Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Garoupa, Nuno; Gómez, Fernando. Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. 2002
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/391
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/391
dc.contributor.author Garoupa, Nuno
dc.contributor.author Gómez, Fernando
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2002-07-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/391
dc.description.abstract Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. This paper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior. Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those of the client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We show that the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem with multiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm) collide with the interests of the other principal (client).
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 639
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:07Z
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.subject.keyword law firms
dc.subject.keyword legal fees
dc.subject.keyword moral hazard
dc.subject.keyword risk-sharing
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


See full text
This document is licensed under a Creative Commons license:

Search


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account

Statistics