subject.keyword Finance and Accounting
dc.subject.keyword financial intermediation
dc.subject.keyword costly state verification
dc.subject.keyword constrained pareto optimality
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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