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dc.contributor.author | Motta, Massimo |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z |
dc.date.issued | 1995-11-01 |
dc.identifier | https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=147 |
dc.identifier.citation | Ricerche Economiche, 50, (1996), pp. 293-315 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20729 |
dc.description.abstract | D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integrated world economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that: 1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantage over foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policy game, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contrary to other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result, welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation. 4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition is formed. |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 147 |
dc.rights | L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title | Research joint ventures in an international economy |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified | 2017-07-23T02:02:15Z |
dc.subject.keyword | Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |