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| dc.contributor.author | Eeckhout, Jan |
| dc.contributor.author | Persico, Nicola |
| dc.contributor.author | Todd, Petra |
| dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament de Comunicació |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-07-05T01:54:21Z |
| dc.date.available | 2012-07-05T01:54:21Z |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/16064 |
| dc.description.abstract | An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction. |
| dc.language.iso | eng |
| dc.rights.uri | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri | (c) 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104 |
| dc.subject.other | Crackdowns |
| dc.subject.other | 0 - Generalitats |
| dc.title | A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.date.modified | 2012-07-04T10:46:52Z |
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| aer.100.3.pdf | 918.2Kb | application/pdf |
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