Competition amongst contests

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Azmat, Ghazala; Möller, Marc. Competition amongst contests. 2008
To cite or link this document: Azmat, Ghazala Möller, Marc
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2008-02-01
dc.description.abstract This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players? aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests? randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1072
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Competition amongst contests
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:51:01Z
dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword contests
dc.subject.keyword allocation of prizes
dc.subject.keyword participation
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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