On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

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Talluri, Kalyan. On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces. 2003
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/451
dc.contributor.author Talluri, Kalyan
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2003-07-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/451
dc.description.abstract We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 701
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:09Z
dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
dc.subject.keyword duopoly
dc.subject.keyword equilibria
dc.subject.keyword revenue management
dc.subject.keyword discrete-choice theory
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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