An experiment on Nash implementation

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Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229
dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Charness, Gary
dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1998-06-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229
dc.description.abstract We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 300
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title An experiment on Nash implementation
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:13:56Z
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.subject.keyword implementation
dc.subject.keyword experiments
dc.subject.keyword mechanisms
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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