Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Litschig, Stephan. Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil. 2008
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
dc.contributor.author Litschig, Stephan
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2008-08-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583
dc.description.abstract Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates, I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formula were manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent with swing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition or conservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus on discretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1144
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:24Z
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword bureaucracy
dc.subject.keyword institutions
dc.subject.keyword redistributive politics
dc.subject.keyword electoral competition
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


See full text
This document is licensed under a Creative Commons license:

Search


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics