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dc.contributor.author | McNally, Louise, 1965- |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-03-03T13:38:48Z |
dc.date.available | 2015-03-03T13:38:48Z |
dc.date.issued | 1998 |
dc.identifier.citation | McNally L. Existential sentences with existential quantification. Linguist Philos. 1998;21(4):353-92. DOI 10.1023/A:1005389330615. |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-0157 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/23159 |
dc.description | The analysis to be proposed has two notable consequences. First, it indicates that while presupposition may play a role in accounting for the so-called definiteness restriction associated with the construction, presupposition cannot account for all of the definiteness restriction facts-in fact, on the view defended here, the definiteness restriction facts cannot be explained by a single generalization. Second, it supports the view that the notions weak and strong should be redefined as suggested in Ladusaw 1994, where “weak” is essentially equated with “nonparticular-denoting”. |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.publisher | Springer |
dc.relation.ispartof | Linguistics and Philosophy. 1998;21(4):353-92 |
dc.rights | © Springer (The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com) |
dc.subject.other | Anglès -- Semàntica |
dc.subject.other | Anglès -- Sintaxi |
dc.title | Existential sentences with existential quantification |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |