Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Journal of Economic Theory, 86, (1999), pp. 159-184
To cite or link this document: Cabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 1996-07-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 86, (1999), pp. 159-184
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonly used against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts, the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literature on implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that the mechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (in contrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple'' mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements should be interpreted with some caution.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 179
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2016-06-04T02:50:17Z
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword implementation
dc.subject.keyword bounded rationality
dc.subject.keyword evolutionary dynamics
dc.subject.keyword mechanisms
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

See full text
This document is licensed under a Creative Commons license:


Advanced Search


My Account