It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

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Political Studies, 53, 1, pp. 1-21, 2005
To cite or link this document: Colomer, Josep M.
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2005-03-01
dc.identifier.citation Political Studies, 53, 1, pp. 1-21, 2005
dc.description.abstract This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 812
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:48Z
dc.subject.keyword Economic and Business History
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword elections
dc.subject.keyword electoral systems
dc.subject.keyword political parties
dc.subject.keyword institutional equilibrium
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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