On p-beauty contest integer games

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López, Rafael. On p-beauty contest integer games. 2001
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/345
dc.contributor.author López, Rafael
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 2001-12-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/345
dc.description.abstract In this paper we provide a full characterization of the pure-strategy Nash Equilibria for the p-Beauty Contest Game when we restrict player’s choices to integer numbers. Opposed to the case of real number choices, equilibrium uniqueness may be lost depending on the value of p and the number of players: in particular, as p approaches 1 any symmetric profile constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. We also show that any experimental p-Beauty Contest Game can be associated to a game with the integer restriction and thus multiplicity of equilibria becomes an issue. Finally, we show that in these games the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies may not lead to a single outcome while the iterated best-reply process always does (though the outcome obtained depends on the initial conditions).
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 608
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title On p-beauty contest integer games
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:14:06Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword beauty contest
dc.subject.keyword multiple equilibria
dc.subject.keyword iterated dominance
dc.subject.keyword iterated best-reply
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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