The informational value of incumbency

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Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 11 (5):775 - 798, 2009
To cite or link this document: Llavador, Humberto Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2006-04-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 11 (5):775 - 798, 2009
dc.description.abstract This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 962
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title The informational value of incumbency
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:56Z
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.subject.keyword incumbency
dc.subject.keyword information
dc.subject.keyword candidate quality
dc.subject.keyword selection bias
dc.subject.keyword ideology
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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