On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces

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dc.contributor.author	Talluri, Kalyan T.
dc.contributor.other	Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned	2012-07-11T02:07:18Z
dc.date.available	2012-07-11T02:07:18Z
dc.date.issued	2005-09-15T23:37:04Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/451
dc.description.abstract	We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights.uri	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.subject.other	Duopoly, equilibria, revenue management, discrete-choice theory
dc.title	On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified	2012-07-10T07:27:22Z