Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

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Mulligan, Casey B.; Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security. 1999
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1124
To cite or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1124
dc.contributor.author Mulligan, Casey B.
dc.contributor.author Sala-i-Martin, Xavier
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.issued 1999-04-01
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1124
dc.description.abstract Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross- country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 383
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2014-06-03T07:13:59Z
dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
dc.subject.keyword social security
dc.subject.keyword retirement
dc.subject.keyword gerontocracy
dc.subject.keyword lobby
dc.subject.keyword pressure groups
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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