An experiment on Nash implementation

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Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,
To cite or link this document: Cabrales, Antonio Charness, Gary Corchón, Luis
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 1998-06-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,
dc.description.abstract We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 300
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title An experiment on Nash implementation
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:22Z
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.subject.keyword implementation
dc.subject.keyword experiments
dc.subject.keyword mechanisms
dc.subject.keyword leex
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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