On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

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Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56, pp. 701-713, 2004
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/411
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/411
dc.contributor.author Ciccone, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Costain, James
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2001-04-01
dc.identifier.citation Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56, pp. 701-713, 2004
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/411
dc.description.abstract Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models in two ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where they are unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviour is smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous. However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedback or guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuous choice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback, depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positive feedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robust to heterogeneity.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 546
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:05Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword heterogeneity
dc.subject.keyword multiplicity
dc.subject.keyword discrete choice
dc.subject.keyword strategic complementarity
dc.subject.keyword positive feedback
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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