Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

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Litschig, Stephan. Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil. 2008
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
Per citar o enllaçar aquest document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
dc.contributor.author Litschig, Stephan
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2008-08-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1144
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2016-09-29T02:50:34Z
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword bureaucracy
dc.subject.keyword institutions
dc.subject.keyword redistributive politics
dc.subject.keyword electoral competition
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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