Bargaining, coalitions and competition

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Economic Theory, 15, 279-296, 2000
To cite or link this document: Dagan, Nir Serrano, Roberto Volij, Oscar
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 1996-06-01
dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory, 15, 279-296, 2000
dc.description.abstract We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalence results between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the case of indivisible goods.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 178
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Bargaining, coalitions and competition
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:17Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword finite coalitions
dc.subject.keyword strategic bargaining
dc.subject.keyword core
dc.subject.keyword walrasian equilibrium
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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