Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

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Games and Economic Behavior (2007) 60: 135-154
To cite or link this document: Germano, Fabrizio Lugosi, Gábor
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2004-10-01
dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior (2007) 60: 135-154
dc.description.abstract We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learning rule introduced by Foster and Young.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 788
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:46Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword regret testing
dc.subject.keyword regret based learning
dc.subject.keyword random search
dc.subject.keyword stochastic dynamics
dc.subject.keyword uncoupled dynamics
dc.subject.keyword global convergence to nash equilibria
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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